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I   THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TORT OF PASSING-OFF 
 
A  Introduction 
 
1 Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the historical development of the tort of passing-off. 
Morison said that the term “passing off” indicates the act of offering goods for 
sale with an accompanying misrepresentation, either by words or by conduct as to 
the origin of the goods, whereby the purchaser has been misled and business has 
been diverted from the plaintiff to the defendant.1 It is called a strict liability tort 
because the plaintiff does not need to show any wrongful intention on the part of 
the defendant, fraud apparently having been abandoned as an element for proof in 
the tort of passing-off. 
 
The composite research question of the thesis is in two parts, as follows: ‘Has the 
historical development of the tort of passing off resulted in the tort becoming a 
strict liability tort? If so, why and how did this development take place?’ 
 
The tort of passing-off derives from the direct rule by the English Kings of earlier 
times, and was developed both as a general regulatory instrument to control industry, 
and in particular to make industry more war-ready.2 The tort of passing-off has a 
very substantial history in the jurisprudence of the medieval and late middle ages 
craft gilds and counties of the United Kingdom. The purpose of this thesis is to set 
out how the tort developed from the ordinances of gild and county jurisprudence into 
the royal courts, and to see whether, why and how from that form of development it 
developed as a strict liability tort. 
 
The thesis will make these five suggestions. (i) The tort of passing-off was put 
together from strict liability prerogative writs, customary commercial laws and gild 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 W L Morison ‘Unfair Competition and “Passing-Off” The flexibility of a formula’ (1956) 2 Sydney 
Law Review, 50-65, 56. 
2 See, for example, the development of the argument in F I Schechter The Historical Foundations of 
the Law Relating to Trademarks (Columbia University Press, 1925), chapters 1-6. 
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ordinances. (ii) A hierarchy of graphic marks signified commercial ranks, from royal 
seals down to artisan trademarks, inferring reverse onus liability for infringement of 
use. (iii) The Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case3 failed because the case was pleaded 
in a reverse onus jurisdiction. (iv) The classical trinity of passing-off signalled re-
emergent commercial customary law, a breach of which was characterized as 
commercial fraud, and dealt with on a reverse onus basis. (v) The thesis will suggest 
that passing-off is a strict liability tort. 
 
2 Research Question and Objectives 
 
The composite research question of the thesis is in two parts, as follows: ‘Has the 
historical development of the tort of passing off resulted in the tort becoming a strict 
liability tort? If so, why and how did this development take place?’ 
 
The thesis research question developed from the following steps. Professor Wadlow 
wrote a detailed history of the tort of passing-off, first published in 1990.4 Laddie J 
cited in obiter Wadlow’s account of the history of passing-off in the 2003 case of 
Inter Lotto (UK) Ltd v Camelot Group Plc.5 According toWadlow’s history of 
passing-off, Lord Parker’s speech in Spalding v Gamage6 eliminated from the tort of 
passing-off a previous restriction to misrepresentation. This earlier restriction 
provided that the goods or business of the defendant must belong to the plaintiff. 
Also, in Spalding v Gamage,7 Lord Parker explained the tort of passing-off in terms 
of protecting a property right. His Lordship described this right as being the property 
the plaintiff owned in the goodwill of this business. Wadlow concludes from these 
two judicial statements that the tort of passing-off came to be treated as protecting a 
kind of property. He stated that this made it convenient for the courts to abandon the 
previous requirement proof of fraud in the tort of passing-off. Wadlow concludes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Later identified by Professor Baker as J G v Samford (1584) unrep, in J H Baker An Introduction to 
English Legal History (Butterworths, 4th ed, 1990), 459. 
4 C Wadlow The Law of Passing-off, Unfair Competition by Misrepresentation (Sweet & Maxwell, 
3rd ed, 2004), 21, et seq. 
5 [2003] 3 All ER 191, 197-200. 
6 (1915) 84 LJ Ch 449, 449-454. 
7 (1915) 84 LJ Ch 449, 450. 
3	  
	  
that this elimination of any requirement for proof of fraud was what made passing-
off a strict liability tort.8 
 
Wadlow limits his history of passing-off to a time frame commencing after the 1584 
Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case.9 Wadlow’s history suggests a research gap in 
describing the first entry of the tort into the royal courts. It did not seek to clarify the 
role of the tort’s prehistory in the tort’s development. The literature tended to dismiss 
the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case10 as of only passing significance, but still refers 
to this case as creating a conundrum about the tort’s development. In this context, in 
order to address the research question, the thesis has the following objectives: 
(a) to provide an overview of the legal norms underlying the origins of the tort 
deriving from a hierarchy of gilds, counties and the crown, with restricted resort 
to the Royal Courts;  
(b) to discuss the seminal 16th Century Elizabethan Gloucestershire Clothier’s 
Case,11 in the context of how the later tort both began and completed the passage 
from gild and county jurisprudence into the royal courts system; 
(c) to examine the so-called completion phase and more protean nature of the tort 
of passing-off in the context of the character of good-will, fraud and causation 
and as set out in the case Erven Warnick BV v Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd,12 
(‘Advocaat Case’). 
(d) to examine the original elements of the tort of passing-off within ancient legal 
custom and pleading narratives, to reveal a dynamic that influenced the shape of 
the law.13  This thesis sets out to identify these underlying elements, customs and 
narratives so that scholars can rethink and re-evaluate current views of the tort of 
passing-off to suit changing commercial and consumer needs.14 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Wadlow, above 4, 32. 
9 Later identified by Professor Baker as J G v Samford (1584) unrep, in J H Baker An Introduction to 
English Legal History (Butterworths, 4th ed, 1990), 459. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 [1979] AC 731, 739-748. 
13 For the relevance of a qualitative legal historical study, see Jane Elizabeth Anderson, Ph D The 
production of indigenous knowledge in intellectual property law (Doctoral thesis at University of 
New South Wales, 2004). 
14 For the relevance of a qualitative legal historical study, see the following. Ulla Secher, Ph D A 
conceptual analysis of the origins, application and implications of the doctrine of radical title of the 
crown in Australia: An inhabited settled colony (Doctoral thesis at University of New South Wales, 
2003). For relevance based on ancient legend within the development of the common law, also see 
Ryan Muckerheide, Ph D English laws and customs in Sir Thomas Malory's "Le Morte 
Darthur" (Doctoral thesis at Arizona State University, 2010). For the relevance of a qualitative legal 
historical study, see Alan Verskin, Ph D Early Islamic legal responses to living under Christian 
rule: Reconquista-era development and 19th-century impact in the Maghrib (Doctoral thesis at 
Princeton University, 2010). 
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3 Background 
 
According to Morison, the term passing-off indicates the act of offering goods for 
sale with an accompanying misrepresentation either by words or by conduct as to 
the origin of the goods, whereby the purchaser has been misled and business has 
been diverted from the plaintiff to the defendant.15 It is commonly called a strict 
liability tort because the plaintiff does not need to show any wrongful intention on 
the part of the defendant, fraud apparently having been abandoned as an element 
of proof of the tort of passing-off. The tort of passing-off is unlike other torts in 
that it has a very substantial history in the jurisprudence of the medieval and late 
middle ages craft guilds and County Courts of the United Kingdom. The purpose 
of this thesis is to set out how the tort developed and transferred from Guild and 
County jurisprudence into the Royal Courts jurisdictions, and to see whether why 
and how from within that style of development it developed as a strict liability 
tort. 
 
In the nineteenth century, the courts of law generally agreed that passing-off 
actions were questions of fact rather than questions of law, while the courts of 
equity performed the work of discovering the legal right they would protect. If the 
reported cases can be relied upon to represent the development of the tort, then it 
appears from them that passing-off was successful in equity before the time of any 
successful cause of action in the common law courts.16 
 
As the gist of passing-off came to be more understood in terms of damage to 
property, the fraud element was said to have dissolved. Lord Westbury’s 
interpretation of the law in terms of property rights was based on a theory of 
common law trade mark infringement, which cause of action was not clearly 
distinguished from the tort of passing-off during his Lordship’s time. Goodwill 
did not become a substantive element of the tort until much later, in the early 20th 
century, after almost 30 years in which hardly any court dealt with the tort of 
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16 Wadlow, above 4, 16. 
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passing-off on the basis of property rights.17 However, the sale of goodwill had 
been discussed and began its development in case-law as early as the 1620 case of 
Broad v Jollyfe.18 
 
The action to restrain the defendant from passing-off his goods as the goods of the 
plaintiff is the generalized form of the action to restrain the infringement of a 
trade mark.19 Wadlow sets out the three essential elements of the tort of passing-
off as misrepresentation, damage and goodwill, and, as well, the ostensibly 
obsolete element of fraud, inferring an ad hoc structure to the tort.20 
 
It is possible that an ad hoc nature of passing-off may be explained by examining 
how it had emerged as a distinct tort. Thus, the following passage was quoted by 
Lord Halsbury in Magnolia Metal Co v Tandem Smelting Syndicate Ltd21 to show 
not only the great antiquity of passing-off, but also to infer the emergence of the 
tort from the restrictive confines of Guild and County jurisprudence. 
An action upon the case was brought in the Common Pleas by a 
clothier, that whereas he had gained great reputation for his making of 
his cloth, and by reason whereof he had great utterance to his great 
benefit and profit, and that he used to set his mark upon the cloth, 
whereby it should be known to be his cloth, and another clothier 
perceiving it, used the same mark to his ill-made cloth on purpose to 
deceive him, it was resolved that an action did well lie.22 
 
The case referred to by Lord Halsbury in the above quote has been identified by 
Baker23 as the Samford case,24 also known as the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case, 
heard during the time of Elizabeth I, in which the plaintiff, a clothier, brought an 
action on the case for deceit and was apparently unsuccessful, because a majority 
of the Court held the matter to be damnum absque injuria.25 This case seemingly 
demonstrated that the courts were not willing to recognize the common law action 
in passing-off. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Ibid. 
18 (1620) Cro Jac 596, 597; 79 ER 509. 
19 D M Kerly The Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names (Sweet & Maxwell, 1913), 529. 
20 Wadlow, above 4, 16. 
21 (1900) 17 RPC 477, 477-486, HL. 
22 (1900) 17 RPC 477, 484, HL. 
23 Baker, above 9, 459. 
24 JG v Samford (1584) (unreported). 
25 Loss without injury compensable at law. 
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The case is reproduced by Baker & Milsom26 from contemporary manuscripts,27 
beginning with the meaningful designation of the plaintiff as a clothier, clothiers 
having been great adherents of exclusive Guild and County jurisprudence 
sustained by the force of Royal Charter.28 
 
Baker’s translated record29 of the case, at variance with the above statement of 
Lord Halsbury, reports that, although the eminent rival clothier action brought the 
action, no judgment was entered because the court was evenly divided. Peryam 
and Mead JJ had found it to be a case of damnum absque injuria, Wyndham J 
suggested that he would find for the plaintiff upon proof of a breach of an 
applicable statute regulating the use of marks by clothiers,30 and only Anderson 
CJ held the defendant liable at common law. In consequence of this, Wadlow 
dismisses Samford’s Case,31 without further analysis, as a mere isolated example, 
which he said did not appear to have contributed much to the development of 
passing-off, either then, or later.32 
 
Baker also found Samford’s Case33 in an alternate manuscript in the Harvard Law 
School collection,34 reporting the facts and outcomes in slightly different terms. 
Also, Dodderidge J cited it in Southern v How.35 Although it was known to later 
courts only from these early reminiscences,36 Southern v How37 has acquired 
weight as authority for the proposition that unauthorised use of a common law 
trade-mark is unlawful and could be subject to an action on the case for deceit. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 J H Baker and S F C Milsom Sources of English Legal History – Private Law to 1750 
(Butterworths, 1986), 617, citing HLS MS 2071, fo 86. 
27 Cory’s entries, BL MS Hargrave 123, fo 168v. 
28 See E Bain Merchant and craft guild : a history of the Aberdeen Incorporated Trades (J and J P 
Edmond & Spark Aberdeen, 1887), where the author has included some relevant Royal Charters. 
29 Translated into English from what has been generally characterized as “Anglo-Norman”, in Cory’s 
entries, BL MS Hargrave 123, fo 168v. 
30 27 Hen VIII c12. 
31 JG v Samford (1584) (unreported). 
32 Wadlow, above 4, 19. 
33 JG v Samford (1584) (unreported). 
34 HLS MS 2071, fo 86 at Harvard Law School. 
35 (1618) Cro Jac 468, 471; Poph 144 
36 See Blanchard v Hill (1742) 2 Atk 484 
37 (1618) Cro Jac 468, 471; Poph 144 
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Schechter’s view was that any systematic attempt to trace the history of trademark 
law up to the time when it began to be administered by the King’s Courts, or to 
consider modern trademark law in the light of this history, must be through 
channels and from sources regarded as somewhat unorthodox from a 
contemporary legal standpoint.38 This includes usages from sources, which were 
not courts of record. Thus, for example, although the Leet courts39 dealt with 
trademark matters up until the 16th century, these matters were confined to 
enforcement by periodic fines relying on the force of statutes providing for 
compulsory affixing of marks by specified trades.40 
 
In order to discover the early phases of modern trademark law and passing-off in 
medieval commerce, before their separation into distinct causes of action, one 
must consult the records of the merchant and craft guild organizations. Medieval 
trade was largely conducted through guilds,41 in which prevention of litigation 
among the guildsmen, outside the guild courts, was enforced by disciplinary 
punishment for litigation at law without guild consent.42 The guilds had practiced 
their own internal system of jurisprudence.43 
 
By 1870, there appear to have been at least three interconnected bodies of law. 
There was the common law action for passing-off, of little practical importance 
because fraud had to be proved and damages were the only remedy. There was the 
equitable action of passing-off, which could result in the grant of an injunction 
without proof of purpose to deceive or defraud. There was the more recent 
doctrine of property in trademarks by which infringement was a wrong, whether 
or not there was knowledge or intent. Although the law of passing-off was 
evolving quite rapidly in the 1870s, judges generally claimed that they were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Schechter, above 2, 13. 
39 The Courts Leet were courts of record in England, presided over by the steward of the manor Their 
jurisdiction was to view the freemen's oath of peacekeeping and good practice in trade, and also to 
try by jury, and punish all crimes committed within the jurisdiction. The courts leet were formally 
abolished in 1977. 
40 Schechter, above 2, 14. 
41 An allusion to the governing system of commercial dispute resolution within the guilds. 
42 Schechter, above 2, 30. 
43 Schechter, above 2, 16. 
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merely applying settled principles of law to the facts of each case.44 In addition to 
this more natural evolution, came the Judicature Act 1873 (UK) and the Trade-
Marks Registration Act 1875 (UK). The Judicature Act 1873 (UK) was said to 
have had the ultimate effect of destroying the element of property, as it then was 
defined, in an action for passing-off.45 
 
Wadlow suggests that passing-off came of age in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century, as during this time there were a series of cases, briefly set out as follows, 
which defined much of the law that still applies today.46 Singer v Loog47 settled 
that passing-off is based on misrepresentation of secondary meanings, rather than 
trade mark rights. Johnston v Orr-Ewing48 is still cited in cases on instruments of 
deception, liability for exports and the “idea of the mark”. Montgomery v 
Thompson49 confirmed that a place name could be distinctive and that it was no 
defence that the defendant produced his goods in a place of that name. Reddaway 
v Banham50 extended the doctrine in Montgomery v Thompson51 to prima facie 
descriptive terms of every type and settled the modern law of secondary meaning. 
Powell v Birmingham Vinegar Brewery52 stated expressly that the plaintiff need 
not be known by name, and introduced the idea of passing-off by misdescription, 
later to be rejected in Magnolia Metal v Tandem Smelting Syndicate53 wherein the 
court strongly indicated that only misrepresentation as to source was actionable. 
Cellular Clothing v Maxton & Murray54 confirmed that Reddaway v Banham55 
was good law. Lever v Goodwin56 in the Court of Appeal protected get-up in its 
own right for the first time. Payton v Snelling, Lampard57 laid down much of the 
modern law for get-up cases. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Wadlow, above 4, 32. 
45 Wadlow, above 4, 28 
46 Wadlow, above 4, 30. 
47 (1879) 11 Ch D 656, 656-662. 
48 (1882) 7 App Cas 219, 219-233. 
49 [1891] AC 217, 217-228. 
50 [1896] AC 199, 199-222. 
51 [1891] AC 217, 217-228. 
52 [1897] AC 710, 710-718. 
53 (1900) 17 RPC 477, 477-486. 
54 [1899] AC 326, 326-347. 
55 [1896] AC 199, 199-222. 
56 [1887] 36 Ch D 1, 1-8. 
57 (1900) 17 RPC 48, 48-67. 
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Although Wadlow said that Lord Parker’s speech in Spalding v Gamage58 gave 
the tort of passing-off its modern basis as a strict liability tort,59 jurisprudence 
from medieval times suggests a much earlier source of strict liability. First, Lord 
Parker’s speech in Spalding v Gamage60 eliminated the previous restriction to 
misrepresentation that the goods or business of the defendant, were those 
specifically of the plaintiff. Second, he explained passing-off in terms of 
protecting a property right, the right being the property the plaintiff had in the 
goodwill of this business. With passing-off now treated as protecting property, the 
courts found it easy to abandon the requirement for proof of fraud even as a legal 
fiction. This was said to have made passing-off a strict liability tort.61 Wadlow 
states62 that the history of the tort of passing-off was substantially complete with 
the 1979 House of Lords decision in Erven Warnick BV v Townend & Sons (Hull) 
Ltd. 63 In this case, Lord Diplock described the tort of passing off as more protean 
than other actions.64 His Lordship may have been referring to the multiform and 
undefined nature of the underlying issue of fraud. 
 
As stated above, Wadlow notes that Lord Parker’s speech in Spalding v Gamage65 
gave passing-off its modern basis.66 Lord Parker’s speech had the following two 
consequences: (a) passing-off was confirmed as a tort of misrepresentation and 
removed the previous restriction to misrepresentation that the goods or business were 
that of the plaintiff; (b) passing-off was now explained as protection of the property 
right of the plaintiff in the goodwill of its business.67 The latter outcome adopted the 
following definition of goodwill as “the attractive force, which brings in custom”.  
However, there is strong evidence that the general unifying concept for goodwill is 
the value in the probability of the business continuing to maintain its authority to 
induce custom. This unifying concept had developed over a series of cases beginning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 (1915) 84 LJ Ch 449, 449-454. 
59	  Wadlow, above 4, 32.	  
60 (1915) 84 LJ Ch 449, 449, 450. 
61 Wadlow, above 4, 32. 
62 Wadlow, above 4, 34. 
63 [1979] AC 731, 731-756. 
64 [1979] AC 731, 740. 
65 (1915) 84 LJ Ch 449, 449-454. 
66 Wadlow, above 4, 32. 
67 (1915) 84 LJ Ch 449, 449, 450. 
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in 1620 and becoming virtually settled by the time of Lord Eldon’s definition of 
goodwill in Cruttwell v Lye.68 This definition of goodwill meant that goodwill was 
uniquely prone to damage by that kind of misrepresentation, which was the 
substance of passing-off. 
 
4 Significance 
 
The significance of the thesis will be its clarification of the concept of strict liability 
as applied to the tort of passing-off. It examines the nature of consumers waiving 
their rights to pre-purchase inspection, and the crown stepping in for their protection. 
It is expected that the research will show that the tort of passing-off is a continuing 
residue from the age of direct control by the crown. 
 
This thesis contributes to knowledge by adding to the pool of historical research into 
those legal issues affecting the relationship between buyers and sellers of goods. The 
thesis discusses re-emergent ancient customary laws, and their modes of 
metamorphosis from proscribed statutory criminal wrongs into civil actions, in the 
context of passing-off. It will suggest a relationship between common law 
prerogative actions and the tort of passing-off. It also will suggest the development 
of the law of graphical representations as a system cognate to the prevailing 
commercial/social structure and superintended by the crown. 
 
The thesis will suggest a factual context to the Samford Case,69 propose possible 
questions to be satisfied in a mesne judgment for it, and examine a common law 
doctrine of secondary meaning arising from it. The thesis will suggest the make-up 
of a bundle of property-related rights within business goodwill and propose a 
relevant relationship between damage to goodwill, fraud and strict liability. 
 
Although this research is historical, it has continuing modern-day implications, 
because it seeks to provide a meta-discourse to the development of the law of 
passing-off, by means of narrative analysis. It continues to be an important gauge of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 (1810) 17 Ves Jr 334, 346. 
69 JG v Samford (1584) (unreported). 
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implied public consent for policy makers trying to get the balance right in protecting 
the rights of sellers to generate profits and protecting the rights of buyers not to be 
sold something that is not what they are expecting. 
 
5 Research Method 
 
This thesis is one of legal history by legal narrative analysis, where various historical 
sequences of events are presented only insofar as they relate to the facts of a state of 
affairs. According to D’Angelo, legal narrative analysis characteristically leads to 
propositions, which are either confirmed or refuted by inductive examples.70 The 
research is literature-based and qualitative. The literature review necessarily is 
interwoven throughout the thesis, because the thesis is limited in scope by its task of 
identifying strict liability within the development of the tort of passing-off. In ths 
context, the thesis seeks out nascent forms of modern legal concepts. The thesis style 
is from the Australian Guide to Legal Citation, 3rd edition. The research focuses on 
primary legal sources, such as the relevant case law, statutes and government 
documents. Because the thesis content is an exercise in legal historiography, it also 
builds on views expressed in secondary legal sources, such as scholarly journal 
articles, books and authoritative reports arising from certain old manuscripts. In all 
cases, it focuses on sources with the earliest possible publication dates, in order to 
enhance historical accuracy of interpretation. For old legal terms, the Oxford English 
Dictionary is used where possible, to avoid applying modern definitions. This is 
because the Oxford English Dictionary contains entries of specifically legal 
meanings annotated with the usage dates of the meanings. 
 
Generally defined, law research exists within the two categories of primary and 
secondary sources. Primary sources are authoritative records of law made by law-
making authorities. Secondary sources are all publications pertaining to law, which 
are not records of legal rules.71 Thus, primary sources are the law as stated, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Frank J D’Angelo, Composition in the Classical Tradition (Allyn and Bacon, 2000), 22, 23. 
71 Enid Campbell, Lee Poh-York, Joycey Tooher Legal Research Materials and Methods (LBC 
Information Services, 4th ed, 1996), 1, 2. 
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secondary sources are discussions about the law.72 There may be grey areas between 
primary and secondary sources. 
 
Thus, the thesis refers to old statutes and customs as primary sources. It also refers to 
old texts, and authoritative journal articles as secondary sources. In all cases, sources 
have been selected for their publication dates as close as possible to the thesis 
propositions for which they are cited sources. The thesis also refers to apparently 
secondary sources, which were authoritative treatises on commercial and legal usage. 
In this respect, they can be regarded as primary sources, limited by their age and 
susceptibility to interpretation. This is where the Oxford English Dictionary assists in 
interpretation. In this context, the chapter structure of the thesis is as follows. 
 
(a) Chapter 2 
 
Chapter 2 begins with a brief survey of the arguments constituting passing-off and 
the nature of strict liability in tort. Then, argument in this chapter sets out to identify 
the genesis of the tort of passing-off, by examining various aspects of public policy 
and regulation, as they existed in the early middle ages. 
 
The king’s power of quo warranto will be examined in order to determine whether a 
person’s higher commercial position might have generated locus standi to sue a 
person of lower position, in the later tort of passing-off. Discussion deals with the 
nature of the jurisdiction of the courts of the City of London, to prioritise commercial 
ranks in relation to product source. An investigation of the City of London control 
over the economy will ask how the City of London might have used its county 
palatine-like73 status to spread the influence of its old customary laws within 
England. The chapter investigates the relevance to passing-off of freedom of the City 
of London. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Bruce Bott, Ruth Talbot-Stokes Effective Legal Research (LexisNexis Butterworth, 4th ed, 2010), 9. 
73 A county palatine was one ruled by a petty sovereign who was not bound by the English Acts of 
Parliament and who held its own parliament, and civil and criminal courts. Remains Historical and 
Literary Connected with the Palatine Counties of Lancaster and Chester, Volume XXXVII (Chetham 
Society, 1856), 3. 
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The chapter will look at the development of the English gilds and the nature of their 
commercial ranks to see whether gild structure, gild rules for admission and 
exclusion, and gild jurisprudence might have been the regulatory genesis of the later 
tort of passing-off. The discussion seeks out a historical context for the element of 
misrepresentation of source in the future tort of passing-off. 
 
The chapter will investigate the legal environment of setting up the positions and 
relative ranks of the masters and the wholesalers, to determine the limits of crown 
regulatory action against the trades.  
 
(b) Chapter 3 
 
Argument in Chapter 3 builds on both the idea of commercial ranks identified in 
chapter 2, and the proposition that a breach of commercial status was a strict liability 
issue, indicative of fraud. It asks when work might have been controlled by police 
action and when work might have been controlled by church supervision. Its 
structure is based on the following proposition: that commercial ranks are related to 
the differential levels of status, symbolised graphically on royal seals as the higher 
status, and symbolised as trademarks as the lower status. 
 
Discussion will seek to relate the graphic representations on royal seals to a strict 
liability enforcement regime against passed off goods. The chapter will examine the 
various strata of administration used to enforce the application of royal seals. Then 
discussion will turn to the swan mark, to inquire into the nature of a customary 
crown administrative system. In examining regulation of publications, the discussion 
will seek out some relevant key consequences of breaches of use of marks in book 
licensing. The chapter examines how merchants used proprietary marks, and how 
they were related to product source and goodwill. Finally, discussion will turn to 
how certification marks were used to certify artisans’ work.  
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(c) Chapter 4 
 
Chapter 4 applies the propositions and customary background developed in chapters 
2 and 3 to an historical examination of the Gloucestershire Clothiers’ Case74 and 
some of its consequences. The significance of this case was that Doderidge J said, in 
the 1618 case of Southern v How,75 that what was later to be recognised as the 
Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case76 was the first recorded case of passing-off.77 This 
chapter comprises analysis and interpretation of the reported pleadings in the 
Gloucestershire Clothiers’ Case.78 It also seeks to build a context in procedural law 
in which the Gloucestershire Clothiers’ Case might be interpreted, in its relationship 
to the development of the tort of passing-off. 
 
The chapter will investigate the various manuscript reports of the Gloucestershire 
Clothiers Case. 79 As background to this investigation, the chapter will examine the 
history of the regulatory mechanisms of seals to see how they might have created a 
strict liability enforcement scheme. The chapter asks how Star Chamber might have 
been the site of crown attempts to stamp out deceit in the trades. An a priori 
examination of classical styles in pleadings to the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case80 
will ask the question of whether the styles of pleading in the Court of Common Pleas 
might have implied a strict liability procedure for litigating passing-off. The chapter 
will investigate how an unsuccessful argument pleaded in Southern v How81 might 
have re-emerged as a strict liability doctrine of secondary meaning, that would allow 
a rival trader to sue when not directly damaged by a misrepresentation. 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Later identified by Professor Baker as J G v Samford (1584) unrep in Baker, above 9, 459. 
75 Cro Jac 468, 471. 
76 Later identified by Professor Baker as J G v Samford (1584) unrep in Baker, above 9, 459. 
77 Passing-off is concerned with misrepresentation made by one trader which damages the goodwill of 
another trader. Misrepresentation, damage and goodwill are therefore the three essential elements of 
the tort, and are sometimes referred to as its ‘classical trinity’. Wadlow, above 4, 6. 
78 Later identified by Professor Baker as J G v Samford (1584) unrep in Baker, above 9, 459. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Cro Jac 468, 471. 
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(d) Chapter 5 
 
In chapter 5, the question is asked as to whether old customary law, discussed in 
chapters 2 and 3, was reintroduced into the elements structure of passing-off, and 
whether a breach of a specified bundle of customs created the policy for the tort of 
passing-off by relating fraud and strict liability. 
 
After a preliminary examination of the nature of fraud in commerce, there will be an 
investigation of the role of custom within goodwill, seeking to develop a workable 
description of goodwill, based on the case law. This is all in preparation to 
investigating how the court might have amended the scope of passing-off in the 
Advocaat Case,82 and if so, what the consequences were in assessing the kind of 
liability in passing-off.  The chapter’s argument addresses these issues by looking at 
fraud in commerce, goodwill, and amending the scope of passing-off. 
 
The chapter builds on the chapter 4 discussion of deceit, and discusses how deceit 
might relate to fraud. The discussion on goodwill builds on the chapter 2 discussion 
of old local custom, and asks how it might interlock with damage to goodwill in the 
context of passing-off. The chapter investigates the doctrine of judicial reasoning by 
analogy so that it can be applied to developing a principle for understanding 
goodwill. The purpose of this is to try to identify how goodwill could be damaged in 
the context of passing-off and to uncover any strict liability in damage to goodwill. 
With these preparations completed, the chapter examines Lord Diplock’s argument 
in the Advocaat Case,83 to identify any strict liability in Lord Diplock’s formulation 
of the elements of passing-off. 
 
(e) Chapter 6 
 
The conclusion summarizes the main points based in the literature at hand, based on 
satisfying the research objectives. It outlines balanced views of the various 
arguments, and inductively extracts principles from the thesis. It proposes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 [1979] AC 731, 731-756. 
83 Ibid. 
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implications and limitations of the research. It outlines an analysis of the new 
knowledge synthesized within the thesis and proposes conclusions and 
recommendations. 
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II THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE TORT OF PASSING-OFF 
 
A   Introduction 
 
In order to begin this investigation of whether the tort of passing-off is a strict 
liability tort, and if so, how and why it became a tort of strict liability, this chapter 
begins with a brief survey of the arguments constituting passing-off. Then it 
considers the nature of strict liability in tort. This is to brief the reader on the 
background of some basic assumptions made, and applied in the thesis. Then 
discussion moves to a historical account of the prehistory of what was to become the 
tort of passing-off. This account starts at a time before common law courts existed. It 
addresses a time before a discernable tort of passing-off existed as a consolidated 
state of affairs in any common law court.  
 
Discussion in this chapter sets out to identify the genesis of the tort, by examining 
various aspects of public policy and regulation, as they existed in the early middle 
ages. After the initial surveys of passing-off and strict liability, the remainder of the 
chapter comprises four sections. 
 
The first section, discussing aspects of the king’s power, deals solely with the king’s 
power of quo warranto, in order to examine whether a person’s higher commercial 
position might have generated locus standi to sue a person of lower position, in the 
later tort of passing-off. The second section is on the City of London legal system, 
and deals with the nature of the jurisdiction of the City of London courts, the City of 
London control over the economy, and freedom of the City. The subsection on the 
nature of the jurisdiction of the courts of the City of London investigates the various 
aspects of the City of London legal system, to prioritise the commercial ranks in 
relation to product source. The sub-section on the City of London control over the 
economy investigates how the City of London might have used its county palatine-
like1 status to spread the influence of its old customary laws within England. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A county palatine was one ruled by a petty sovereign who was not bound by the English Acts of 
Parliament and who held its own parliament, and civil and criminal courts. Remains Historical and 
Literary Connected with the palatine Counties of Lancaster and Chester, Volume XXXVII (Chetham 
Society, 1856), 3. 
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subsection on freedom of the City investigates the relevance of freedom of the City 
of London. 
 
The third section is on the relationship between commerce, the economy and the 
gilds. It deals with formation of gilds, gild ordinance structure, and a later collapse 
of gild independence. The subsection on gild formation investigates the development 
of the English gilds and the nature of their commercial ranks. The subsection on gild 
ordinance structure investigates whether gild structure, gild rules for admission and 
exclusion, and gild jurisprudence might have been the regulatory genesis of the later 
tort of passing-off. The subsection on the collapse of gild independence seeks out a 
historical context for the element of misrepresentation of source in the future tort of 
passing-off. 
 
The fourth section is on the position of the workers. It deals with the City of London 
protection of the masters, and the pressing of the trades into a crown-controlled 
system of commercial ranks. The subsection on the City of London protection of the 
masters investigates the legal environment setting up the positions and relative ranks 
of the masters and the wholesalers. The subsection on the pressing of the trades into 
a crown-controlled system of commercial ranks investigates the limits of crown 
regulatory action against the trades. 
 
The chapter will conclude there was arguably a system of customary commercial 
ranks, in matters of personal property. Londoners had a superior customary right 
over foreigners to sue in matters of representation of the source of manufactured 
goods. The crown brought the gilds under crown control to maintain commercial 
ranks among the masters and the artisans. Masters, and those of the same or higher 
commercial rank, were the only ones who could trade in their own names. In this 
context, insubordination of commercial rank by breaching the London custom 
against holding out oneself as a master was a strict liability matter. 
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B   A Brief Introduction to Passing-Off 
 
The first articulation of the legal term “passing-off” in litigation arose in the 1842 
case of Perry v Truefitt.2 This thesis refers to Wadlow’s historical account of the 
development of the tort of passing-off as a contemporary authority on the topic. This 
is because Wadlow wrote a detailed history of the tort of passing-off3 and Laddie J 
cited this historical account with approval in Inter Lotto (UK) Ltd v Camelot Group 
Plc.4  
 
1   Arguments Constituting Passing-off 
 
In this thesis, the hyphenated term “passing-off” will be used to indicate the tort of 
that name. The term “passing off”, without a hyphen, will be used to denote the actus 
reus of what would become the later tort. Wadlow sets out the three essential 
elements of the tort of passing-off as misrepresentation, damage and goodwill, and, 
as well, the ostensibly obsolete element of fraud.5 
 
Wadlow argues as follows. In the nineteenth century, the courts of law generally 
agreed that passing-off actions were arguments based on questions of fact, rather 
than on questions of law. The courts of equity performed the work of hypothesizing 
the underlying legal right they would protect. It appears from the reported cases that 
passing-off was successful in equity before the time of any successful cause of action 
in the common law courts.6 
 
As the gist of passing-off came to be more understood in terms of damage to 
property rights, the fraud element was said to have dissolved.7 Lord Westbury’s 
interpretation of the law in terms of property rights was based on a theory of 
common law trade mark infringement, which cause of action was not distinguished 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Perry v Truefitt (1842) 6 Beav 66. 
3 C Wadlow The Law of Passing-off, Unfair Competition by Misrepresentation (Sweet & Maxwell, 
2004), 21, et seq. 
4 [2003] 3 All ER 191, 197-200. 
5 Wadlow, above 3, 16. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
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from the tort of passing-off during his Lordship’s time.8 Goodwill did not become a 
substantive element of the tort until much later, in the early 20th century, after almost 
30 years in which hardly any court dealt with the tort of passing-off on the basis of 
property rights.9 However, the sale of and damage to goodwill had been discussed 
already in the case law as early as the 1620 case of Broad v Jollyfe.10 
 
2   Basis of Passing-Off in the Old Law 
 
Kerly said that the action to restrain the defendant from passing off his goods as the 
goods of the plaintiff was the generalized form of an action to restrain the 
infringement of a trademark.11 There appears to have been some changes in the 
element structure of tort of passing-off. Wadlow set out the three essential and 
original elements of the tort of passing-off as misrepresentation, damage and 
goodwill, and, as well, the ostensibly obsolete element of fraud.12 The first three of 
these elements were known together as the classical trinity. 
 
Lord Diplock held, in the Advocaat Case,13 that five characteristics of a valid cause 
of action for passing-off could be identified. He identified the following five. 
1. A misrepresentation; 
2. made by a trader in the course of trade; 
3. to prospective customers of his or ultimate consumers of goods or services 
supplied by him; 
4. which is calculated to injure14 the business or goodwill of another trader (in 
the sense that this is a reasonably foreseeable consequence); and, 
5. which causes actual damage to business or goodwill of the trader by whom 
the action is brought or, in a quia timet action, will probably do so.15 
 
An alternative analysis of passing-off, as a conjectural argument based on facts, was 
read to the House of Lords by Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, in the Advocaat Case.16 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 1861-1865; Wadlow, above 3, 16. 
9 Wadlow, above 3, 16. 
10 Cro Jac 596, 597. 
11 D M Kerly The Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names (Sweet & Maxwell, 1913), 529. 
12 Wadlow, above 3, 16. 
13 [1979] AC 731, 740. 
14 The wordage “calculated to injure” appears to represent an interpretation of the natural 
consequences of the defendant’s actions. It does not appear to imply that the defendant calculated 
anything. 
15 [1979] AC 731, 739, 740. 
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His Lordship held that, in a passing-off action, it was essential for the plaintiff to 
prove at least the following facts. 
(1) that his business consists of, or includes, selling in England a class of goods to 
which the particular trade name applies; 
(2) that the class of goods is clearly defined, and that in the minds of the public, or a 
section of the public, in England, the trade name distinguishes that class from other 
similar goods; 
(3) that because of the reputation of the goods, there is goodwill attached to the name; 
(4) that he, the plaintiff, as a member of the class of those who sell the goods, is the 
owner of goodwill in England which is of substantial value; 
(5) that he has suffered, or is likely to suffer, substantial damage to his property in the 
goodwill by reason of the defendants selling the goods which are falsely described 
by the trade name to which the goodwill is attached.17 
 
After the Advocaat Case,18 the Privy Council confirmed a return to the classical 
trinity, in the 1981 case of Cadbury-Schweppes Pty Ltd v Pub Squash Co Pty Ltd,19 
(‘Pub Squash Case’). The classical trinity was also reconfirmed in the 1990 House of 
Lords case of Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd. v Borden Inc.20 The thesis will 
investigate the possible relevance of strict liability to this apparent instability in the 
element structure of the tort of passing-off. 
 
As stated in chapter 1, this thesis terminates its analytic time frame at the 1979 
Advocaat Case.21 This is due, in part, to subsequent development of consumer law 
statutes, an analysis of which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
It was possible that instability in the elements of passing-off might be explained by 
examining how it had emerged as a distinct tort. In 1900, Lord Halsbury quoted the 
following passage in his speech in Magnolia Metal Co v Tandem Smelting Syndicate 
Ltd.22 The passage suggested the great antiquity of passing-off. It also suggested the 
significance of looking at the emergence of the tort from the perspective of gild and 
county jurisprudence. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 [1979] AC 731, 749-756. Note that the Rhetorica ad Herennium classified an argument based on 
facts as “conjectural”. Cicero Rhetorica Ad Herennium (Harvard University Press, 2004), 35. Some 
arguments could be validly classified as arguments based on fact, per 1 Quintilian, Institutio 
Oratoria, 409. 
17 [1979] AC 731, 755, 756. 
18 [1979] AC 731, 731-756. 
19 [1980] 2 NSWLR 851, 861. 
20 (1990) 17 IPR 1, 19, per Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle. 
21 [1979] AC 731, 731-756. 
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An action upon the case was brought in the Common Pleas by a clothier, that 
whereas he had gained great reputation for his making of his cloth, and by 
reason whereof he had great utterance to his great benefit and profit, and that 
he used to set his mark upon the cloth, whereby it should be known to be his 
cloth, and another clothier perceiving it, used the same mark to his ill-made 
cloth on purpose to deceive him, it was resolved that an action did well lie.23 
 
Professor Baker24 identified the case, referred to by Lord Halsbury in the above 
quote, as the Samford case,25 (‘Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case’). This 16th century 
case was heard during the time of Elizabeth I, in the Court of Common Pleas. In the 
case, the plaintiff was a clothier who apparently brought an action on the case for 
deceit. In the various manuscript accounts uncovered by Baker,26 the plaintiff was 
apparently unsuccessful in its action. This was because a majority of the Court held 
the matter to be damnum absque injuria. The case arguably suggested that members 
of the court were not willing to recognize a common law action in passing-off. 
 
The case is reproduced by Baker & Milsom,27 from contemporary manuscripts.28 
They designate the plaintiff as a clothier. This was significant because clothiers were 
arguably great adherents of exclusive gild and county jurisprudence, sustained by the 
force of Royal Charter.29 
 
Baker’s translated record30 of the case was at variance with the above statement of 
Lord Halsbury in Magnolia Metal Co v Tandem Smelting Syndicate Ltd.31 Baker 
reported that, although the action was by the eminent rival clothier, no judgment was 
entered because the court was divided. Peryam and Mead JJ had found it to be a case 
of damnum absque injuria, and Wyndham J stated that he would find for the plaintiff 
upon proof of a breach of an applicable statute regulating the use of marks by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 (1900) 17 RPC 477, 484, HL. 
24 J H Baker An Introduction to English Legal History (Butterworths, 4th ed, 1990), 459. 
25 J G v Samford (1584) (unreported). 
26 Baker, above 24, 459. 
27 J H Baker and S F C Milsom Sources of English Legal History – Private Law to 1750 
(Butterworths, 1986), 617, citing HLS MS 2071, fo 86. 
28 Cory’s entries, BL MS Hargrave 123, fo 168v. 
29 See Ebenezer Bain Merchant and craft guild: a history of the Aberdeen Incorporated Trades (J and 
J P Edmond & Spark, 1887), where the author has included some relevant Royal Charters. 
30 Translated into English from what has been generally characterized as “Anglo-Norman”, in Cory’s 
entries, BL MS Hargrave 123, fo 168v. 
31 (1900) 17 RPC 477, HL. 
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clothiers.32 Only Anderson CJ held the defendant liable at common law. In 
consequence of this report, Wadlow suggests the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case33 
be cast aside without a requirement for further analysis. He says it did not appear to 
have contributed much to the development of passing-off, either then, or later.34 This 
thesis will look behind and clarify Wadlow’s determination of the case’s 
significance, in chapter 4 below, to see how the reported issues of the case might be 
construed. 
 
The Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case35 was also set out in an alternate manuscript.36 
Additionally, Doderidge J cited it in Southern v How.37 Although it was known to 
later courts only from these early reminiscences,38 Southern v How39 acquired weight 
as authority for the proposition that unauthorized use of a common law trademark 
was unlawful and could be subject to an action on the case for deceit. 
 
Schechter stated a view about any systematic attempt to trace the history of 
trademark law and passing-off before the tort succeeded in the king’s courts, 
effectively as one combined kind of action. He stated that this attempt must be 
through somewhat unorthodox channels and sources from a contemporary legal 
standpoint.40 As an example of this problem of orthodoxy, he stated that the Leet 
Courts dealt with trademark matters up until the 16th century, and these matters were 
confined to enforcement by periodic fines. They relied on the force of regulatory 
provisions of statutes, which provided for compulsory affixing of marks by specified 
trades.41 
 
In order to ascertain the early phases of modern trademark law and passing-off in 
medieval commerce, before their separation into distinct causes of action, the thesis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 The statute was likely to have been 27 Hen VIII c12. 
33 Later identified by Professor Baker as J G v Samford (1584) unrep in Baker, above 24, 459. 
34 Wadlow, above 3, 19. 
35 Later identified by Professor Baker as J G v Samford (1584) unrep in Baker, above 24, 459. 
36 HLS MS 2071, fo 86. 
37 (1618) Cro Jac 468, 471; Poph 144. 
38 See Blanchard v Hill (1742) 2 Atk 484, 485. 
39 (1618) Cro Jac 468, 471; Poph 144. 
40 F I Schechter The Historical Foundations of the Law Relating to Trademarks (Columbia University 
Press, 1925), 13. 
41 Schechter, above 40, 14. 
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consults some records and other reports of the merchant and craft gild organizations. 
Schechter noted that medieval and middle ages trade was largely conducted through 
gilds. The gilds sought to restrict litigation among the gildsmen to the gild courts. 
This was enforced by disciplinary punishment for litigation at law without gild 
consent.42 According to Schechter, the gilds had practiced their own internal system 
of jurisprudence, in which certain ordinances prohibited the specific acts, which later 
would constitute passing-off.43 
 
Wadlow states that, by 1870, there appeared to have been at least three 
interconnected bodies of relevant law of passing-off. There was the common law 
action for passing-off, of little practical importance because common law fraud had 
to be proved and damages were the only remedy. There was the action of passing-off 
in a court of equity, which could result in the grant of an injunction quia timet 
without proof of mala fides. He states that there was the later statutory doctrine of 
property in trademarks, by which infringement was a wrong, whether or not there 
was knowledge or intent. Wadlow states that the law of passing-off was evolving 
quite rapidly in the 1870s. However, despite this, the judges generally claimed that 
they were merely applying settled principles of law to the facts of each case.44 
 
Wadlow proposes that passing-off came of age in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century. He identified a series of cases, which defined much of the law that still 
applies today.45 Singer v Loog46 settled that passing-off is based on misrepresentation 
of secondary meanings, rather than trade mark rights. Johnston v Orr-Ewing47 is still 
cited on instruments of deception, liability for exports and the “idea of the mark”. 
Montgomery v Thompson48 confirmed that a place name could be distinctive and that 
it was no defence that the defendant produced his goods in a place of that name. 
Reddaway v Banham49 extended the doctrine in Montgomery v Thompson to prima 
facie descriptive terms of every type and arguably settled the modern law of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Schechter, above 40, 30. 
43 Schechter, above 40, 16. 
44 Wadlow, above 3, 32. 
45 Wadlow, above 3, 30. 
46 (1882) 8 AC 15 HL. 
47 (1882) 7 AC 219 HL. 
48 [1891] AC 217; 8 RPC 361 HL. 
49 [1896] AC 199; [1895-9] All ER 313; 13 RPC 218 HL. 
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secondary meaning. In Powell v Birmingham Vinegar Brewery50 the court held the 
plaintiff need not be known by name. It introduced the idea of passing-off by 
misdescription. This was later rejected in Magnolia Metal v Tandem Smelting 
Syndicate.51 In this case, the court strongly indicated that only misrepresentation of 
the product source was actionable. Cellular Clothing v Maxton & Murray52 
confirmed that Reddaway v Banham53 was good law. Lever v Goodwin54 in the Court 
of Appeal protected get-up in its own right for the first time. Payton v Snelling, 
Lampard55 laid down much of the modern law for get-up cases. 
 
3   The Modern Phase 
 
Wadlow says that Lord Parker’s speech in Spalding v Gamage56 gave the tort of 
passing-off its modern basis as a strict liability tort.57 This thesis asks whether gild 
and county jurisprudence from the middle ages suggested a much earlier basis of 
strict liability. Wadlow’s explanation of strict liability in passing-off runs as follows. 
Lord Parker’s speech in the 1915 case of Spalding v Gamage58 eliminated the 
previous restriction to misrepresentation that the goods or business of the defendant 
belonged to the plaintiff. Second, his Lordship explained passing-off in terms of 
protecting a property right, the right being the property the plaintiff had in the 
goodwill of this business. According to Wadlow, passing-off was now treated as 
protecting a kind of property. For this reason, he says, the courts found it easy to 
abandon the requirement for proof of fraud. Wadlow suggests that this was what 
made passing-off a strict liability tort.59 
 
Wadlow states that the history of the tort of passing-off was substantially complete60 
with the 1979 House of Lords decision in the Advocaat Case.61 In that case, Lord 
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Diplock described the tort of passing off as more protean than other actions.62 This 
thesis contains an examination, in chapter 5, of this judicial use of the word 
“protean”. By the use of the term “protean”, his Lordship could possibly have been 
referring to Lord Langdale’s view of fraud, expressed in the 1847 case of Franks v 
Weaver.63 In that case, Lord Langdale stated that nobody had been able to define 
what fraud was, because it was so multiform. He stated that in the case before the 
court, “it consisted in the crafty64 adaptation of certain words in such a manner, 
ordinarily and constantly, as to be calculated to make it appear to persons when he 
was selling the product that the thing sold was prepared by the plaintiff”.65 
 
As stated above, Wadlow notes that Lord Parker’s speech in Spalding v Gamage66 
gave passing-off its modern basis,67 suggesting the following two consequences. The 
first was that passing-off was confirmed as a tort of misrepresentation, removing the 
previous restriction to misrepresentation that the goods or business were that of the 
plaintiff. The second was that passing-off was now explained as protection of the 
plaintiff’s bundle of rights in the goodwill of its business.68 This latter outcome 
adopted a definition of goodwill as “the attractive force which brings in custom”.69 
However, the thesis will argue from the case law that a unifying concept for goodwill 
could be the value in the probability of the business continuing to maintain its 
connection with customers of good disposition to it, to induce local custom by means 
of its own nostrums and reputation, in the same way as in the past. This will be 
discussed in chapter 5, below. This unifying concept developed over a series of 
cases, beginning in 1620. Also, it seems that a workable legal description of goodwill 
was virtually settled by the time of Lord Eldon’s definition of goodwill in the 1810 
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case of Cruttwell v Lye.70 The chapter 5 discussion will argue that goodwill was 
uniquely prone to damage by that kind of misrepresentation, which was the gist of 
passing-off. 
 
C   Strict Liability 
 
Wadlow states that the courts eventually abandoned fraud in passing-off, even as a 
legal fiction, and that this made the tort of passing-off a strict liability tort.71 
Therefore, this brief survey of the nature of strict liability is presented to clarify for 
the reader how the development of the tort of passing-off might be assessed as for 
strict liability. Strict liability in tort has been described in the following terms. 
Accountability without proven negligence or fault. Neither the intent of the 
defendant nor the presence or absence of negligence are relevant to the issue of 
a defendant’s liability where strict liability for the defendant’s conduct applies. 
A defendant may be held liable even though he or she took reasonable care to 
prevent the damage.72 
 
Epstein stated that it was likely that strict liability dominated the formative years of 
the common law. He added that the development of the common law of tort was 
marked by a divergence in the late nineteenth century between two key practices. At 
that time, the courts had not decided precisely where the principles of negligence as 
mens rea should dominate, and where they should not. The first theory held that a 
plaintiff should be entitled, prima facie, to recover from a defendant who has caused 
him harm, only if the defendant intended to harm the plaintiff, or failed to take 
reasonable steps to avoid inflicting the harm. The alternative theory was that of strict 
liability. It held that the defendant was prima facie liable for the harm caused, 
whether or not either of the two additional elements relating to the defendant’s intent 
and negligence was satisfied.73 
 
Epstein said that the doctrine of strict liability stated that proof that the defendant 
caused harm created a presumption of liability. There was no room for the defendant 
to argue he had no intention to harm the plaintiff, as part of the prima facie case. 
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Neither was there room to argue that the defendant could have avoided the harm he 
caused by the use of reasonable care. The choice was simply either the plaintiff or 
the defendant. The analysis and tracing of causation to the defendant was the sole 
measure by which responsibility fastened prima facie onto the defendant.74 
 
Pollock cited an example of this theory. He said the tort of breach of statutory duty 
was one of strict liability. This was because there was an external statutory 
determination of the prima facie wrongful conduct. The defendant did not determine 
wrongfulness. This arguably eliminated intent and negligence as elements.75 
 
Duff defined liability in crime as absolute if it required no proof of fault in any 
aspect of the offence, and liability in crime as strict if it required no proof of fault in 
one aspect of the offence.76 Gardner stated that in general, private law cared about 
the wrongdoer’s fault or blame, if and only if fault was a constituent of the wrong.77 
 
In the context of the civil law, Pollock stated that ‘the commission of an act 
specifically forbidden by law, or the omission or failure to perform any duty 
specifically imposed by law, is generally equivalent to an act done with intent to 
cause wrongful injury’. He added that where the harm ensuing from such an act was 
of the kind that the law specifically sought to prevent, then the justice and necessity 
of the rule would be self-evident.78 This principle was illustrated in the following 
common law rule, as relevant to a discussion of the tort of passing-off. If a party took 
in hand anything requiring particular skill and knowledge, the law required of 
him/her a level of competence typically found in the people who usually undertook 
these matters. Anyone who professed a craft, held himself/herself out to have the 
common skill of that craft, and was answerable accordingly. If this person failed, it 
was no excuse that he or she merely did the best possible. The rule was that he/she 
must be reasonably skilled at his/her peril. The term “at his/her peril” was the 
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indicium of strict liability because it meant that the breach itself caused the 
punishment.79 
 
Pollock stated that strict liability appeared ancient and therefore prescriptive. His 
reasoning ran as follows. The policy was reflected in the convenient form of a 
maxim, as maxims facilitated long-term transmission of a rule. The Romans put it in 
the form of the maxim imperitia culpae adnumeratur, or, ‘the situation is governed 
by its own class’. This policy was expressed in the following hypothetical narrative, 
which illustrated the inevitable effect on a community of the commission of a civil 
wrong: ‘He went about to do harm, and having begun an act of wrongful mischief, he 
cannot stop the risk at his pleasure, nor confine it to the precise objects he laid out, 
but must abide it fully and to the end.’ The principle inhering within this narrative 
was illustrated within the following maxim: “a man is presumed to intend the natural 
consequences of his acts”, combined with the observation that the law naturally 
inferred intention and mostly the inference was correct.80 This maxim referred only 
to acts. It did not say that a man was presumed to have intended the natural 
consequences of his state of mind. 
 
Pollock stated that this procedural judicial policy came from a time when intention 
could hardly ever be a matter of direct proof, the thought of man being not triable.81 
Further, it was normal for the presiding judge to have or project in his/her own mind 
the likely intentions of the defendant, so that the judge might infer either willfulness 
or recklessness of intention. This represented the perimeter of the term ‘natural’, in 
the maxim as above, or as it would have been embedded within the reasoning in the 
judge’s mind, ‘natural and probable’.82 
 
The 1875 criminal case of R. v Prince83 presented to the Court an opportunity to 
discuss strict liability in crime. It was also open to discuss the circumstances in 
which a criminal breach of a statutory wrong might become a civil breach of a 
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statutory duty. In this case a man carried away a girl who was under 16, knowing that 
she was in her father’s sole lawful custody. This was a statutory criminal offence. He 
believed on reasonable grounds that she was 18. He was charged under the relevant 
Act and the court held that the state of his knowledge of her age was irrelevant. This 
case suggested that, by 1875, strict liability was already a feature of civil, or private, 
law. It arose in an application of the maxim, as stated as above, and applying to cases 
of tort liability “a man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts”. 
Illustrating the application of this maxim in R. v Prince,84 Brett J referred to the prior 
1859 case of Hearne v Gareton,85 in which the respondents had been charged for 
having sent oil of vitriol86 by rail without marking, or stating, the nature of the goods. 
The applicable statute was 20 & 21 Vict c 43, s 168. It provided ‘every person who 
shall send or cause to be sent by the said railway any oil of vitriol, shall distinctly 
mark or state the nature of such goods, &c, on pain of forfeiting, &c.’ Section 206 of 
that statute made the provision into an offence by giving the Court power to deal 
with such matters summarily, before justices with power to imprison.  While the 
respondents in fact did the prohibited acts, the justices in Hearne v Gareton87 found 
that there was no guilty knowledge, and they had acted with full diligence, under a 
reasonable belief that the goods had been correctly described.88 On appeal, Lord 
Campbell CJ held that the presumption of guilty knowledge was rebutted by proof 
that a fraud had been practiced on the respondents. If so, they would be civilly liable 
instead of being criminally culpable. Earle J agreed that, in the circumstances, they 
would be civilly liable.89 
 
Piggott stated that negligence, recklessness and heedlessness as mens rea were 
distinguished from each other in that the latter two were intentional, such that it 
could be said that there was knowledge of the consequences and a deliberate 
intention that these consequences should follow the act. Recklessness was where 
there was knowledge of the consequences and a deliberate intention that they should 
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follow the act. Heedlessness was where there was no knowledge of the consequences 
and no regard is paid to whether any consequences might follow.90 
 
Piggott added that negligence and heedlessness both inferred unconsciousness. In 
negligence, the person did not think of the act. In heedlessness, the person did not 
think of the consequence. When an act was done which should have been left 
undone, a negative duty was breached. Negligence could be regarded as a term 
describing a mens rea, under which is grouped all those acts or omissions that were 
not malicious, fraudulent, or named torts.91 
 
Piggott concluded that mens rea in tort was divided therefore into involuntary acts, 
negligence and intentional acts, the last of which divided into fraud and malice.92 
 
Cases of absolute liability might be classified into three, as set out as follows. The 
first was liability for inevitable accident, in cases in which a person acted at his/her 
peril (suo periculo) and made by law an insurer of others against the harmful results 
of the act. Acts suo periculo were an essential precondition for absolute liability. The 
second was liability for inevitable mistake, where, although the act and its 
consequences were intended, the defendant acted under an erroneous belief, formed 
on reasonable grounds, that the circumstances justified the act. This was discussed in 
the 1829 case of Glasspoole v Young,93 in which case it was stated that although a 
defamatory statement was not actionable if it were true, a mistaken belief in its truth 
was commonly no defence and he who attacked another’s reputation did so at his 
peril (suo periculo). Also later, in the 1872 case of Fowler v Hollins,94 the Court 
stated “persons deal with the property in chattels or exercise acts of ownership over 
them at their peril . . . .” The third was vicarious liability for the wrongful acts of 
others. This was illustrated by the doctrine of respondeat superior, (let the principal 
answer). The Court applied this doctrine in Limpus v London General Omnibus 
Co.,95 where a master was liable for the torts of his servant, (suo periculo). This was 
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provided they were committed in the course of the servant’s employment. It applied 
even though the master did not authorize them, and even if the master expressly 
forbade them.96 
 
Concluding this discussion, liability in crime was strict if it required no proof of fault 
in one aspect of the offence. Therefore, it could be argued that liability in tort was 
strict, rather than absolute, if it required proof of mens rea in one or more aspect of 
the tort, the remaining aspects either requiring no proof of mens rea or that proof 
being provided by a presumption of the law. In other words, mens rea would be 
presumed for some aspects of the tort’s elements, but not presumed for others. This 
would mean that mens rea would have to be proved for that aspect or those aspects 
of the tort where a presumption of legal negligence did not apply. Any aspect 
requiring proof of mens rea would be one where suo periclo did not apply, or in 
other words, an act where the actor was not necessarily acting at his/her peril, and 
negligence mens rea would have to be proved. If suo periclo applied to all elements 
of the tort, or if mens rea were presumed for all elements, it would be one of absolute 
liability. 
 
It is suggested that Pollock indicated a more generic approach based on maxims. The 
issue of the legal context of maxims will be discussed in chapter 5. For the purposes 
only of this thesis, and to avoid arguments between defining strict liability and 
arguments defining absolute liability, it is suggested that that absolute liability be 
treated as a limiting form of strict liability.  
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D   The King’s Power 
 
1   The King’s Power of Quo Warranto 
 
This section seeks to synthesise what has just been discussed about strict liability 
with an apparently nascent form of passing-off. The King retained a paramount 
power of appointing people to key official positions. This would allow him to police 
and enforce the agreed terms of those appointive offices. This investigation of the 
early common law civil action in quo warranto is written to place in context the 
various positions of privilege among those in the various commercial ranks. This is 
in order to ascertain how locus standi by a person of higher commercial rank to sue 
one of lower rank might have played a formative role in the later tort of passing-off. 
 
In the 1846 case of Darley v The Queen,97 its judges were summoned to the House of 
Lords to give their opinion on the nature of quo warranto, at a time before the House 
of Lords possessed a judicial arm. Tindal CJ stated to the House of Lords the general 
rule as to the proper defendant in proceedings in quo warranto, as follows. 
The procedure by quo warranto is appropriate wherever there has been an 
usurpation of any office, whether created by charter alone or by the Crown 
with the consent of Parliament; provided the office be of a public nature and 
a substantive office, not merely the function or employment of a deputy or 
servant held at the will and pleasure of others.98 
 
This opinion assumed a usurpation of office had already been identified and traced to 
its source, suggesting an indicium of strict liability. Shortt collated the following list 
of gild officers, who had been held to be proper defendants in quo warranto 
proceedings, when the usurpation of office was inferred by improper performance in 
office. The list included the master of a city company, such as that of Merchant 
Taylors’ Company, or the Coopers’ Company, or the Patton Makers’ Company. The 
list also included the master of the Company of Tailors at Lichfield, and, the assistant 
of the Saddlers’ Company.99 Any of these officers acting in derogation of the crown 
was therefore subject to a possible quo warranto judicial inquiry. In theory, this 
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perceived threat could colour the way these officials both structured their positions 
and executed their duties within their gilds. They would want to avoid an action in 
quo warranto. 
 
The king maintained his positioning atop the goods manufacturing and mercantile 
hierarchies by means of proceedings in quo warranto. In this way the king could 
construct his own hierarchies. He could specify who would occupy the positions of 
lords, who would owe fealty or exact homage100 or own in socage,101 from one to the 
other. It will be argued in this section that by this hierarchy a person higher up the 
order could maintain a right to sue a person lower in the order, in an action 
resembling in form the later tort of passing-off. In this way, any later tort of passing-
off would depend upon the king maintaining the hierarchical social order. 
 
In the same way, arguably the king could remove entire charters. After the Norman 
Conquest of 1066, manufactured goods were produced and sold by way of a power 
granted in a crown franchise. A franchise, created by royal charter, was always 
subject to the king’s pleasure. No franchise could be relied upon as permanent.102 
 
The king had an ancient power in respect of the forfeiture of the charters and 
franchises of a corporation aggregate.103 By this power, he could seize franchises and 
liberties and examine charters.104 This power was based on the doctrine, similar to 
King John’s doctrine of public deceit,105 that when the King granted a franchise there 
was an ancient condition in law that he should do right to all parties concerned, 
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otherwise the franchise should be seized.106 That condition in law derived from an 
ancient statement of the purpose of making corporations. In the time of William the 
Conqueror this had been implied as conditions into charters. It provided that 
corporations were erected for, first, the conservation of the dignities and pre-
eminences of the crown and the laws of the land, second, for defence of the king’s 
subjects and for keeping the king’s peace in time of sudden uproars, and third, for 
defence of the realm against outward and inward hostility.107 
 
The single exception to this statement of law appears to have been in the case of the 
City of London. The liberties of the City of London could not be taken into the 
king’s hands, but continued both its own customs108 and the ancient Roman Imperial 
Law.109 Stolte reported, from a telephone interview that he conducted with Professor 
J. H. Baker on 21 October 1997, that a “custom” was a type of legal action heard by 
local or municipal courts as opposed to common law courts.110 The common law 
courts frequently adopted the “customs” of prominent cities and counties such as 
London and incorporated them into the common law of the realm. Crown charters 
continued the ancient franchises and Customs of London. These crown charters were 
of gifts, grants and confirmations.111 Although these grants of continuation might 
still be forfeited if they were somehow abused or misused, the king could never act 
summarily in this way.112 The reason was that crown summary action would be 
ineffective against any local customary law already established by prescription, and 
thus, the crown got around the power of established custom by use of an 
administrative action in quo warranto against the Mayor and Commonalty and 
Citizens of the City.113 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Kidgell, above 102, 6, citing 20 E 4 fol 5, 6. 
107 Ibid. Without citing the stated record of William the Conqueror. 
108 Keith M Stolte ‘How Early Did Anglo-American Trademark Law Begin? An Answer to Schechter’s 
Conundrum’ (1998) 88 TMR 564, 592n. 
109 Kidgell, above 102, 9, citing Rot. Parl. I E. 3. Authoritate Parliament, Injt. Part 4. Fol. 253. 
110 Stolte, above 108. 
111 It will be argued in chapter 3, below, that these grants were initiated typically at the request of the 
grantee. 
112 Kidgell, above 102, 9. 
113 Ibid. 
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For example, during the reign of Edward I,114 the franchise of returning members to 
parliament was conferred on many towns, most of which were incorporated. This 
franchise was executed by writ of a bailiff or other chief officer, which by this 
process gained a certain regal authority. The crown saw the need to strengthen its 
control over franchise holders.  It devised and implemented the common law writ of 
quo warranto. By this writ, the judges were empowered to inquire by what warrant 
all who claimed any franchise, in derogation of the crown, maintained their title to 
this franchise.115 This form of action assumed strictly that the claimant had wrongly 
claimed a franchise against the interests of the crown.116 
 
The common law action in quo warranto was arguably analogous in form to the 
future tort of passing-off. Its operation was identifiable as one of strict liability as the 
term applied to the later tort of passing-off. An analogy of passing-off to quo 
warranto could be articulated ‘by what warrant did the specified artisan claim to be a 
master and maintain an independent right to offer his goods for sale, in derogation of 
the property rights in goodwill of the true masters, deriving ultimately from the 
agreement of the king?’ 
 
In theory, quo warranto proceedings also could overturn any ranking system of 
officials. In this way, it could control the commercial activities of anyone inferior in 
title to that of the king. This included those producing goods for sale at the lower 
levels of commercial ranks. It will be argued below in chapter 3 that the towns would 
regulate most manufacturing via the signification of approved seals. So in the statute 
18 Edward I of 1290, entitled Statutum De Quo Warranto Novum, the king’s position 
over the towns was considerably strengthened by making quo warranto more 
specific. It was enacted in the following terms, implying both a reverse onus on the 
defendant and strict liability. 
Concerning the writ that is called quo warranto, our lord the king at the 
feast of Pentecost, in the eighteenth year of his reign, hath established, that 
all those who claim to have quiet possession of any franchise before the 
time of king Richard, without interruption, and can show the same by lawful 
inquest, shall well enjoy their possession, and in case that such possession 
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a treatise on mandamus and quo warranto (John S Little, 1836), 4. 
116 Willcock, above 115, 4. 
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be demanded for cause reasonable, our lord the king shall confirm it by title. 
And those that have old charters of privileges shall have the same charters 
adjudged according to the tenor and form of them: And those that have lost 
their liberties since Easter last past by the aforesaid writ, according to the 
course of pleading in the same way writ heretofore used, shall have 
restitution of their franchise lost, and from henceforth they shall have 
according to the nature of this present constitution.117 
 
This statutory provision provided guidance for quo warranto proceedings. It allowed 
long-held claims to stand by confirmation of the king, it provided that old charters 
should be judged by their tenor and form, and it appeared to appease those who had 
more recently lost their franchises by restoring them with statutory force. The 
allowance of judging a charter by tenor and form apparently allowed the court more 
depth of examination, and suggested a presumption in favour of long-held office. 
 
Proceedings in quo warranto commenced with the old common law writ were purely 
civil, and judgment against the defendant might include the remedy of the king 
seizing the franchise. The king could grant it out again, however he pleased.118 This 
was presumably only for public purposes, using the king’s ancient power of 
forfeiture of charters and franchises, as discussed above. 
 
E   The City of London Legal System 
 
1   Nature of the Jurisdiction of the Courts of the City of London 
 
This section investigates the various relevant aspects of the City of London legal 
system. This is for a context in which the customary laws of London could have 
prioritised London-sourced personal property over foreign-sourced personal 
property. This prioritization of commercial ranks will be examined to see how it 
might apply to regulation of representation of product source within the later tort of 
passing-off. 
 
The City of London had its own ancient jurisdiction, and therefore had its own 
courts of law within the walls of the City of London. The Court of Hustings was the 
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highest court of judicature in London, presided over by the mayor and sheriffs. This 
court had jurisdiction over all real and mixed actions except ejectment. It had 
jurisdiction in actions in personam only by appeal from the sheriff’s court.119 In 
matters of appeal, the Town Clerk could make out orders in prohibition, certiorari 
and procendendo.120 This effectively gave the Hustings control over the action in 
replevin. In theory, replevin could remove all passed off goods into the hands of the 
plaintiff at the outset of an action for unlawful possession of goods.121 
 
Indicative of administrative reverse onus in property matters, the Court of Hustings  
maintained a register of all real and personal property in London.122 Arguably, this 
allowed it full administrative and supervisory control of all property in London. In 
theory, title to property could be changed administratively, just by amending the 
property register. 
 
Both the procedural123 and the substantive law in London were arguably customary 
law in character. It is argued in this chapter, below, that they were strict liability law. 
Pulling, speaking of the most ancient legal usages of London, stated that long before 
the court of chancery was established, the lord mayor’s court, also called the court of 
aldermen, was a court of record of law and equity.124 More relevantly, it had powers 
of the widest kind over property. The Recorder of the City of London was in fact the 
sole presiding judge. The Recorder’s record of the oral customs of the court, rather 
than those of the community, became the authority for judging disputes.125 In 
chapter 4, it will become evident that the Recorder’s position was part of the 
pleadings in the Gloucestershire Clothiers’ Case,126 which is considered to have 
been the first passing-off matter in the royal courts. 
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120 Pulling, above 119, 173. 
121 The term “passed off” is used in this sense without the hyphen as a factual rather than legal 
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122 Pulling, above 119, 176. 
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124 Pulling, above 119, 177. 
125 Pulling, above 119, 177. 
126 Later identified by Professor Baker as J G v Samford (1584) unrep in Baker, above 24, 459. 
39	  
	  
This London system appeared to have been widespread in other English 
jurisdictions. For example, all people, freemen and non-freemen could sue in the 
court of aldermen. Later, litigants resorted to the court of chancery while the court of 
aldermen fully retained its equitable jurisdiction.127 If for some reason the defendant 
did not appear, or was found to be outside the jurisdiction of the court, the remedy of 
foreign attachment applied. By this remedy, the plaintiff could instantly attach any 
property or debts owing to the defendant from any person within the jurisdiction.128 
An action previously commenced in the superior courts, however, acted as a bar to 
the remedy of attachment in the mayor’s court.129 This customary mode of 
commencing an action also applied in other ancient English cities and towns such as 
Bristol, Exeter, Lancaster, as well as in Scotland and Jersey.130 
 
Similarly, the court was seized of jurisdiction in the powerful remedy of 
sequestration. Suggesting how a creditor might out-rank an alleged debtor, if a 
debtor absconded leaving goods in a house or warehouse, a creditor could apply for 
the subject goods to be sequestered.131 The remedies of foreign attachment and 
sequestration were arguably open to abuse. Hypothetically, a debtor could either be 
chased away, or kidnapped, or worse, so that his goods could be either attached or 
sequestered or both. In this way, title to his working capital and stock could be 
transferred out of the debtor’s hands. 
 
Actions commenced in London were unlikely to be appealed or removed to royal 
courts in Westminster. Suggesting a procedure for perpetual investigation, and 
therefore permanent and continuing reverse onus, an action in the lord mayor’s court 
remained in force forever. This could be so, even without the commencement of 
formal proceedings. In this way, the Court exercised a supervisory jurisdiction. Such 
actions could be removed to a superior court at Westminster only by the prerogative 
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129 Pulling, above 119, 192, citing 2 Show 374; 1 Rol Abr 552, g. 
130 Pulling, above 119, 189. 
131 Pulling, above 119, 192. 
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actions of habeas corpus or certiorari, except where the action lay by the custom of 
London, in which case they could not be removed at all.132 
 
Making removal to royal courts even more unlikely, the lord mayor’s court was an 
appeal court, and in its equitable jurisdiction could stay all other kinds of action.133 
The lord mayor’s power to stay actions was quite advantageous to many wealthy and 
privileged defendants. For example: in the sheriff’s court, by ancient custom of 
London, a losing party might apply, at a time after verdict and before judgment, to 
have the matter “marked” by the lord mayor. This process was known as markment 
and allowed the mayor to bar the complaint and stay enforcement proceedings. The 
defendant entered into a mere recognizance134 for double the amount of the verdict, 
rather than suffering a damaging judgment.135 Chapter 5 will investigate the 
attributes of procedural and substantive custom within the future tort of passing-off. 
 
2   The City of London Control over the Economy 
 
This section investigates how the City of London might have used both its County 
Palatine form136 over the weaker status of chartered cities, and its strict control over 
the gilds, to make the influence of its oral customary laws spread in England.  
 
Royal Charter137 declared the following ancient custom of London. “The mayor and 
aldermen for the time being ought to record all their ancient customs by word of 
mouth as often as anything should be moved in act or question before any judges or 
justices touching their customs.”138 An official holding the office and title of 
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Recorder performed this recording process.139 The records of the Recorder were 
subject to being proved in Court, by the evidential procedure of judicial notice, with 
only the Recorder himself appearing at the bar of the Court.140 
 
Royal charters set up many counties and cities. London was the most significant 
exception to this rule, with law by ancient prescription being more powerful than 
royal charter. Charters were a species of letters patent from the crown. They 
conferred franchises and made regulations for local governments, such as the 
constitutional arrangements allowed the crown to grant.141 However, the main formal 
difference between charters and letters patent was that, while the letter patent usually 
bore a simple teste meipso,142 the charter declared itself to have been delivered by the 
king or by his chancellor. This was in the presence of many witnesses whose names 
were given within it. The charter was attended upon by a public gathering for the 
announcement and was emblematic of the king’s will.143 Arguably, this kind of will 
of the king was a public good. 
 
Charters set up the constitutions of civic gilds or companies. Arguably, charters were 
based on accepted practice based on long-standing custom. Charters regulated the 
proceedings of local courts, and conferred upon the corporations their own power to 
administer justice, the privileges of holding markets, collecting tolls, fines, and 
forfeitures.144 The London trading companies had charters of their own. These 
defined their powers over their members and their trade.145 This suggested that the 
power of commerce was divided between the City and County corporations at the 
higher level of prestige as constituters of markets, and the companies or gilds at a 
lower level of prestige as regulators of their own members. 
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The City of London had no gild-like form of charter of establishment. Its royal 
charters were confined to a mere continuing of its ancient system of government, 
recognized under the ancient Roman Imperial law. Its customary laws were not 
subject to desuetude, so that when the king’s force to the contrary was removed, the 
ancient prescriptions automatically returned to operation.146 Arguably, the king had 
to struggle to prevail in the City of London. 
 
3   Freedom of the City 
 
This section investigates the freedom of the City of London, to place in context the 
various restrictions and obligations placed on London freemen. The section seeks to 
determine how foreigners as non-freemen were restricted from trading in their own 
names, or at all, inferring that foreigners had a lower commercial rank than that of 
local freemen. 
 
This section argues the following propositions. Freedom of the city was the 
administrative procedure that controlled the workplace. Any breach of it was dealt 
with without the requirement for proof of mens rea. It was equivalent to immigration 
status conferred on those people who had been either foreigners or strangers to the 
City. It created subservient ranks of master craftsmen, lawful journeymen and 
apprentices. This micro-hierarchy was subservient to the City and County, which in 
turn, was subservient to the king. The freedom system allowed those higher up in the 
hierarchy to take action against those of lower rank for misrepresenting their rank. 
 
The freedom of the city was the device by which the right to make a living was 
enforced. Without it, the worker reverted to the ancient form of slavery. From early 
Saxon times, membership in the gilds depended on full citizenship. However, the 
exclusion of strangers could not be explained by any political activist tendency by 
the crafts. Non-citizens, whether they were aliens or mere strangers, occupied a 
precarious position in medieval England. On their arrival in town, they were required 
to lodge in the house of one of the burgesses assigned to them as host, and who 
would be responsible for their good behavior. The burgess answered for the stranger 
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and this situated the stranger in a lowly hierarchical position. The period of the 
stranger’s sojourn was often limited by the immigration laws of the day to forty days. 
They were allowed to trade only with citizens or members of the applicable merchant 
gild.147  At the trade fairs, strangers were subject to separate tribunals, such as the 
piepowder courts. In all cases, heavy fines were imposed.148 
 
A court of Piepowders was a special court in England arranged by a borough for a 
fair or market. This court’s jurisdiction was for events taking place in the market, 
including disputes between merchants, theft, and acts of violence. Punishments 
typically included fines and the possibility of being held in a pillory or being drawn 
in a tumbrel in order to humiliate the offender. The court of Piepowder had its own 
position within the system of the common law. Doctor and Student situated the Court 
of Piepowder within the legal system, by noting that common law marketplace issues 
of a pre-statutory nature could be dealt with in courts of Piepowder.149 
 
Seligman noted that the distinction between freeman and foreigner was strongly 
accentuated in the general law. It was also accentuated in all the city regulations, 
such as those of Worcester, Bristol, Winchester, Ipswich, and the Cinque Ports.150 He 
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stated that the exclusion of non-freemen from the crafts was not so much the result of 
any independent action of the gilds, but was a principle of the early common law.151 
 
Freedom was arguably a specious term. It did not really mean that the person was 
free. The meaning of this kind of freedom was far from today’s meaning of the 
absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint in choice or action. From ancient times, 
freedom of the city of London could be acquired only by one of the original three 
pathways of patrimony, apprenticeship, or by redemption from the court of 
aldermen.152 Pulling wrote that from ancient Saxon times the power of conferring the 
freedom of the city was independent of the crown.153 People not free of the city were 
designated as foreigners or strangers, in accordance with the ancient law of Rome.154 
 
The freedom of the City of London was essential for commercial activity and 
functioned as follows. Only city freemen could vote in Parliamentary elections, vote 
in civic elections for councilmen and alderman, be exempt from all tolls payable on 
animals brought into the City for sale, be exempt from all market tolls payable 
anywhere in the country, be exempt from naval conscription, and enjoy the right to 
claim freedom from prosecution except in the city’s courts.155 
 
Up to 1835, every person who wished to become a city freeman first had to become a 
freeman of one of the City livery companies. These were mercantile successors to the 
medieval trade and craft gilds. The freedom of a livery company was merely an 
ordinary membership. A person wishing to become a senior member of a livery 
company had to be first a freeman both of that company and of the City of London. 
A person who was a freeman of both the City and a livery company was named, 
referred to, and thus identified as "Citizen and [Livery Company name] of 
London".156 
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Freedom by servitude was when a person had to complete an apprenticeship of at 
least 7 years' duration to a City freeman. Freedom by patrimony was open only to the 
legitimate and natural children of a male freeman who were born after their parent's 
own freedom admission. Redemption, or purchase, was obtainable by “presentation” 
by a corporation officer or other person who had been granted the right of presenting 
a limited number of candidates in lieu of salary or as a reward for services. The 
intending freeman usually had to pay the officer for presenting him.157 
 
Livery was an underlying customary norm to public representation of commercial 
rank. A public breach of this customary arrangement was arguably a 
misrepresentation of fact, which would have been complete without mens rea. With 
these customs, those with the freedom of the city were represented publicly first by 
their livery. This meant their special uniform as worn by a servant, an official, or a 
member of a City company. People could have an honorary freedom acclaimed by 
the citizenry as a public act, a completed apprenticeship of 7 years, by lawfully 
recognized patrimony, or by paying an official essentially for recognition. In fact, to 
be admitted on the livery of a company was technically called ‘having the 
clothing’.158 
 
Breaching the freedom of the city by non-freemen, or arguably passing oneself off as 
a freeman, was discussed in the following case. In this case, the defendants’ 
pleadings were the sole basis for judgment, suggesting the reverse onus system of an 
administrative hearing. 
31 Aug. 1306. Wednesday after the Feast of the Decollation of St 
John the Baptist [29 Aug.] before John de Wengrave, deputy of the 
Mayor. John de Coppedok, Geoffrey Giffard, John Brid, John de 
Rodbourne, and Hamo atte Barre, poulterers, were attached to answer 
the Commonalty, for buying poultry within the City to sell it outside, 
as though they were freemen, thus producing a scarcity of poultry to 
the damage of the citizens. The defendants pleaded that they bought 
poultry in the markets of Kyngeston, Berkingg, St Albans and other 
places far and near, paying custom there, and brought it to the City 
and sold it there to the profit of the City, and that they paid the bailiffs 
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158 William Herbert The History of the Twelve Great Livery Companies, Vol I (William Herbert, 1887), 
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murage and other customs; and they demanded a jury. Afterwards 
John de Redbourne (sic) and Hamo atte Barre paid a fine to the 
Commonalty to have the freedom, and went quit. A jury of John Burel 
and others gave a verdict in accordance with the defendants’ pleading. 
They were mainprised by John de Sabrichesworth, John atte Barre, 
John Burel and Roger Prior, poulterers, to hear judgment on Saturday. 
Afterwards the defendants made satisfaction to the Commonalty and 
were admitted and sworn to the freedom of the City.159 
 
The most significant privileges for the citizen with freedom of the city were two. 
Freemen enjoyed freedom from tolls throughout the realm, whenever they travelled 
outside their home city. There was also the freeman’s right to claim freedom from 
prosecution, except in the city’s courts. As this freedom was gained either by public 
honour, heredity, apprenticeship or redemption, admission to these privileges was a 
means by which the city could exercise control over the flow of trade immigrants. In 
order to formalize this control into an administrative methodology, the City needed a 
system of registration. It therefore turned to the misteries160 for administrative 
support, because only they had control over their own membership registries.161 
 
The freedom of the city was designed to identify foreigners and apprentices as 
prospective economic threats to both the master craftsmen and the taxation system. 
The meaning of this freedom within the administrative structure was suggested in the 
earliest surviving City of London Ordinance as to the freedom of London, dated circa 
1230, as follows. It maintained the anti-vagrant policy devised and enacted under 
King Athelstan,162 apparently to deal with conflicts arising from the presence of 
unauthorised people. Under this rule, people were prohibited from travelling unless 
there was a Lord to answer for them. 
Because many persons of the City travelling throughout England 
claim to belong to the liberty of London, whereby disputes and 
tumults arise, in order that it may be known whom of the City to 
defend as freemen, it is provided that no foreigner nor any apprentice 
departing from his lord shall enjoy the liberties of the City, nor sell 
retail in the City, unless they are found to have been enrolled. . . . 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Calendar of Early Mayor's Court Rolls: 1298-1307, Calendar Roll H 12 December 1305 - 12 
November 1306 (1924), 228 - 252 < http://www.british-
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160 Also known as gilds, guilds, companies. 
161 A F Sutton ‘The Silent Years of London Guild History before 1300: the Case of the Mercers’ 
(1998) 81 (175) Historical Research, 137. 
162 Carl Stephenson ‘The Anglo-Saxon Borough’ (1930) 45(178) The English Historical Review, 177-
207, 198, 199. 
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because by the taking of apprentices many contentions and discords 
arise owing to the ambiguity of their covenants, and in order that such 
ambiguities may henceforth be removed, it is provided that no one 
receive an apprentice unless they cause the covenant to be enrolled . . 
.163 
 
Only masters with the freedom of the City could take on apprentices. Apprentices 
had to be sworn and enrolled as freemen before they could practice their craft as 
masters. Otherwise they would have to continue as a servant/employee to a master. 
Both master and apprentice were bound together by a private contract. Either the 
Chamberlain of the City or the mayor’s court would enforce this contract. They 
could either specifically enforce it, or annul it. Thus, the outward representational 
sign of this gild power to identify and control members was the bestowing of a 
communal cognizance and livery.164 
 
Freedom of the City was enforced by the terms of an oath. These terms seemed to 
infer elements of an early form of passing-off. On 10 December 1830, the common 
council settled an amended form of the oath to be sworn upon being admitted to the 
freedom of the city of London. The oath was amended to accommodate 
contemporary variations in religious principles. Thus, any natural born subject 
became admitted to the freedom automatically at that date.165 Otherwise, the oath 
wordage remained unchanged since former and ancient times. The oath was worded 
as follows. 
Ye shall swear that ye shall be good and true to our Sovereign Lady Queen 
Victoria; obeysant and obedient ye shall be to the mayor and ministers of this city; 
the franchises and customs thereof ye shall maintain, and the city keep harmless in 
that in you is. Ye shall be contributing to all manner of charges within this city, as 
summons, watches, contributions, taxes, talliages, lot and scot, and to all other 
charges, bearing your part as a freeman ought to do. Ye shall colour no foreigner’s 
goods under or in your name, whereby the Queen or this city might or may lose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Corporation of London Records Office, Liber Ordinacionum fo 173 For other suits prosecuted in 
1299 by the clerks of the chamber on behalf of the commonalty of the city against those who 
infringed the freedom, in the courts of the chamberlain and the mayor, see Arthur Hermann Thomas 
Calendar of Early Mayor's Court Rolls, City of London (England) Lord Mayor's Court, City of 
London (England) Court of Common Council (Library Committee, The University Press, 1924). 
164 Sutton, above 161. Cognizance and Livery. In Heraldry. a device by which a person or a person's 
servants or property can be recognized, such as by a badge or uniform; a special uniform worn by a 
servant, an official, or a member of a City Company. The original sense was ‘the dispensing of 
food, provisions, or clothing to servants’, and the sense of a special uniform arose because medieval 
nobles provided matching clothes to distinguish their own servants from those of others. Oxford 
English Dictionary (Clarendon Press, 2nd ed, 1989). 
165 Pulling, above 119, 61. 
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their customs or advantages. Ye shall take none apprentices for any less term than 
for seven years, without fraud or deceit, and within the first year ye shall cause 
him to be enrolled, or else pay such fine as shall reasonably be imposed upon you 
for omitting the same; and after the term’s end, within convenient time (being 
required) ye shall make him free of this city, if he have well and truly served you. 
Ye shall also keep the Queen’s peace in your own person. Ye shall know no 
gatherings, conventicles, nor conspiracies made against the Queen’s peace, but ye 
shall warn the mayor thereof, or let it to your power. All these points and articles 
ye shall well and truly keep, according to the laws and customs of the city, to your 
power.166 
 
The newly amended wordage of the oath contained the following key requirements. 
The first was a duty to carry out unspecified charges using language of the common 
good. The second prohibited the use of the freeman’s name on the goods of a 
foreigner or stranger, thus restricting secondary meanings in product representations. 
The third conferred responsibility on the freeman for keeping the queen’s peace and 
reporting any breaches to the mayor. The fourth ensured no freedoms to apprentices. 
The fifth required apprentices to be registered, forced to serve seven years, and, 
given freedom only if they well and truly served. 
 
F   The Relationship Between Commerce, The Economy and The Gilds 
 
1   Gild Formation 
 
This section investigates the development of the gilds in England and the nature of 
their commercial rank, in order to place in the context of the later tort of passing-off 
the various ancient regulatory prohibitions affecting work as an artisan. 
 
‘Gild’, ‘guild’, ‘mistery’, ‘company’: all refer to the same concept in its historical 
development. Although the word gild shall be used throughout this thesis to refer to 
these other designations, each term implies its own meaning in the nature of a gild. 
The meaning of the word gild has passed through several phases.167 First, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Pulling, above 119, 61,62. 
167 The word itself, less commonly, but more correctly, written gild, was derived from the Anglo-Saxon 
gildan meaning "to pay", whence came the noun gegilda, "the subscribing member of a gild". In its 
origin the word guild is found in the sense of "idol" and also of "sacrifice", which has led some 
writers to connect the origin of the gilds with the sacrificial assemblies and banquets of the heathen 
Germanic tribes. E Burton et al The Catholic Encyclopedia, Guilds Robert Appleton Company, 
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originally meant the sacrificial meal convened out of the common contributions. 
Later, it meant a sacrificial banquet in general, and lastly it came to mean a society. 
It was a socially cohesive force for its members.168 
 
Traces of old gilds were also found around the English countryside, importing a 
certain system of customary servitude. One was said to have existed in Winchester in 
856 C.E., and although nothing was told about its nature, it was probably the same as 
the Cnighten-gild mentioned in Domesday. Similarly, there were several other 
Cnighten-gilds at Canterbury, London, and Nottingham.169 However, Seligman 
suggested it might have been preserved in the Tenure by Knights Service, as 
explained in Littleton’s Tenures. Littleton explained that tenure by homage, fealty 
and escuage, which were of heraldic origin indicating a right to form military 
structures, were all forms of holding title by knight’s service. The obligations of 
Knight’s service included strict control over the tenant’s marital rights, inheritance 
and the holding of property by the lord before the age of becoming sui juris. It was 
uncertain what these Cnighten or Knights were. However, it may be inferred that this 
kind of service, signified by its heraldic art, was part of the military structure of the 
realm. The word “Cnighten” originally had the meaning of a servant, and frequently 
occurred in the sense of a subordinate member of a nobleman's retinue. It was 
apparently used in this sense in the gild statutes of Exeter and Cambridge, where the 
Knight contributed less money than the full member, and where his lord was 
responsible if he were to draw a weapon or wound another. The Knights’ rank and 
importance, however, increased until at the Conquest they became the equals of the 
Thanes, or nobles.170 
 
Gilds began as groups for crown policing of some unlawful activities. Gross noted 
that Athelstan’s gilds were units for the social control of property.171 This was done 
by classifying men either as riders or workers, and governing them by a church style 
of organization in the gilds and by military style of organization in the field. Under 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Toulmin Smith (ed), English Gilds (Oxford University Press, 1870), xviii. 
169 Littleton’s Tenures, above 101, 39-111. 
170 Seligman, above 147, 15, 16. 
171 Athelstan was the first king of all England, and Alfred the Great's grandson. He reigned between 
925 and 939. 
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Athelstan there were statutes of a fully developed frithguild recorded in the Judicia 
Civitatis Londoniae.172 This was a combination of associations of one hundred men, 
subdivided into smaller groups of ten, subject to common rules, but otherwise 
independent of each other.173 In the time of King Athelstan, the gilds had already 
developed their own very rudimentary system of justice against theft, administerd by 
both the reeve and the bishop. The Judicia Civitatis Londoniae,174 provided as 
follows. “This is the ordinance which the bishops and reeves who belong to 
Londonborough have agreed upon.” After repeating Athelstan's recent enactments 
concerning cattle thieves, the ordinance proceeded to describe the protective 
association, called the frithgild, formed to help in enforcing the enactments. 
Offenders were to be rigorously pursued. No pursuit was to be abandoned on either 
side of the Thames, before every gildsman with a horse had ridden out. The man who 
owned no horse was to keep at work until his lord returned. If any group members 
were to protect a thief and prove strong enough to defy the gild, then the presiding 
reeve was to call out the gild’s full strength and send for aid from the reeves on both 
adjoining sides. When a trail was followed from one such district into another, the 
fullest co-operation of the reeves concerned was mandatory. In this way, people were 
classified as either men with horses or men as workers.175 
 
Thus, the ordinance was that one either protected property or tended to it. The only 
forms of property that were likely to be stolen, and for which compensation could be 
claimed, were horses, oxen, cows, pigs, sheep, and slaves.176 King Athelstan’s most 
important enactment controlled individuals who wandered around the country 
without either property or a lord to answer for them. These wanderers were a form of 
property held by relevant Lords. Two indicia of servitude together defined the 
qualifications for being a member of the state. They were property and status within 
an overlord system of rank. The close relatives of the wandering vagrants were 
commanded to place them under a lord, who, were they to be accused, should present 
them for justice.177 
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Sutton stated that the 1200s were a pivotal period in the work-life of London. It was 
a century, which saw the growth of restrictive regulations by towns. It was a period 
witnessing the rise of closed shops and closed towns as privileges were gathered, 
written down and arrayed against competitors. Craft178 gilds, such as for example the 
Weavers, coalesced as groupings of powerful craftsmen in English towns, from the 
early twelfth century.179 These craft gilds were called mestier, métier, ministerium,180 
and from this, derived the English ‘mistery’, or ‘mystery’, simply meaning a 
handicraft or trade.181 
 
Eventually, the gild system fractured into mercantile gilds and artisan gilds, the 
former with a higher commercial rank, or status, than that of the latter. Immediately 
prior to 1266, there appeared to be an economic transition where the classes of the 
poor coalesced with the classes of the craftsmen. The poor were excluded originally 
from merchant gild association for the lack of any property possession.182 This 
transition gave birth to a gild statute creating merchant gilds for the first time, merely 
by excluding practicing craftsmen coming from the artisan gilds. It provided that no 
person “with dirty hands or with blue nails”183 or who hawked his wares in the 
streets such as peddlers could become a member of the gild, and that craftsmen must 
have foresworn their trade for at least a year before being admitted to the gild.184 
This suggested a tendency to populate these new mercantile gilds with those of 
higher status, rather than with artisans or salesmen of lower status. It suggested that 
artisans were limited in their ability to trade in their own name. 
 
Toulmin-Smith illustrated this development with the instance of the Gild of Berwick. 
He reasoned inductively that they were representative of a national social 
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James Morwood (ed), The Oxford Latin Mini Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 1995). 
179 Sutton, above 161, 126. 
180 From the Latin, meaning ‘service’. James Morwood (ed), The Oxford Latin Mini Dictionary 
(Oxford University Press, 1995). 
181 Sutton, above 161, 126. 
182 Toulmin Smith, above 168, cvii. 
183 The suggestion is that a person with dirty hands or with blue fingernails would have been a 
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membership. 
184 Toulmin Smith, above 168, cvii. 
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movement.185 Berwick was a merchant gild where its members only traded, rather 
than worked, in wool or hides. Formerly this trade was undoubtedly carried on with 
that of the butchers. After craftsmen had been excluded from the gilds, butchers 
working outside the purview of this gild were forbidden to carry on the trade 
practised by current gild members.186 This was enacted into Article 25 of the Statutes 
of Berwick. The article said “No butcher, while he follows that calling, shall buy 
wool or hides”.187 This meant that no butcher, while carrying on his trade of cutting 
and preparing meat, was allowed to deal in wool or hides unless he gave up cutting 
and preparing meat.188 
 
However, every artisan was permitted to carry on his trade provided he joined and 
submitted himself to the regulation of the relevant craft gild, but not a mercantile 
gild. The principal purposes of craft gild rules were to secure sound quality work, to 
act as a police authority on behalf of the public, and as well, to secure the welfare of 
the members. Admission to a trade was via a long apprenticeship typically of some 
seven years in duration. Admission of an apprentice was a public event of a 
contractual nature. It was held in the Guildhall and presided over by the Chamberlain 
of the City. They instructed the apprentice in his solemn moral and trade duties, and 
then publicly executed the indentures of apprenticeship.189 
 
2   Gild Ordinance Structure 
 
This section investigates how gild structure, their rules for admission and exclusion, 
and their jurisprudence might have been the regulatory genesis of the later tort of 
passing-off. Gild ordinances seemed to be the genesis of the later tort of passing-off, 
a proscription against enticing away customers from the master, or from any gild 
brother, being the key unifying precept. 
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189 Toulmin Smith, above 168, cxxix. 
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Toulmin-Smith indicated that the available records of the Gild of Tailors of Exeter 
gave an instructive example of the character, workings, and usefulness of a middle-
ages craft gild in England.190 This gild was erected by the Charter of Edward IV,191 
in which the king commanded that gild members were to wear livery,192 hold feasts, 
make ordinances, be a body corporate and have a common seal. The charter also 
commanded that the master and wardens were to have control over tailors and others 
of the gild.193 This suggested the creation of ever-tightening rules for the control of 
manufacture of goods. 
 
Significant ordinances of this gild were set out as follows. The indenture of each 
apprentice had to be enrolled in a gild registry within 12 months, or else the master 
could lose his freedom permanently.194 The registry was an effective means for 
controlling the apprentices and their work. Newly created freemen were limited in 
how many servants they could have.195 Arguably, their capacity for production, and 
competition with senior masters, was limited by this provision. 
 
Each craftsman tailor had to swear an oath to the fraternity. Perhaps, this oath 
illustrated the nature of gild covenants among the fraternity. Each element of the oath 
was a proscribed act, inferring strict liability methods of dealing with their breach. 
The most significant elements of the oath were as follows. 
• To be true to the fraternity;196 
• To obey the master and wardens, disobedience to authority suggesting 
insubordination;197 
• Not to disclose the affairs of the craft, suggesting a prohibition against making 
public the secrets of the craft;198 
• Not to counsel or to encourage any foreigner either to dwell within the franchises or 
to use the craft;199 
• To show the indentures of the apprentices and to bring them in at the end of their 
terms;200 
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• Not to hire or entice any worker or apprentice away;201 
• Not to take a shop until admitted as a freeman;202 
• Not to entice customers away, by any means, from the master of from any brother;203 
• Not to leave the gild, but to uphold it according to the brother’s estate;204 
• Not to sue any brother of the craft without licence from the master.205 
 
It is of note in these rules that failure to obey an authority suggested an act of 
insubordination. Toulmin Smith recorded that in the event of disputes among 
members of a gild, it was a requirement that gild-brothers had to bring their case 
before the gild court of the master and wardens for settlement, before considering a 
court of law. This was in order to attempt reconciliation before the matter went 
further. However, the gild only dealt with such matters by way of compensation, 
fines and expulsion, as it had never assumed either a right of members’ life and limb, 
or a judicial role.206 
 
3   Collapse Of Gild Independence 
 
This section investigates the Evil May Day riots of 1517 and subsequent crown, 
court, city and gild responses to it, in order to place in this context the element of 
misrepresentation of source in the future tort of passing-off. 
 
One version of the Evil May-day riot207 commences with an account by a chronicler 
named Edward Hall. Hall noted that anti-alien sentiments had been mounting in the 
capital for some time. In early April of 1517, a peddler208 named John Lincoln 
convinced a minister of religion called Dr. Bell to introduce his sermon at St Paul’s 
Cross on Easter Tuesday with an exhortation stated in the following terms. 
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“Englishmen to cherish and defend themselves, and to hurt and grieve aliens for the 
common weal”.209 Dr. Bell read the complaint to a crowd in the following terms. 
To all you, the Worshipful Lords and Masters of this City, that will take 
compassion on the poor people, your neighbours; as also, of the great and 
insufferable hurts, losses, and hindrances, whereof proceedeth the extreme 
poverty to all the Kings Subjects that inhabit within this City and the suburbs 
thereof; for so it is, that the Aliens and Strangers eat the bread from the 
fatherless children, and take the living from the artificers, and the intercourse 
from all merchants, whereby poverty is so increased, that everyone 
bewaileth the misery of the other; for crafts-men be brought to beggary, and 
merchants to neediness; wherefore the premises considered, the redress must 
be of the Commons, knit and united to one part; and as the hurt and damages 
grieveth all men, that they set their willing power for the remedy, and not 
suffer the Aliens so highly in their wealth, and the natural born men of this 
kingdom to come to poverty.210 
 
Scattered attacks were mounted against aliens over the ensuing two weeks, and there 
were rumours that, on the very next May Day, a so-called spontaneous riot was 
expected to erupt. Aware of these rumours of impending riot, the aldermen imposed 
a 9.00 pm curfew on the eve of the expected riot. They did not announce the curfew 
until 8.30 pm. One hour before the curfew was to commence, one alderman John 
Mundy had a street altercation with a youth. This altercation precipitated a riot of 
about 1000 apprentices, in the ensuing 2 hours. The rioting apprentices descended 
upon the wealthy neighborhood of St Martin le Grand, where many aliens lived 
within the walls near St Paul’s Cathedral.211 
 
The under-sheriff of London met them. He had almost succeeded in convincing them 
to return to their homes when the residents of St Martin le Grand began to throw 
stones at them. Residents poured hot water on them from their windows. An official 
was apparently wounded, at which he yelled ‘down with them’.212 This unleashed the 
mob on the alien community of St Martin le Grand. Three hundred people were 
arrested. The king later pardoned most of them. However, 13 rioters, including John 
Lincoln, were convicted of treason and were executed.213 
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Resolving the conflicts of Evil May Day did little to resolve the underlying cause of 
attacks on London’s aliens. In April of 1518, the Merchant Taylors complained to 
the Common Council of London that strangers, who were licensed to work as only 
menders of clothing, were making clothes. The complaint was drafted in the 
following terms. 
A great multitude of strangers and aliens born out of this realm, not being 
freemen of this city, daily resort, multiply, increase and inhabit within this 
city and liberties thereof and in the same presume to work and do work in 
houses, chambers, alleys and in other places, as well secret as open . . . in the 
name of botchers, which is only to amend old apparel and garments; by 
colour whereof they work and make new apparel to the great loss, hurt and 
damage of the freemen of the handicraft or mystery of Merchant Taylors.214 
 
The result came in 1523 through an Act of Parliament stopping all strangers from 
hiring as an apprentice any person not born in England. It placed further limits on the 
hiring of non-English born journeymen. For the companies of London, the third 
section of the Act was the most significant, because it gave them direct control of all 
strangers living in the city. It was drafted in the following terms.215 
All manners of persons being aliens born using any manner of handicraft, be 
they denizens or not denizens, and inhabited within the city of London or 
suburbs of the same . . . or within two miles compass . . . shall be under the 
search and reformation of the [companies’] wardens . . . with one substantial 
stranger being a householder of the same craft by the same wardens to be 
chosen.216 
 
In this way, the companies were given operational crown authority to regulate the 
economic activities of all Londoners practicing crafts and trades within a radius of 
two miles of the city. The wardens were given full power and authority to search, 
view and reform all kinds of wares and workmanship made by alien-born 
handicraftsmen. 
 
In 1529, the crown intervened again, with an action in Star Chamber by a group of 
craftsmen. Henry VIII’s Lord Chancellor Cardinal Wolsey instigated the action. He 
charged a group of Flemings with violations of the Act of 1523. The outcome was a 
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decree against the Flemings and an Act of Parliament in the following year. The Act 
provided that no stranger, artificer, or handicraftsman should set up or keep any 
house, shop, shops, or chamber in England, in which they would exercise any 
handicraft. They were exempt from this if a denizen.217 Denization occurred by a 
grant of letters patent, as an exercise of the royal prerogative. Denizens paid a fee 
and took an oath of allegiance to the crown. The denizen was neither a citizen nor an 
alien, but had a status akin to today’s permanent residency. Sir William Blackstone 
stated the following. "A denizen is a kind of middle state, between an alien and a 
natural-born subject, and partakes of both."218 
 
In 1549, the terms of a new statute219 apparently identified a likely wrong of passing 
off.220 It forbade conspiracies of handicraftsmen to sell their wares at unreasonable 
prices, in an apparent attempt to protect consumers from oppressive market behavior 
such as of over-pricing and poor identification of product sources. The Statute also 
proscribed intermeddling in each other’s work, to finish another person’s already-
started work.221 Taken together, this suggested an actus reus of passing off combined 
with an anti-consumer intent was proscribed by the statutory duty, and since the 
wrong was externally proscribed, it was strict liability. 
 
In 1641 the apprentices petitioned Parliament pleading to restrict the activities and 
rights of settlement of foreign craftsmen.222  
And first we beseech your honours to take into consideration the intolerable 
abuse of our apprentices, for where we by coercion are necessarily 
compelled to serve seven or eight years at least, before we can have the 
immunity and freedom of this city to trade in: those which are mere 
strangers do snatch this freedom from us, and pull the trades out of our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 Rappaport, above 207, 46; 3 Statutes of the Realm 1509-1545, 297-301. 
218 The denizen was not a citizen because he did not have any political rights: he could not be a 
member of parliament or hold any civil or military office. However, the status of denizen allowed a 
foreigner to purchase property, although a denizen could not inherit property. Historically, paying 
for letters patent was thus a requirement of foreign land ownership in England. Sir William 
Blackstone Commentaries on the Law of England (Childs & Peterson, 1860), Book 1, Chapter X, 
374. 
219 Penalties on butchers, bakers, etc conspiring to sell victuals only at certain prices; and on artificers 
conspiring as to prices or times of work . . . . Act 2nd and 3rd Edw VI c 15; 4 Statutes of the Realm 
1547-1624, 58, 59. 
220 The perm passing off is commonly used without the hyphen to mean a factual situation, and with the 
hyphen to denote the later tort of passing-off. 
221 Toulmin Smith, above 168, clvii. 
222 Toulmin Smith, above 168, cl. 
58	  
	  
hands, so that by these means, when our times are fully expired, we do then 
begin in a manner to suffer a second apprenticeship to them, who do thus 
domineer over us in our own trades, &c.223 
 
Rappaport said that the issue was now fully clarified, saying it was as to who should 
and could lawfully dominate craftsmen in their own trade. One argument as to the 
methodology for resolution of this serious social problem, suggested that the crown, 
the City and the companies began an unprecedented cooperation by means of 
legislation and charters to limit the rights of Londoners without the freedom. He 
reported that these new crown restrictions had to be enforced by the City authorities, 
and through the City’s powers, the companies were then given operational crown 
authority to regulate the economic activities of all Londoners.224 
 
G   The Position of The Workers 
 
1   City of London Protection of the Masters 
 
This section investigates how the positions and relative ranks of the masters and the 
wholesalers might have been relevant to plaintiff locus standi, in the later tort of 
passing-off. 
 
It was considered a good custom in London for the governing officers of a trade to 
have the power to seize ill and unserviceable goods, which were exposed to sale, and 
then to remove them to Guildhall. This suggested that a breach of custom could be 
dealt with summarily as an argument based on fact. It also suggested the possibility 
of the exercise of an administrative discretion on a reverse-onus basis by the 
governing officers of a trade. At Guildhall, these officers could impanel a jury to 
render their verdict, and as a result, to restore or destroy these goods. This custom 
arguably served as the basis for city companies making by-laws for general 
regulation of their trades, and for the discipline of the individual members.225 
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The City of London reacted with its customary jurisdiction to the king’s exercise of 
power to allow the entry of foreign merchants. This was because it was not in the 
interests of the London inhabitants to be flooded with non-loyal and non-tax-paying 
foreigners. By the Act of common council of 15 April 1606,226 it was found that 
there was a custom from time immemorial that no person, not being free of the City 
of London, should either by himself or his agent, show or sell his wares by means of 
retail, within the city or its liberties. Thus, it was unlawful to pass off oneself as a 
freeman. The penalty for breach of this regulation was £5 for each offence. The act 
further provided as follows. 
 . . . that no person, not free of the city, could “by any colour, way, or means 
whatsoever, directly or indirectly, by himself or by any other” keep any shop or 
other place whatsoever, inward or outward, for show, sale, or putting to sale of 
any wares or merchandise whatsoever by way of retail, or use any art, trade, 
occupation, mystery, or handicraft whatsoever within the said city or the 
liberties thereof”, under the same penalty.227 
 
These were declared not to exclude the keeping of apprentices under 21 years of age, 
or employ strangers who were feltmakers, cap-thickers, carders, spinners, knitters, or 
brewers, or to employ non-freemen if freemen could not be found.228 The prohibitory 
part of these by-laws was stated in very remarkably similar terms to that set out in 
the Wagoner’s case,229 extracted below. 
 
In the 1610 Case of Wagoner v Finch, known as Wagoner’s Case, the Case of the 
City of London,230 Mr Wagoner was already in custody for non-payment of a fine for 
unlawfully plying his trade and for keeping an unlawful shop. The fine was levied by 
the City of London as a reverse onus procedure. His legal representatives brought an 
action in habeas corpus as against the Mayor, Aldermen and Sheriffs of London 
regarding his incarceration.231 The City of London submitted a reply to the action, 
making key arguments, as follows. 
. . . where by the ancient charters, customs, franchises, and liberties of the city of 
London, confirmed by sundry acts of Parliament, no person not being free of the 
city of London, may or ought to sell or put to sale any wares or merchandizes 
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within the said city, or the liberties of the same, by retail, or keep any open or 
inward shop, or other inward place or room, for show, sale, or putting to sale of 
any wares or merchandizes, or the use of any art, occupation, mystery, or 
handicraft within the same. And whereas also Edward, sometime King of England, 
of famous memory, the third of that name, by his charter made and granted to the 
said city in the fifteenth year of his reign, confirmed also by Parliament, amongst 
other things granted, that if any customs in the said city before that time obtained 
and used, were in any part hard or defective, or any things in the same city newly 
arising, where remedy before that time was not ordained, should need amendment, 
the Mayor and Aldermen of the said city, and their successors, with the assent of 
the Commonalty of the same city, might put and ordain thereunto fit remedy, as 
often as it should seem expedient to them, so that such ordinance should be 
profitable to the King, for the profit of the citizens, and other his people repairing 
to the said city, and agreeable to reason.232 
 
The first key issue in the reply was that it cited certain charters, customs, franchises, 
and liberties of the city of London, apparently confirmed by several acts of 
Parliament.233  The Court stated that the following was evident from The Prince’s 
Case.234 “[A] Charter having the authority and force of parliament is sufficient in 
itself without any other act”.235 The Rhetorica ad Herennium described legal custom 
as that which, in the absence of any statute, was endowed by usage with the force of 
statute law.236 Taken together, this raises the issue of whether the custom of London, 
as a species of statute, so cited might and should be read as good and operative law. 
 
The second key issue was that the Court noted that one might become free of the 
city, or, a freeman of the City of London, in only three ways, as follows. The first 
was by service such as by an apprenticeship. The second was by birthright, such as 
for example the son of a freeman. The third was by redemption by way of allowance 
by the Court of the Mayor and Aldermen. These three methods were customary in 
character, and neither charter nor command of the king could create the status of the 
freeman of the City.237 Thus, passing off oneself as a freeman was arguably a breach 
of ancient customary law. 
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The court held further that strangers and foreigners had devised and practiced, by 
sinister and subtle means, ways of defrauding the charters, liberties, customs, good 
orders and ordinances of London. From this might be inferred the possibility that a 
sinister and subtle breach of customary laws might have been indicative of fraud. 
The inference could run thus: people without a historical connection to a customary 
rule, or not bound by such a customary law, acted without proper approval or 
supervision as if they were of equal rank or status to those approved and properly 
supervised people paying their taxes, and damaged these properly approved and 
supervised people. This formulation contained the three elements of 
misrepresentation of status, damage and the public good. Arguably, this formulation 
is of the same genus as the classical trinity of the later tort of passing-off. The court’s 
holding seemed to be a statement of alleged secret activities by foreigners. It inferred 
a presumption of reverse onus against those foreigners and strangers, and therefore 
strict liability. In its totality, it suggested the possibility that a strict liability genus of 
passing-off was an indicium of fraud. 
 
The holding continued by particularising its suggestion of fraud. It was alleged they 
had sold and presented for sale their wares and merchandises in private and secret 
places, probably suggesting a failure to operate in market overt. The allegation also 
stated they had used arts, trades, occupations, mysteries, and handicrafts to the 
detriment and hurt of the inhabitants of the city. It added that the local inhabitants 
had to pay scot and lot, bore offices and underwent other charges, which foreigners 
and strangers did not have to do.238 This reasoning suggested that while all the locals 
had to pay burdensome taxes and circumscribe their lives with certain prohibitive 
rules, a foreign person not so constrained caused apparent detriment to the local 
inhabitants. Therefore the city made by-laws forcing strangers to become free of the 
city. These by-laws required them to show their wares in public, so that regulatory 
authorities could supervise them. 
 
Coke’s Reports wrote that the court held as follows. 
In this case it was resolved, that the said custom of London, that no person 
whatsoever, not being free of the city of London, shall by any colour,239 way, 
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or mean whatsoever, directly or indirectly, by himself or any other, keep any 
shop or any other place whatsoever, inward or outward, for show or putting 
to sale of any wares or merchandizes whatsoever by way of retail, or use any 
trade, occupation, mystery, or handicraft, for hire, gain, or sale, within the 
City of London, is, upon the whole matter disclosed in the return, a good 
custom; and that such constitution made according to the custom alleged in 
the return, upon pain of forfeiture of 5l, was also good.240 
 
Arguably, the holding in Wagoner’s Case effectively re-stated a customary 
proscription against what was the essential character of the later tort of passing-off as 
an anti-competition law. By using the wordage ‘by any colour’, it arguably inferred 
that a species of fraud was an underlying component. This issue will be examined in 
chapter 4, below, as the doctrine of secondary meaning, and in 5, below, as a badge 
of fraud. 
 
Morison’s view was that the term “passing-off” indicated the act of selling goods 
with an accompanying fraudulent misrepresentation by words or conduct as to the 
origin of the goods, whereby the purchaser has been misled and business has been 
diverted from the plaintiff to the defendant.241 The words “by any colour” seem to 
correlated to misrepresentation. The words “not be being free of the city” seem to 
correlate to the goods’ origin, or propriety of custom. This suggested that strangers 
were considered as diverters of business away from lawful freemen. In other words, 
it could be argued as a corollary of forestalling of goods that strangers were unfair 
competitors. 
 
The court also resolved that a city’s custom and a charter granted to a city were 
different in effect. This was because customs could only be good by the very nature 
of custom. However, a custom could not be effective by grant, unless deemed so by 
an act of parliament,242 because trade could not be maintained or enhanced without 
proper government. Therefore, the king could lawfully counteract a custom by 
erecting a new guildam mercatoriam, or, mercantile gild.243 All members of this 
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mercantile gild were to pay scot and lot. Seligman noted that freemen, or citizens, of 
the city and gild members were not the same. The freeman was the inhabitant 
householder who paid scot and bore lot. This meant that the freeman contributed his 
proportion to the taxes, bore his share of the civic burdens and was enrolled at the 
Court Leet. On the other hand, gild members were recruited from strangers as well as 
from local inhabitants. While the guild members might reside outside the city, the 
citizen in general could not. While the citizen needed to have a house, the guild 
member did not.244 This suggested a judgment establishing a superior commercial 
rank of the freemen over other citizens. 
 
In practice, the city limited itself to restricting retail dealers or tradespersons in those 
trades requiring more than the ordinary surveillance of the civic authorities.245 Thus, 
when the power of the city and county corporations became more strictly exercised, 
the main wholesale transactions took place in fairs and markets, and it was in these 
venues that the city concentrated its control.246 
 
In Hutchins v Player, Chamberlain of London,247 the court stated that the corporation 
of the City of London could generally restrain persons in places for public buying 
and selling, the times in which they could buy and sell, the trades with which they 
could meddle, and the trades with which they should not intermeddle. 
 
Thus, in the 1675 case of Hutchins v Player248 the court considered the issue of the 
claim by non-freemen to deal by wholesale within the jurisdiction of the City of 
London. The reported facts referred to an Act for the better regulating of the old and 
new drapery in Blackwell Hall and Leadenhall. It appeared that Samuel Hutchins had 
been arrested and was in Sheriffs’ custody in a London gaol, for an apparently 
unpaid fine. He was fined under an Ordinance of the City. It stated that all broad 
cloths should be pitched and harboured in Blackwell Hall and Leadenhall, and that 
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they should be duly entered with both hallage249 and duty to be paid. It was also 
enacted that no person should be a broker, factor or buyer in those Halls unless first 
approved by the mayor and aldermen and entered into a recognizance in the King’s 
Court. 250 
 
Sir Orlando Bridgman then stated, inter alia, the following holdings which are 
arguably relevant to the later tort of passing-off. They suggested that a prima facie 
case of a breach of City Custom was sufficient for the City to act by levying a fine 
and confiscating goods. 
i. A fuller statement of the relevant custom than that which is reproduced in 
Wagoner’s Case251 is as follows. The ordinance of Common Council had 
stated that many freemen pretended to be immediate buyers, but were really 
agents and brokers for strangers and foreign men. This was contrary to the 
custom of London and the privileges of the City, and that such practices 
were colouring of foreigners’ goods and contrary to the oath of a freeman. 
Therefore all such commodities bought and sold were to be forfeit to the 
City.252 
 
ii. For the factors, buying is in the markets. Therefore he should not be 
permitted to exercise a by-trade253 of his own in the same commodities 
whereby he is the clothier’s servant. If the factor buys for himself, it is in his 
power to undo the clothier. For example: a clothier sends twelve cloths to 
his factor to sell for him. The factor likes them and buys them all for 
himself, or he culls out the best colours and cloths, then leaves the refuse to 
an uncertain market. This factor may then make the clothier pay factorage 
for the cloths he has culled out for himself, thereby under-buying any other 
man. He might keep the cloths unsold until the rates are low so that he may 
buy them at his own price. If the factor trades for himself in this way, no 
man can buy goods except at second hand.254 
 
The legislature enacted the Statute of Elizabeth255 specifically to adopt this custom of 
the City of London on a nation-wide basis. This statute enacted that a prior 
apprenticeship was required to carry on trade in any part of the kingdom,256 in the 
following terms. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 Hallage. A fee or toll paid for goods sold in a hall. Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (C & 
G Merriam Co, 1913). 
250 Orlando Bridgman, above 247, 273, 274. 
251 4 Coke Rep 121b. 
252 Orlando Bridgman, above 247, 289, 290. 
253 Presumably a trade ancillary to that of the clothier. 
254 Orlando Bridgman, above 247, 313, 314. 
255 5 Eliz C 4, s 24. 
256 Pulling, above 119, 481. 
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AND bee it further enacted by the authoritee aforesaid, That after the first 
daye of Maie next coming, it shall not be lawfull to any person or persons, 
other then suche as nowe doo laufully use or exercise any Arte Misterye or 
Occupation, nowe used or occupied within the Realme of Englande or 
Wales, Excepte he shall have been brought uppe therin Seaven yeares at the 
least as Apprentice, in maner and fourme abovesaid, nor to set anye person 
on woorck in suche Misterye Arte or Occupation, being not a Worckman at 
this Day, excepte he shall have bene Apprentice as ys aforesaid, orels 
having served as an Apprentice as is aforesaid, shall or will become a 
Journeymen, or be hyred by the yere; upon payne that every person 
willingly offending or doing the contrary, shall forfeite and lose for every 
Defaulte fourtye shillinges for every monethe.257 
 
Further, in accordance with an old custom of London, a person who had served a 
seven-year apprenticeship to a trade of buying and selling, might give up that trade 
and take up another.258 This custom was considered to apply to every trade in which 
the Statute of Elizabeth259 specifically required an apprenticeship.260 
 
The principal crafts had become incorporated, during the time of Henry VI,261 
directly by the crown.262 However, in the 1830 case of Clark v Denton263 it was held, 
citing the same principles enunciated in Wagoner’s Case,264 that the real meaning of 
the custom that no person should keep a shop or place for use of any art or trade, was 
specifically that people should not carry on business as masters, unless they were 
masters. If the defendant could prove that he acted in the trade as a journeyman or 
apprentice only, it would be a defence.265 This suggested that a person of lower 
commercial rank than master was presumed legally incompetent to sell in market 
overt on his own account. 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 4 Statutes of the Realm 1547-1624, 420. 
258 Allen v Tolley BR 12 Jac I, Calth Rep 9, 48. 
259 5 Eliz, c 4. 
260 Allen v Tolley BR 12 Jac I, Calth Rep 9, 48. 
261 1547-1555. 
262 Pulling, above 119, 485. 
263 1 Barn & Ad 92; (1830) 109 ER 721. 
264 4 Coke Rep 121b. 
265 Clark v Denton 1 Barn & Ad 92, 97. 
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2   The Pressing of The Trades into a Crown System of Commercial Ranks 
 
This section investigates the limits of crown regulatory action against the trades, 
bringing the gilds under direct crown control in the context of the king’s will in the 
public interest, and how this regulation might relate to the later tort of passing-off. 
 
As for commercial rank, at the conclusion of the reign of Edward II266 it had been 
established that a certain twelve of the companies were the “wisest” and most self-
sufficient, and therefore, they should be the most active in advising the city. These 
companies were, in descending order of precedence and therefore also presumably 
in descending order of wisdom and prerogative, or rank, as follows: mercers; 
grocers; drapers; fishmongers; goldsmiths; skinners; merchant tailors; haberdashers; 
salters; ironmongers; vintners, and, the cloth workers.267  
 
The London court of aldermen enacted an ordinance,268 probably in 1356, 
establishing and confirming the custom as follows. 
 . . . all the mysteries should be faithfully ruled and governed, each 
according to its nature, and in such a manner, that no deceit should be found 
in any of their works or trades; that in each mystery, there should be chosen 
four or six, or more, or less, according to the needs of the mystery; which 
persons, so chosen and sworn, should have full power from the mayor to 
will and faithfully to do and perform the same.269 
 
This ordinance suggests that deceit in the trades was inconsistent with very powerful 
supervision. It could be expected, as a natural consequence, that the crown would 
want to be atop this hierarchy, should it have desired to control the stamping out of 
deceit. 
 
The royal reaction to this ranking of the companies by the city appeared to have 
been to bring its tenets more under the king’s jurisdiction, by enacting the following 
statute.270 
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267 Pulling, above 119, 78. 
268 39 Edward III. 
269 2 Rep MC 13. 
270 15 Henry VI c 6, probably in 1437. 
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. . . the Masters Wardens and People of every such Guild Fraternity or 
Company incorporate, betwixt this and the Feast of Saint Michael next 
coming, shall bring and do all their Letters Patents and Charters to be 
registered of Record before the Justices of Peace in the Counties, or before 
the Chief Governors of the said Cities, Boroughs, and Towns where such 
Guilds, Fraternities, and Companies be . . . no such Masters, Wardens, nor 
People make nor use no Ordinance which shall be to the Disherison or 
Diminution of the [King's Franchises] or of other, nor against the common 
Profit of the People . . . .271 
 
This situation was further clarified,272 using a recital of the substance of 15 Hen. VI. 
c. 6, as above, and noting that 15 Hen. VI. c. 6 had expired. It provided as follows. 
. . . divers and many ordinances had been made by divers and many private 
bodies corporate within their cities, towns, and boroughs, contrary to the 
king’s prerogative, his laws, and the common weal of his subjects: it was 
therefore enacted, that no masters, wardens, and fellowships of crafts or 
mysteries, nor any of them, nor any rulers, or gilds, or fraternities, should 
make any acts or ordinances in disinheritance of the prerogative of the king, 
nor of none others, nor against the common profit of the people . . . .273 
 
This statute explicitly set the prerogative of the king above anyone else’s 
prerogative. It set the common profit of the people as being equal to a sole right in 
the king, and appeared to remove any management prerogative from within the gilds, 
unless approved by the crown. 
 
H   Conclusion 
 
The chapter began with a brief survey of the tort of passing-off, suggesting that 
passing-off was a conjectural argument, and therefore one of reverse onus. It 
proceeded to review strict liability in tort, and set out the following six propositions 
as arguably defining strict liability in tort, for the purposes of the scope of this thesis. 
These were the six propositions. First, proof that the defendant caused harm created a 
presumption of liability. Second, the tort of breach of statutory duty was one of strict 
liability. This was because there was an external statutory determination of the prima 
facie wrongful conduct. Third, anyone who professed a craft, held himself/herself out 
to have the common skill of that craft, and was answerable accordingly. If this 
person failed, it was no excuse that he or she merely did the best possible. The rule 
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272 19 Hen VII c 7, probably in 1504. 
273 Ibid. 
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was that he/she must be reasonably skilled at his/her peril. Fourth, if the presumption 
of guilty knowledge in a crime were rebutted by proof that a fraud had been 
practiced on the defendant, then the defendant would be civilly liable instead of 
being criminally culpable. Fifth, mens rea in tort was divided into involuntary acts, 
negligence and intentional acts, the last of which divided into fraud and malice. 
Sixth, liability in tort was strict, rather than absolute, if it required proof of mens rea 
in one or more aspect of the tort, the remaining aspects either required no proof of 
mens rea or that proof was provided by a presumption of the law. 
 
The chapter sought to identify the genesis of the tort of passing-off by examining 
various relevant aspects of public policy and regulation, in the early middle ages. 
 
There was a system of commercial ranks, by which a higher rank could sue a lower 
rank in matters of personal property. The section on the king’s power of quo 
warranto argued that accreditation and confiscation might arguably have been a 
reaction by those of lower supervisory commercial rank to the possibility of an 
action in quo warranto. This action could in theory be initiated by those of higher 
commercial rank against those of lower commercial rank. The crown controlled the 
power of the county by common law actions in quo warranto, the county controlled 
the power of the gilds by common law actions in quo warranto and the gilds 
controlled the work of the artisans and apprentices by inspection, accreditation and 
sometime confiscation of their work products. The process of certification will be 
examined in chapter 3 in the section on development of the law of certification 
marks. 
 
Londoners had a superior right over foreigners to sue in matters of representation of 
the source of manufactured goods. The section on the nature of the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the city of London suggested that the London Town Clerk could make out 
several prerogative orders, and that the Hustings had complete control over all real 
and personal property. It could order attachment or sequestration. Foreigners had no 
local rights in the London courts and Londoners could not be sued outside the walls 
of London. London’s customary jurisdiction appeared to give it complete power to 
prioritise the rights in London-sourced personal property over foreign-sourced 
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personal property. This suggested a superior locus standi to sue by the Londoner in 
matters of personal property. The section on the City of London control over the 
economy suggested that the customary laws of London were first oral, then stated by 
the Recorder and archived. London customary laws were not subject to desuetude. 
Thus, London might state its own laws in the common interest and, by its prestige, 
influence laws elsewhere in England. The section on freedom of the City argued that 
the system of freedom of the city controlled the right to make a living as an artisan. 
The oath of a freeman included prohibition of a freeman’s name on foreign goods. 
By prohibiting the acts of passing off the goods of non-freemen, it appeared that 
foreigners suffered a disability making and selling their goods under any name in 
London. 
 
The crown brought the gilds under crown control to maintain commercial ranks 
among the masters and the artisans. The section on gild formation argued artisan gild 
membership was both permission to and restriction on work, and, it was exclusion 
from the mercantile classes. Gross noted that as early as Athelstan’s time, gilds were 
units for the social control of property. This was done by classifying men either as 
riders or workers, and governing them by both church organization in the gilds and 
by military organization in the field. The section on gild ordinance structure 
established that gild ordinances were structured to restrict entry into the trades 
through apprenticeship. It argued that gild jurisprudence contained a nascent form of 
the later tort of passing-off through prohibiting commercial insubordination. The 
section on the collapse of gild independence argued that companies/gilds were given 
rank by crown authority to regulate craft and trades activities. It suggests that the 
crown and parliament used the Evil May Day riot ultimately to implement 
regulations for prohibiting misrepresentation of source within the sale of goods. 
 
This chapter argued that a nascent form of passing-off existed well before this action 
was taken in the royal courts. This was well before the national common law courts 
were established. Masters and those of the same commercial rank were the only ones 
who could trade in their own names. Those of lower status could not. Issues of status 
in disputes will be examined in chapter 4. The section on the protection of the 
masters argued that gild regulatory power of search and seizure of goods was 
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enforced nationally by the cities and gilds so that only masters could trade in their 
own names, and, wholesalers could trade in masters’ goods only by consent of the 
king. The section on the pressing of the trades into a crown system of commercial 
ranks argued that the companies were arranged into higher and lower ranks based on 
so-called wisdom and self-sufficiency, ostensibly to stamp out deceit. On this basis, 
this suggests that insubordination was related to deceit. It argued further that the 
stamping out of deceit could not go so far as to derogate from the king’s will or the 
common profit of the people. This suggested that deceit was somehow related to 
public opinion. Cited case law suggested that breaches of City customary law were 
dealt with on a strict liability basis, and were indicative of fraud. This suggestion will 
be investigated in chapters 4 and 5.
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III THE LAW OF GRAPHIC REPRESENTATIONS 
 
A   Introduction 
 
In chapter 2, there was argument for the existence of various commercial ranks, 
arising from customary law. A breach of this custom was dealt with on a strict 
liability basis, suggesting indications of fraud. Chapter 2 inferred a relationship 
between this customary law and a strict liability structure of a nascent form of 
passing-off. It noted that early gilds were supervised by a church-style regimen. 
Argument in Chapter 3 proposes to adopt and build on both the proposition of 
commercial ranks identified in chapter 2, and the proposition that a breach of 
commercial status was a strict liability issue indicative of fraud. It asks when work 
might have been controlled by police action and when work might have been 
controlled by church supervision. Therefore, its structure is based on the following 
proposition: that commercial ranks are related to the differential levels of status, 
symbolised graphically on royal seals as the higher status, and symbolised in 
trademarks as the lower status. 
 
The first section is on the law of seals. The subsection on seals on royal documents 
seeks to relate the graphic representations on royal seals to a strict liability 
enforcement regime against passed off goods. The subsection on the administration 
of the seals examines the various strata of administration used to enforce the 
application of royal seals. The subsection on the swan mark inquires into a 
customary crown administrative system. The subsection on regulation of publications 
examines some relevant key consequences of breaches in book licensing. 
 
The second section is on the development of trademarks. The subsection on crown 
regulation of proprietary marks examines how merchants used proprietary marks. 
The subsection on production marks examines how they were related to product 
source and goodwill. The subsection on certification marks investigates how marks 
were used to certify artisans’ work. 
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This chapter will argue that the tort of passing-off has strict liability characteristics, 
because both seals and marks were controlled by an administrative registry system, 
resulting from a unilateral crown declaration of jurisdiction. It will be argued that, 
pursuant to this registry system, a misrepresentation in the registry, traceable to being 
caused by a defendant, inferred defendant liability at the time the registry entry 
became incorrect. Also, the chapter argues that since registries were operated by 
customary procedures, the identified administrative system continued to inhere 
within the strict policing of graphic representations. Consequently, passing off any 
mark controlled by such an administrative registry would be enforced as strict 
liability, due to what the mark symbolised. 
 
B   The Law of Seals 
 
1   Seals on Royal Documents 
 
This section asks whether the graphic representations on royal seals were related to a 
strict liability enforcement regime against passed off goods. It asks further that if this 
were so, how might seals’ power have been enforced? 
 
Deane explained that grants made in charters were made by the sovereign under the 
royal prerogative.1 Each grant was surrounded by essential formalities. This was so 
that no detriment or injury might result to the property or persons of the king’s 
subjects, or to the rights and possessions of the crown. Such formalities were 
pursuant to an ancient and customary principle, traceable back to the earliest period 
of the English constitution.2 Custom provided that the sovereign’s prerogative might 
not be exercised arbitrarily or without properly exercised discretion, and might only 
be exercised legally and for the general benefit of the Commonwealth, or, by consent 
of the people. This precept was applied directly to the process of issuing letters 
patent under seal from the crown, and was implied as a term into the charters so 
issued in the public interest.3 
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Son, 1870), 3. 
2 Most probably from the time of Athelstan, who reigned from 929 to 939 C E. 
3 Deane, above 1, 3. 
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Royal seals appear to have followed certain symbolic rules, which had existed since 
ancient times.4 Each graphic element of each seal conveyed meaning. For example, 
Chaplais noted that all the great seals of the English kings were derived from the seal 
of Edward the Confessor,5 who reigned from 1042-1066 C.E. That seal was circular 
and double-sided with a diameter of about three inches. Each side of the seal was a 
seal of majesty representing the king with his various symbols of royal power, 
linking land to the power of the sword. On one side was a sceptre topped with a 
trefoil in the king’s right hand and an orb topped with a cross on his left. On the 
other side was a virga topped with an eagle in his right hand and a sword in his left.6 
Littleton explained the virga as derived from Latin, twig or branch. It was an 
observable streak or shaft of precipitation that fell from a cloud but evaporated 
before reaching the ground. Littleton explained tenants by the “verge” as in the same 
nature as tenants by copy or court roll. However, they were called tenants by the 
verge because when they surrendered their tenement into the hands of their lord for 
the use of another, they would have a little rod in their hand, which they would 
deliver to the steward or bailiff. The steward or bailiff would then deliver the rod to 
the person taking the land in the name of seisin. This taking was entered into the 
court roll pursuant to the custom of the manor.7 
 
Chaplais reported that the seal of William the Conqueror was circular but slightly 
larger, with majesty on one side only. The other side was the baronial side 
representing the king as Duke of the Normans. The majesty side was William sitting 
on a throne holding a sword in his right hand and an orb surmounted by a cross in his 
left hand. All later kings retained this principal design, until as recently as early 
modern times.8 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Since ancient times, kings had used mimetic symbols techniques to communicate their power and 
their laws to the illiterate populace by analogy to what the populace already believed and understood. 
Lillian B Lawler ‘Proteus Is a Dancer’ (1943) 36(10) The Classical Weekly, 116-117, 116, 117. 
5 Pierre Chaplais English Royal Documents King John – Henry VI, 1199 – 1461 The Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1971, 2. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Sir Thomas Littleton Littleton’s Tenures in English (John Byrne & Co, 1903), 36. 
8 Chaplais, above 5, 2. 
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Chaplais added that the royal seal had its own administrative apparatus. In the time 
of King John,9 custodianship of the great seal was in the hands of the chancellor, 
who was also an archbishop. The chancellor’s two principal assistants were the vice-
chancellor as keeper of the seal, and the protonotary supervising the clerical staff of 
the chancery, in their writing roles.10 
 
Seals represented a substantial body of regulatory administration. During the reign of 
King John, the chancery had a great deal of work to do in order to prepare each 
document. First, a draft was prepared, and then this draft had to be checked and 
corrected. The checked and corrected document was then presented for the affixing 
of the seal and would only receive the seal if written in an aesthetically fair hand.11 
Presumably the keeper of the seal judged it aesthetically pleasing, an unpleasing 
writing not being appropriate for a royal document. 
 
Chancery documents were the forerunners of the later injunctions in the court of 
chancery. At regular time intervals, it was customary for chancery documents to be 
sewn into chancery rolls, one roll for charters, one roll for letters patent and one roll 
for letters close.12 The three styles of document, charters, letters patent and letters 
close, were all derived from the one document style, descending from the form of 
writ of Edward the Confessor in Old English. Every Old English writ was a transfer 
by way of declaration under the name of the king, indicating that he had made or 
confirmed a grant of land or a grant of rights on land. This declaration was an open 
letter sealed by the royal seal. It was addressed to the officials and suitors of the 
court of the shire, but in later times to the sheriff, setting out particulars of the land 
grant. The grantee caused the document to be written by the grantee’s own scribes. 
The grantee presented it to the king for sealing, and then took it to the shire court to 
be read aloud in public. This secured both public notice and a measure of public 
interest. The writ was then handed back to the grantee.13 After William’s conquest of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Reigned 1199–1216. 
10 Chaplais, above 5, 3. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Chaplais, above 5, 3, 4. 
13 Ibid. 
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England, the writs were used as a means of conveying an injunction. They were 
addressed to the specified individuals, enjoining them to perform only one action.14 
 
Grants and injunctions were self-funding administrative devices under royal seal for 
direct crown control. Fees for the issue of chancery documents were charged 
pursuant to an ancient custom. However, by the close of the reign of Henry III,15 
these fees were reserved for the benefit of the chancellor and his senior colleagues in 
the chancery. Whenever there was a vacancy in the office of chancellor, the fees 
accrued direct to the king. The great seal was used in this way as a tax farm, until the 
occasion of the death in 1244 of Chancellor Ralph de Neville. Neville had been 
appointed chancellor for life. After his death, the fees were collected for the sole 
benefit of the crown.16 
 
During the reigns of William I and William II,17 writs of exemption from tolls and 
writs of protection were issued under the great seal. They conferred permanent rights 
on the addressees, and were written in the form of a prerogative order in 
prohibition.18 Merchants ascribed great value to such grants, as they were essential to 
a profitable business. This crown power could flow down through the commercial 
ranks. As argued in chapter 2, according to Pulling, in matters of appeal, the Town 
Clerk could make out orders in prohibition, certiorari and procendendo.19 This 
effectively gave control to the London Court of Hustings over the action in 
replevin.20 
 
Arguably, replevin was a strict liability procedure by its presumptive nature. Its 
power seems to have flowed down using royal instruments. In theory, it could 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Chaplais, above 5, 5. 
15 1216-1272. 
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17 Together, 1066-1100. 
18 Chaplais, above 5, 5, 6. 
19 Alexander Pulling The Laws, Customs, Usages and Regulations of the City and Port of London 
(William Henry Bond and Wildy and Sons, 2nd ed, 1854), 173. 
20 Replevin. A legal remedy for a person to recover goods unlawfully withheld from his or her 
possession, by means of a special form of legal process in which a court may require a defendant to 
return specific goods to the plaintiff at the outset of the action. Encyclopaedic Australian Legal 
Dictionary, LexisNexis, Sydney [2012], online. 
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remove all passed off21 goods into the hands of the plaintiff, at the outset of an action 
for unlawful possession of goods.22 
 
2   Administration of the Seals 
 
This section examines the various strata of administration used to enforce application 
of royal seals. The first king who had a privy seal was Richard I.23 The king used the 
Privy Seal for his personal and secret correspondence. His successor, king John, 
began the practice of using his privy seal for official business such as for chancery 
writs. The privy seal was much smaller than the great seal, inferring its use for and 
on smaller documents. However, it appears that the king used his privy seal 
whenever he wanted the fees or other monies paid directly into his personal account, 
and not into the exchequer.24 In consequence of this, a new department of state was 
set up in 1312 under Edward II.25 His majesty named this department the privy seal 
office. It was set up by the ordinance of 5 Edw. II, stated in these words. 
AND Forasmuch as the King hath been evil guided and counselled by bad 
Counsellors, as is aforesaid, We do ordain, that all evil Counsellors be put 
away and removed altogether, so that neither they nor other such be near him, 
nor retained in any Office of the King, and other more fit People be put in 
their Places; And in the same manner shall it be done of their Servants and 
People of Office, and of others who are in the King's Household, who are not 
fit. AND Forasmuch as many Evils have come to pass by such Counsellors 
and such Ministers, We do ordain that the King do make the Chancellor, Chief 
Justice of the one Bench and the other, the Treasurer, the Chancellor and 
Chief Baron of the Exchequer, the Steward of his Household, the Keeper of 
his Wardrobe, and Comptroller, and a fit Clerk to keep the Privy Seal, a Chief 
Keeper of the Forests on this Side of Trent, and another on the other Side of 
Trent, and also an Escheator on this Side of Trent, and another on the other 
Side of Trent, and the Chief Clerk of the King in the Common Bench, by the 
Counsel and Assent of his Baronage, and that in Parliament; And if it happen 
by any chance, that it be expedient to appoint any of the said Ministers before 
there be a Parliament, then the King shall appoint thereto by the good Counsel 
which he shall have near him, until the Parliament. And so it shall henceforth 
be done of such Ministers, when need shall be.26  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 As stated in chapter one, the term “pass off” represents only the actus reus of the later tort of 
passing-off. The thesis adopts the protocol of writing the name of the tort with a hyphen. 
22 The term “passed off” is used in this sense without the hyphen as a factual rather than legal 
circumstance. 
23 1189–1199. 
24 Chaplais, above 5, 24, 25. 
25 1307–1327. 
26 5 Edw II Ordinances c 11-18, 1 Statutes of the Realm 1235-1377, 160. 
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It appears that the purpose was to keep the privy seal under the control of a 
permanent staff of four clerks.27 This was under the guise of removing evil 
counsellors away from the king.28 
 
In 1312, Edward II lost control of the Privy Seal for a time. This was coincident with 
the above Ordinances, and with political trouble and civil unrest in the city of 
London. Consequently, the king acquired for himself a secret seal in 1312. He started 
to authorize the use of the privy seal either via an envoy, or in writing, using his 
secret seal.29 Arguably, the king proved that he had an established customary power 
of inducing cooperation. 
 
Trueman noted that in 1312, London was a source of very substantial trouble for the 
king.30 Apparently the king linked seditious religious control of the people and the 
potential for civil war.31 In that year, there were several king’s writs directed to the 
mayor and to the aldermen of the city. These writs charged them with safeguarding 
the City on the king's behalf and with preventing the barons-in-arms from entering 
the city. On 26 June 1312, the king ordered the mayor to seize all war horses and to 
prohibit their taking from the city. On 24 July 1312, the sheriffs were ordered to 
make a proclamation forbidding the holding of conventicles and the making of 
federations and bonds "to live and die together".32 
 
From the time of Edward I,33 privy seal documents fell into four main categories: 
letters and writs close; letters and writs patent; bills; and, indentures. These styles 
were still current in the fifteenth century.34 Letters and writs close were invariably 
administrative writs and personal letters. Letters patent were used for commissions to 
certain royal officers, receipts, acknowledgements of debts, letters of protection and 
safe-keeping, and orders for the collection and delivery of money or food supplies 
for the royal household. Bills were used mainly as warrants to the chancellor for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Chaplais, above 5, 26. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Chaplais, above 5, 45. 
30 John H Trueman ‘The Privy Seal and the English Ordinances of 1311’ (1956) 31(4) Speculum, 615. 
31 Trueman, above 30. 
32 Ibid. 
33 1272-1307. 
34 Chaplais, above 5, 28, 29. 
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issue of routine documents under the great seal. Indentures were used as records of 
indented service such as military service.35 
 
In the Myers and Harris edited account, the privy seal created actionable warrants for 
the application of the great seal. A Bill submitted for sealing had to be approved first 
by a secretary of state. This officer had to make sure the Bill was a lawful and 
appropriate request, that it was prepared in the correct legal form. Finally, it was 
annexed to a summary docket that the monarch might be prepared to read.36 The 
proper procedure under which a patent acquired the Great Seal was set forth in the 
1536 statute of 27 Hen. VIII c. 11. This was described as an Act Concerning Clerks 
of the Signet and Privy Seal.37 Under this procedure, according to the Myers and 
Harris edited account, the monarch first approved and signed a draft of the intended 
grant, and gave it to one of the principal secretaries, who kept it as evidence that the 
king had signed it. He ordered it to be copied by one of the four clerks of the signet 
as the warrant to the keeper of the privy seal. One of the clerks at the privy seal 
office retained this document, now called the Bill, had it copied again and had the 
copy sealed. The resulting writ of privy seal was conveyed to the chancery where it 
worked as the final warrant for the application of the great seal. One of the six clerks 
of chancery wrote out the actual patent and had the great seal affixed to it. This writ 
was once again copied, but this final time onto the patent roll. This was the registry’s 
archival copy.38 
 
3   The Swan Mark – Seals on Royal Birds 
 
To this point, this thesis has argued the existence of a royal system of administration, 
the various ranks of which were represented graphically by royal seals. This section 
on the Swan Mark inquires into how this kind of customary administrative system 
might have set up a jurisdiction and used it lower down the commercial ranks. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Chaplais, above 5, 28-34. 
36 Robin Myers and Michael Harris (eds), The Stationers’ Company and the Book Trade 1550-1990 
(Oak Knoll Press, 1997), 15. 
37 3 Statutes of the Realm 1509-1545, 542-544. 
38 Myers, above 36, 14. 
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In the 1592-3 Case of the Swans,39 the Court of King’s Bench decided that a person 
could acquire property per industriam, or, by virtue of having applied labour. 
 
At common law, the swan was presumed to be a royal bird. It could not be killed 
without an express legal right. It was the property of the crown and could only be 
possessed by a subject under a special grant from the crown or its officials. Each 
licence granted for possession of a swan was registered administratively to a grant of 
a swan mark, which mark was cut by a knife into the upper mandible of the birds, 
specifically in order to show the level of possessory right of the owner.40 
 
Goble stated that there were many different kinds of swan mark, and the mark could 
be owned by a gild, suggesting that the crown might have a property interest in the 
personal property within the gild organisation.41 Wood listed the following several 
examples.42 The swan mark of the Vintners’ Company contained a double chevron 
indicating acquisition of property by purchase for consideration.43 The swan mark of 
Cambridge was three buckles,44 and the swan mark of the Dyers’ Company was a 
notch on one side of the bird’s beak. Just as the privy seal was applied in a public 
ceremony, to give notice to the populace, so too was there a public ceremony for the 
marking of the swans.45 One took place annually in the month of August,46 when the 
markers of both the Dyers’ and the Vintners’ Companies took public account of all 
swans in the River Thames. At this time, they marked all the mature clear-billed 
birds.47 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 4 Co Rep 82. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Dale D Goble ‘Three Cases/Four tales: Commons, capture, the Public trust, and Property in Land’ 
(2005) 35 Environmental Law, 807, 813. 
42 J G Wood The Illustrated Natural History – Birds (Routledge Warne and Routledge, 1864) 724. 
43 The word “chevron” is derived from the name of the ancient city of Hebron, which was the subject 
locale of arguably the first biblical account of real property acquisition by purchase. 
44 Buckles indicating a kind of binding. 
45 A notorious maiming of the animal without punishment. 
46 The word “august” has the following meanings as an adjective. 1. Inspiring mingled reverence and 
admiration; impressing the emotions or imagination as magnificent; majestic, stately, sublime, 
solemnly grand; venerable, revered. 2. Venerable from birth or position; of stately dignity; 
dignified, worshipful, eminent, majestic. Oxford English Dictionary (Clarendon Press, 2nd ed, 
1989). 
47 Wood, above 42, 724. 
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The swan mark was arguably a species of proprietary mark, flowing down from 
crown ownership. Giles noted that it was laid down in customary law that all white 
swans which were not marked, living in natural freedom, might be seized to the use 
of the king by virtue of the prerogative, because a swan was a royal bird. However, a 
subject might have property in white swans, which were not marked, and any man 
might have the property in swans not marked and which were in his private waters. 
To this end, a man could claim a prescriptive title in both swans and cygnets. 
However, no person could have a swan-mark unless by grant of the king, a grant by 
the king’s authorized officers, or by prescription, at his or her peril.48 The term “at 
his/her peril” was an indicium of strict liability, because it meant that the breach 
itself caused the punishment.49 A limitation to this rule was enacted in the 1482-3 
statute of 22 Edw. IV. c. 6,50 such that no person could have a swan mark unless he 
had property in lands of the yearly value of five marks.51 Coke on Littleton stated 
that the statute of 22 Edw. IV. c. 6 was based on the common law rule that he who 
owned such a swan mark could grant it over to another person.52 22 Edw. IV c. 6 was 
set out as follows. 
That no Person, of what Estate, Degree, or Condition he be, other than the Son 
of our Sovereign Lord the King, from the Feast of Saint Michael next coming, 
shall have or possess any such Mark or Game of his own, or any other to his 
Use shall have or possess any such Mark or Game, except he have Lands and 
Tenements of Estate of Freehold to the yearly Value of Five Marks above all 
yearly Charges. And moreover, That every Person or Persons now having any 
such Mark or Game, shall sell or give the same betwixt this and the Feast of 
Saint Michael next coming, to the Use of them to whom they shall be sold or 
given; and if it happen any Person or Persons not having any Possession of 
Lands or Tenements to the said yearly Value, or any other, to have or possess 
Lands to his or their Use, to have or possess any such Mark or Game after the 
said Feast, that then it shall be lawful to any of the King's Subjects, having 
Lands and Tenements to the said Value, to seise the said Swans as forfeit; 
whereof the King shall have one Half, and he shall seise the other half.53 
 
The precedent for this was in the time of king Henry VI.54 It stated that a grant of 
incorporeal things must be by deed. It probably could not be granted by a common 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 T Giles Game Law (E & R Nutt and R Gosling, 1740), 152. 
49 F Pollock The Law of Torts (Banks & Brothers, 1895), 17, 18, 19. 
50 2 Statutes of the Realm 1377-1504, 474. 
51 Giles, above 48, 153. 
52 Co Lit 47a. 
53 2 Statutes of the Realm 1377-1504, 474. 
54 Henry VI reigned 1422-1461; Edward IV reigned 1461-1483. 
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man, but only by the king’s royal prerogative.55 This suggested that there was little 
possibility of the common person having these property rights. Arguably it would 
have linked the bundle of rights in the mark to that in real property rights. A common 
person representing him/herself as having property in a swan mark would, in theory, 
be strictly liable for misrepresentation, at the time the representation was recognised 
as not correlating to a registered title. 
 
Giles explained that it was also provided that, if swans were marked and pinioned,56 
or unmarked and kept in a moat, pond, or private river, then to steal them was a 
felony.57 The 1495 statute of 11 Hen. VII. c. 17 set out the status of swan eggs, and 
their taking by unauthorized persons, as follows. 
Also it is ordained by the said authority that no person, of what condition or 
degree he be, take or cause to be taken, be it upon his own ground or any 
other, the eggs of any falcon, goshawk, laners, or swans out of the nest 
upon pain of imprisonment of a year and a day and a fine the one half 
thereof to the King and the other half to the owner of the ground where the 
eggs were so taken; and that Justices of the Peace have authority to hear and 
determine such matter as well by inquisition . . . .58 
 
The mere taking, the statutory setting up of the wrong of taking, and a hearing by 
inquisition all argue for a strict liability nature of this wrongful taking of swan eggs. 
The split nature of the fine suggests that the king was a continuing or radical holder 
of property rights in swan eggs. These issues were all illustrated and expanded in the 
Court’s discussion, in the Case of the Swans.59 
 
The case was between the Queen, and the defendants Lady Joan Young and Thomas 
Saunger. It was heard before Sir Matthew Arundel and other commissioners of the 
Queen under the Great Seal. A writ had been directed to the Sheriff of the county of 
Dorset to summons all the unmarked white swans, and the Sheriff responded with a 
report that he had seised four hundred white swans. Lady Joan Young and Thomas 
Saunger complained against the Sheriff’s response. She said that before the 
investigation, the Abbot of Abbotsbury had been seised in fee, and that at the time of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Co Lit 47a. 
56 Pinioned. Of a bird: Having the wings maimed or confined. Oxford English Dictionary (Clarendon 
Press, 2nd ed, 1989). 
57 Giles, above 48, 46, citing Hale’s Pl C 68. 
58 2 Statutes of the Realm 1377-1504, 581. 
59 4 Co Rep 82. 
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the investigation, and from time immemorial, a game of wild swans had lived in the 
estuary. She added that the Abbot had the custom to cut off the pinion of one wing of 
each swan. Afterwards, the Abbot had surrendered the premises to King Henry VIII, 
who in the 35th year of his reign granted the estate to Giles Strangways, Esq. by way 
of his own letters patent. After Giles died, the estate descended to Giles Strangways 
his cousin and heir. He then transferred to the defendants his property in the subject 
game of swans for one year. The Queen's Attorney demurred in the law. The Court 
set out reasons for its decision as follows, resolving that all unmarked white swans, 
which having gained their natural liberty, and were swimming in an open and 
common river, might be seised to the King's use, by a natural liberty deriving from 
the king’s prerogative. This was because a swan was a royal fowl, and all those 
swans without known owners belonged to the King by his prerogative. Similarly, 
whales and sturgeons were royal fish, and belonged to the King by his prerogative. 
To supervise and regulate the king’s property rights in swans, there was an ancient 
office of the King called Magister Deductus Cygnorum. It was resolved also, that a 
person might have property in unmarked white swans. However, if they escaped out 
of private waters into an open and common river, the landowner might bring them 
back and retake property in them.60 If they had gained their natural liberty, and were 
swimming in open and common rivers, the King's officer might seise them for the 
king in the open and common part of the river. When the property in a swan could 
not be determined, it belonged to the King as a royal fowl. This was arguably the 
essence of radical title in the crown.61 The court confirmed the taking of swans as 
personal property was a tortious act.62 
 
4   Regulation of Publications 
 
This section examines printers’ devices as marks, their modes of regulation and some 
key consequences of breaches of their use. The discussion will investigate several 
kinds of infringement and some of their trials. It will seek to outline any resulting 
state statutory responses, which possibly might have set up a strict liability procedure 
for dealing with passing off printers’ devices. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 4 Co Rep 82, citing Bracton, lib 2 c 1 fol 9. 
61 4 Co Rep 82. 
62 Ibid. 
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Printers’ devices were arguably highly significant. Bibliographers used them for 
ascertaining knowledge of their ownership at different times, any alterations made to 
them, and the various accidents in which they were involved. They helped the 
bibliographer to be able to trace, date and assign books to their true printers.63 
McKerrow characterised printers’ devices with a somewhat cumbersome definition, 
by stating first a narrow definition and then adding certain classes of objects, which 
were not covered by it, but were used in a similar way. His definition was supposed 
to apply up to the year 1557, and was as follows. 
Let us say, then, in the first place that any picture, design, or ornament (not 
being an initial letter) found on a title page, final leaf, or in any other 
conspicuous place in a book, and having an obvious reference to the sign at 
which the printer or publisher of the book carried on business, or to the name of 
either of them, or including the arms or crest of either of them, is – whatever its 
origin – that printer’s or publisher’s device.64 
 
In practice, if a person worked at the sign of the Sun and used a cut of the sun in his 
title pages or at the end of his books, it would be his device. It might have been 
nothing more than an old wood cut taken from a book on astronomy. After 1557, the 
emblematic form of device began to take over from that which referred to the sign. 
These emblems were chosen at the sole discretion of the printer or publisher. For 
example, William Leake dwelt successively at the Crane, the White Greyhound and 
the Holy Ghost. However, his device was a winged death-head.65 
 
One significant exception to the definition, above, was that many printers and 
publishers used common ornaments, such as a rose, a mermaid, or a cherub. None of 
these ornaments represented the sign of the house. They could have been purchased 
from a type-founder. McKerrow failed to find any one of these generic devices used 
by more than one person,66 suggesting they were subject to underlying legal norms 
either as comity among the printers or as some species of subterranean regulation. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Ronald McKerrow Printers’ & Publishers’ Devices in England & Scotland 1485-1640 (The 
Bibliographical Society, 1913), xxxii. 
64 McKerrow, above 63, xii, xiii. 
65 McKerrow, above 63, xiii, xiv. 
66 McKerrow, above 63, xiv. 
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McKerrow set out a broad classification system of printers’ devices in seven parts, as 
follows. This first was devices representing the sign at which the printer or publisher 
worked. The second was those devices, which represented a rebus or pun on the 
owner’s name. The third was a device referring to an incident in the owner’s career. 
The fourth was monograms or initials with or without a mark. The fifth was a portrait 
of the owner of the device. This sixth was heraldic devices, reviewed briefly, below. 
The seventh was an emblem of some kind, but not related to the owner’s sign or a 
pun on his name.67 
 
Since the above definition of printers’ devices referred in part to heraldic designs, a 
brief examination of the nature of heraldic graphic representations is in order. Rogers 
suggested that heraldic graphical representations were similar to trademarks in their 
public effect. He related armorial bearings to trade marks, in the following way. 
There is a curious parallel between the marks of artisans and traders during the 
middle ages, and the heraldic devices in use at the same time. When knights were 
cased in plate and fought with visors down, features were concealed and some 
method of distinguishing the individual in battle or in the lists was imperative. Thus 
leaders for purposes of identification adopted characteristic devices by which they 
could be recognized. These devices, originally badges of personal identification, 
later became hereditary. The analogy between the heraldic device as originally 
employed and trade-marks is exact. Both are identifying symbols.68 
 
Like trademarks representing the work of artisans, heraldic graphical representations 
were the subject of licensing in the public interest. It appears that in former times, the 
accurate drawing up of coats of arms was so important that herald painters were 
formally licensed by the crown in order to continue in their vocation.  They were 
liable to penalty in the Court of Chivalry if they practised their art without the 
authority conferred by licence. This Court of Chivalry, also known as the Earl 
Marshal’s Court, operated as a civilian law court, and its procedure was limited to 
the civilian procedural system. The court continues to have jurisdiction to hear 
heraldic classes of action.69 
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68 Edward S Rogers ‘Some Historical Matter concerning Trade-Marks’ (1910) 9(1) Michigan Law 
Review, 29-43, 38. 
69 George Seton The Law and Practice of Heraldry in Scotland (Edmonston and Douglas, 1863), 15. 
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An appeal from the Court of Chivalry would lie by way of a petition to the crown 
and directed to the Clerk of the Privy Council. The civilian procedure in the Court of 
Chivalry was illustrated in the 1631 case of Rea v Ramsay,70 in which the Court of 
Chivalry convened to award a trial by duel, although later the king stopped the duel. 
Foreshadowing a civilian procedure, Chief Justice Fineux was said to have told king 
Henry VIII that the jurisdiction of the Court of Chivalry belonged to the law of arms, 
and not to the law of England.71 
 
In Rea v Ramsay,72 the Earl Marshal disclosed the king’s interest and role in this 
special court. The Earl Marshal commenced the proceedings by rising, making 
obedience to the Constable, meeting the kings of heralds, and presenting to the 
constable his commission, which was in words to the following effect. 
That his majesty being informed by Donald lord Rey, how David Ramsay esq. 
Had plotted, and was privy unto divers Treasons and Conspiracies against his 
royal person, government and kingdoms. In the search whereof the king had used 
all ways and means for the discovery of the truth: the one of them accusing, the 
other denying, and so no certain security to his own person and his subjects: 
therefore he doth authorize the said Robert Bartie earl of Lindsey lord high 
constable, for to call unto him Thomas earl of Arundel earl marshal, and with him 
such other peers, sheriffs and officers as he thinks fit, to hold a marshal’s court, 
for sifting the truth between the said parties, etc.73 
 
At the conclusion of the matter, the Constable and the Earl Marshal held as follows. 
First, David Ramsay was not guilty of treason, although he had made many attempts 
at treason. Second, both David Ramsay and Lord Rea had seditiously committed 
many acts of contempt against the king, reformation for which was reserved solely 
for his majesty. Third, both David Ramsay and Lord Rea were committed to the 
Tower of London until they could provide sufficient sureties to the satisfaction of the 
king.74 These findings would have amounted to conduct or language inciting to 
rebellion against the constituted authority in a state and those printers’ devices, 
which were armorial bearing, could have come under this jurisdiction. 
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This discussion of heraldry has shown that the grant of the design was an act of state. 
Further, Rogers argued that the analogy between heraldic devices and trademarks 
was exact in that they both were obligations to the community, inferring a public 
interest and honour inhering in heraldic designs. Following on from this, the crown 
issued licences to heraldic designs painters, and any breach of user could be heard 
properly in the Earl Marshal’s Court. This court would apply the remedy of 
injunction in a civilian procedure, based on the underlying principle that all subjects 
were bound to discover treason. The 1631 Earl Marshal’s Court case of Rea v 
Ramsay75 noted such seditious acts of contempt against the king would only be dealt 
with by his majesty himself. Arguably, the court’s procedure was focussed on the 
preference of the King. 
 
Continuing the examination of printers’ devices, many devices passed from one 
owner to another with little change in their designs. It appears that these transfers 
took place in order to signify the change in a right to print or publish a specific book. 
There is a record of John Day seizing control of a device from Gibson in 1569.76 Day 
made changes to the initials T.G. so that they now appeared like his own.77 
 
King Henry VIII granted the earliest known royal privileges issued for books to 
Richard Pynson in 1518. None of these early grants has left any trace of proper 
process in the public records of patent rolls or Privy Seal warrants. In the Myers and 
Harris edited work, they were said to have been issued cum privilegio regali78 in text 
and summary pages of the so-authorised books.79 Henry VIII issued a proclamation 
concerning seditious and heretical books on 16 November 1538, which contained the 
following relevant clause. 
That no person or persons in this realm shall from henceforth print any 
book in the English tongue unless upon examination made by some of his 
Grace’s Privy Council or other such as his Highness shall appoint they have 
licence so to do and yet so having not to put these words cum privilegio 
regali without adding ad imprimendum solum, and that the whole copy, or 
else at the least the effect of his licence and privilege be therewith printed, 
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and plainly declared and expressed in the English tongue underneath 
them.80 
 
It appeared that the cause for the 1538 proclamation was publications containing 
added notes and margin comments, in works that had been already examined and 
cleared for publication. The proclamation required books printed abroad to have a 
special royal licence before their sale in England. Books printed in England had to 
have a licence after close examination by royal appointees.81 In this way, the 
publisher gained not only an exclusive licence to print, but also royal authority for 
the book’s contents. The problem had been clarified in Venice in 1516, when the 
Rituum ecclesiasticorum was published carrying notice of a privilege from Pope Leo 
X. The contents created trouble, but legates pointed out that the book could claim no 
authority for its contents because Pope Leo X had not expressly approved the 
contents. He had only granted a privilege to protect the book against pirate 
reprinting.82 Myers and Harris reported that after the time of Henry VIII and his 
royal grants, most book privileges were granted by letters patent under the Great Seal 
and properly registered on the patent rolls.83 
 
Arber’s record states that the book entries in that of the Company of Stationers of 
London were originally records of receipts for payment. However, as control of 
printing by the Bishop of London increased, these book entries gathered the same 
force during the period 1571 to 1576 as that of a registry of licences to print.84 This 
development resulted in all prints being licensed by a full court of master wardens 
and Assistants of the Company of Stationers and as well by a licenser. Arber 
recorded that this licenser was also a member of the clergy.85 
 
According to Arber, the Stationers had existed as a gild from ancient times, but later 
procured a charter as a company. Queen Elizabeth’s confirmation of this was 
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recorded in the Stationers’ Register on 10 November 1559, along with certain small 
amendments made by the queen, the original of this confirmation having been 
burned in the great fire of London.86 One of the key operative articles of this charter 
was as follows. 
Besides we will, grant, ordain, and appoint for ourselves and the successors of 
us the foresaid Queen that no person within this our realm of England or the 
dominions of the same shall practise or exercise by himself or by his ministers, 
his servants or by any other person the art or mistery of printing any book or any 
thing for sale or traffic within this our realm of England or the dominions of the 
same, unless the same person at the time of his foresaid printing is or shall be 
one of the community of the foresaid mistery or art of Stationery of the foresaid 
City, or has therefore licence of us, or the heirs or successors of us the foresaid 
Queen by the letters patent of us or the heirs or successors of us the foresaid 
Queen.87 
 
Arber recorded that the first Master of the Company of Stationers, appointed under 
the 1559 arrangements, was not a printer or publisher, but was a Proctor of the Court 
of Arches, which Blackstone categorised under the heading of courts for private 
wrongs, as follows. 
The court of arches is a court of appeal belonging to the archbishop of 
Canterbury. . . . His proper jurisdiction is only over the thirteen peculiar parishes 
belonging to the archbishop in London. . . . from him lies an appeal to the king 
in chancery, that is, to a court of delegates appointed under the king’s great seal 
by statute 25 Hen. VIII, c. 19,88 as supreme head of the English church, in the 
place of the bishop of Rome, who formerly exercised this jurisdiction . . . . 89 
 
The Company sought, and was granted, heraldic arms by the King of Arms Sir 
Gilbert Dethick in May during September 1557. The general motif of the granted 
arms was light disseminating down through the three emblems of a heavenly dove, a 
flying eagle and three books.90 
 
Rushworth stated that the company had an ancient customary ordinance that forbade 
any member of the company from setting up, sustaining or supporting any private 
printing press. This was later strengthened in 1643 by an order of the Parliament. The 
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order stated that the Company’s ancient ordinance had proven to be of little effect.91 
Arber recorded that any apprentice, journeyman, foreigner or other employee who 
offended against the company’s prohibitive ordinances was to be put out of work for 
up to three months.92 
 
When Queen Elizabeth I issued her Injunctions of 1559, her Majesty gave the power 
of licensing books to the two ecclesiastical authorities of the Bishop of London and 
the Archbishop of Canterbury.93 Myers and Harris stated that these Injunctions were 
the sole foundation of all protestant episcopal licensing of books in England.94 Gee 
and Hardy reproduced these significant Injunctions in full, as follows. 
LI. Item, because there is a great abuse in the printers of books, which for 
covetousness chiefly regard not what they print, so they may have gain, 
whereby ariseth great disorder by publication of unfruitful, vain, and infamous 
books and papers; the queen's majesty straitly charges and commands, that no 
manner of person shall print any manner of book or paper, of what sort, 
nature, or in what language soever it be, except the same be first licensed by 
her majesty by express words in writing, or by six of her privy council; or be 
perused and licensed by the archbishops of Canterbury and York, the Bishop 
of London, the chancellors of both universities, the bishop being ordinary, and 
the archdeacon also of the place, where any such shall be printed, or by two of 
them, whereof the ordinary of the place to be always one. And that the names 
of such as shall allow the same to be added in the end of every such work, for 
a testimony of the allowance thereof. And because many pamphlets, plays, 
and ballads be oftentimes printed, wherein regard would be had that nothing 
therein should be either heretical, seditious, or unseemly for Christian ears; 
her majesty likewise commands that no manner of person shall enterprise to 
print any such, except the same be to him licensed by such her majesty's 
commissioners, or three of them, as be appointed in the city of London to hear 
and determine divers causes ecclesiastical, tending to the execution of certain 
statutes made the last Parliament for uniformity of order in religion. And if 
any shall sell or utter any manner of books or papers, being not licensed as is 
above-said, that the same party shall be punished by order of the said 
commissioners, as to the quality of the fault shall be thought meet. And 
touching all other books of matters of religion, or policy, or governance that 
have been printed, either on this side the seas or on the other side, because the 
diversity of them is great, and that there needs good consideration to be had of 
the particularities thereof, her majesty refers the prohibition or permission 
thereof to the order which her said commissioners within the city of London 
shall take and notify. According to which her majesty straitly commands all 
manner her subjects, and especially the wardens and company of Stationers, to 
be obedient.95 
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Relevant points of the Injunctions were as follows. First, no person could print any 
kind of book unless licensed by her majesty by express words in writing, or by 
certain combinations of archbishops as prescribed in the injunction, or by the Queens 
commissioners of the City of London. Arguably, this implemented the strict liability 
rules of registry. Second, instructions to the commissioners advised that the penalty, 
when selling or uttering any kind of book without licence, should be a punishment by 
order of the commissioners according to the quality of the offender’s fault.96 This 
sounds like significant administrative discretion in the hands of the commissioners. 
 
Hamburger stated that during the period until 1695, the printed press was controlled 
by a registration and licensing regime, rather than by trials for seditious libel. 
However, such trials were very similar to those for seditious libel, because judges 
tended to mention the legal basis for the prosecution only in passing, if at all, while 
articulating a strong denouncement of the accused as defamatory and seditious. Such 
denunciations were arguably legally irrelevant.97 Such a trial took place in the Star 
Chamber case of Day v Ward,98 in which a breach of licence to publish could be 
punished in the Star Chamber as for the underlying legal norm of sedition against the 
king. 
 
In Day v Ward,99 John Day had been granted a privilege for the printing of, among 
other things, the work A.B.C. with a little cathechisme. According to Malcolm,100 
King James recorded later that the grant by Queen Elizabeth I of letters patent was 
granted to Verney Alley and his assigns. This grant was by her letters patent under 
the Great Seal of England, on 26 February of the 33rd year of her reign, at 
Westminster. It was the licence and privilege, in reversion for the term of thirty 
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years, commencing upon the death of John Day and Richard Day his son, to print by 
himself or by his assigns the Psalms of David in English metre and notes on how to 
sing them. This book was called The ABC with the Little Catechisme compiled by 
Alexander Nowell.101 Subsequently, these letters patent were assigned by the 
administrators of the estate of Verney Alley in trust to the use of the Master and 
Keepers or Wardens and Commonalty of the Mistery of Stationers of the City of 
London and their successors. The Queen had formalised this grant direct over to the 
Stationers, prohibiting anyone else from printing the book, and stated that 
publication should not be inconsistent with any laws of the church, nor of the state.102 
 
On 7 February 1582, John Day filed a bill in the Star Chamber against both Roger 
Ward and William Holmes, alleging that they had pirated The ABC with a little 
catechism, contrary to the Star Chamber decree of 1566.103 This decree was worded 
to prohibit the publication of any book considered to be contrary to statute, 
injunction, ordinance and letters patents, as well as to ban the importation of such 
works. This provided the first occasion on which the proprietary interests of the 
Stationers’ Company and the ideological control of the press become explicitly 
linked. The commentary by L. Bently & M. Kretschmer describes the background to 
the Decree and in particular the concern of Elizabeth's High Commission over the 
influx of Catholic texts from continental Europe. The commentary argues that the 
Decree was particularly significant in that it formalized, for the first time, the 
specific link between the interests of the government in regulating and censuring the 
press and the economic interests of the Stationers' Company. The formal inclusion of 
the category of 'letters patents' within the remit of the Decree ensured that works 
published under a printing privilege now attracted the formal protection of the Star 
Chamber.104 
 
In the Star Chamber, it was alleged that, in 1581 or 1582, Roger Ward printed an 
unlicensed edition of the A.B.C. with a little Catechism, and the right to print it 
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belonged solely to John Day. At the end of the book was Day’s mark, which it was 
alleged that Ward had arranged to have it imitated by a Frenchman living within the 
Blackfriars.105 In this Star Chamber case, Day v Ward,106 it was not alleged that 
Ward had misused Day’s mark, but rather it was for the unauthorised setting of 
Day’s name to the fraudulent edition of the A.B.C. with a little cathechisme.107 
Evidence was adduced that Ward had imitated Day’s particular style of printers’ 
type, and also had used one of Day’s marks. John Day held the sole patent to print 
this book, the grant in letters patent being a species of property under the royal 
prerogative.108 
 
Ward admitted to having printed 10,000 copies of the ABC. His defence was that 
members of the Company of Stationers had all the best patents, so that other printers 
could barely make a living. In response to evidence as to Ward’s use of Day’s mark, 
Ward responded that it was not he who replicated the mark, but a Frenchman living 
in Blackfriars had made marks with the same “artificiall” as those used by John 
Day.109 In any event, Ward appears to have ignored the Star Chamber action against 
him and continued his printing.110 
 
In 1586, Star Chamber decreed increasing and further strengthening the penalties for 
book printing licence offences.111 Malcolm reported that this decree touching printers 
and booksellers was made in the Court of Star Chamber112 on 23 June in the 28th 
years of Queen Elizabeth’s reign, 1586.113 Arber recorded the decree with 
commentary as follows. 
A decree prohibiting the publication of any book contrary to statute, injunction, 
ordinance and letters patents, as well as any ordinance set down by the 
Company of Stationers.” The formal protection of the Star Chamber was 
extended not only to books protected under royal printing privileges but to 
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books printed in contravention of the internal regulations of the Stationers' 
Company itself, further enhancing the significance of ‘stationers' copyright'. 
The commentary describes the background to the decree, in particular the 
religious controversies of the 1570s and 1580s, as well as the dissatisfaction 
within the general printing trade during this period at the manner in which a 
number of the printing privileges granted by Queen Elizabeth resulted in the 
monopolistic control of commercially lucrative works within the hands of a 
few stationers only. The commentary also details the efforts of the dominant 
members of the Stationers' Company to influence the substance of the decree 
and further augment their control over the internal operation of the book 
trade.114 
 
Explaining what kind of law the Star Chamber might review and apply, Hamburger 
stated that in 1637, in the Star Chamber, Prynne, Bastwicke and Burton were charged 
with writing and having had printed various specified books “contrary to the 
wholesome lawes, Customes & Statutes of this  . . . Realme”.115 This suggested that 
the Star Chamber reviewed, balanced and applied ancient custom against other forms 
of law. 
 
Schechter stated that the 1662 Statute of 14 Charles II, c. 33,116 was arguably a 
statutory formulation of the modern tort of passing-off.117 It forbade the printing, 
forging or counterfeiting the name, title, mark or vinnet118 of the Company of the 
Society of Stationers, or of any other person who had lawful privilege, without due 
consent.119 
That no private120 person or persons whatsoever shall at any time hereafter 
print or cause to be printed any book or Pamphlet whatsoever unless the 
same Books and Pamphlet together with all and every of the Titles Epistles 
Prefaces Proems Preambles Introductions Tables Dedications and other 
matters and things thereunto annexed be first entered in the Book of the 
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Register of the Company of Stationers of London . . . and unless the same 
Booke and Pamphlet and also all and every the said Titles Epistles Prefaces 
Proems Preambles Introductions Tables Dedications and other matters and 
things whatsoever, thereunto annexed or therewith to be imprinted shall be 
first lawfully licensed and authorized to be printed by such person and 
persons only as shall be constituted and appointed to license the same 
according to the direction and true meaning of this present Act. . . . 121 
 
Suggesting a cognate link between the publishing of information and the 
manufacturing of goods, Hamburger reported that between 1680 and 1685, seditious 
libel trials were set up as trials for publishing news, without a licence and contrary to 
the declared prerogative of the king. In 1680, Henry Carr was charged with causing 
to be published the Weekly Packet of Advice from Rome. Although the information 
stated that the accused had acted maliciously and had intended to scandalise the 
crown, at trial the crucial issue of intent was not canvassed. Rather, only the issue of 
publishing without licence was canvassed. Despite Carr’s good intentions, the jury 
was instructed to find him guilty if they could find that he caused the publication of 
an unlicensed book. Carr’s good intentions only applied to, and were canvassed at 
the hearing for, mitigation of the inevitable sentence, inferring the offence to have 
been strict liability.122 
 
C   Development Of Trademarks 
 
1   Crown Regulation of Proprietary Marks in the Middle Ages 
 
Schechter noted that the courts treated the functions of trademarks as either that of 
origin or ownership of the associated goods, deriving from how the marks were used 
in the middle-ages. He stated that marks designating ownership were not trademarks 
in the technical sense, but were mere proprietary marks. In the middle ages, it was 
the proprietary mark rather than the merchant’s personal mark that had acquired legal 
significance.123 Building on prior argument in this thesis, this section suggests that 
the legal significance was most likely an administrative matter, subject to the strict 
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rules of the registry. In the Case of the Swans,124 the registry was set up directly by 
the crown. In the case of product marks, this section asks whether registries were set 
up by a variety of statutes, merchants’ customs and international regulations. 
 
Schechter stated that in the English law of the fourteenth and following centuries, 
merchant’s marks afforded almost conclusive evidence of proprietary right in the 
goods on which they were affixed. For example, prior to the time of Edward III,125 
when a ship was lost at sea and the cargo washed up onto land, the goods belonged to 
the king as a wreck unless a dog or other living animal escaped by which the owner 
might be discovered, or unless there was a merchant’s mark affixed to the goods.126 
This example of a kind of escheat suggested an underlying crown interest in the title 
in manufactured goods. It gives rise to the question as to how goods could be 
identified on board ship to prevent conversion or theft. 
 
During the reign of Edward III,127 it appeared that shipping was in continual danger 
from piracy on the high seas. The 1353 statute of 27 Edward III, c. 13 was passed to 
provide that foreign merchants who had been robbed of their goods at sea or on shore 
should have recovery of the goods upon proof of their property, without having to 
sue at common law. It stated thus. 
We will and grant, That if any Merchant, Privy or Stranger, be robbed of his 
Goods upon the Sea, and the Goods so robbed come into any Parts within our 
Realm and Lands, and he will sue for to recover the said Goods, he shall be 
received to prove the said Goods to be his own by his Marks, or by his Chart or 
Cocket or by good and lawful Merchants, Privy or Strangers; and by such 
Proofs the same Goods shall be delivered to the Merchants, without making 
other Suit at the Common Law: And in case that any Ships, going out of the 
said Realm and Lands, or coming to the same, by Tempest or other Misfortune, 
break upon the Sea Banks, and the Goods come to the Land, which may not be 
said Wreck, they shall be presently without fraud or evil device delivered to the 
Merchants to whom the Goods be, or to their servants, by such proof as before 
is said, paying to them that have saved and kept the same, convenient for their 
Travel; that is to say, by the discretion of the Sheriffs and Bailiffs, or other our 
Ministers, in places guildable, where other Lords have no franchise, and by the 
advice and assent of four or six of the best or most sufficient discreet men of the 
country; 2nd, if that be within the franchise of other Lords, then it shall be done 
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by the Stewards and Bailiff, or Wardens of the same Franchises, and by the 
Advice of four or six discreet Men of the Country . . . .128 
 
Prescribed by this statute as the three methods of proof of ownership were the marks 
appearing on the goods, the chart, or evidence of good and lawful merchants. Either 
one could trigger this summary procedure for recovery. The so-called “chart” 
suggests a reference to the book of lading, which was the precursor to the bill of 
lading.129 
 
The Selden Society reported that the proper jurisdiction for this summary procedure 
for recovery was in the Court of Admiralty.130 During the Elizabethan and Stuart 
reigns, the Admiralty Court was the chief commercial court. Matters of bills of 
lading, bills of exchange, general average, insurance, and other matters strictly of the 
law merchant were litigated very rarely in the common law courts at Westminster 
during these times. However, the Admiralty Court began to fall into decay after the 
restoration, beginning in 1660, and by 1697, the common law courts were making 
definite pronouncements in matters of the law merchant.131 
 
In the 1771 case of Hamilton and Smythe v Davis,132 the plaintiff invoked the 1353 
statute of 27 Edward III, c.13.133 It sought to recover hogsheads of tallow cast ashore 
from a wreck, which bore the plaintiff’s marks identical to those indorsed on the bill 
of lading. Gaskell stated that a bill of lading is literally a document that records 
certain goods as having been “loaded” on board a ship. In modern times, bills of 
lading are documents of title, and the bill itself may be transferred.134 In Hamilton 
and Smyth v Davis,135 Lord Mansfield preferred the summary procedure of the 
statute of 27 Edward III, c.13136 to a claim of wreck, and found for the plaintiff.137 
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Schechter stated that the municipal authorities of the period continued to view 
merchants’ marks as presumptive evidence of ownership.138 However, this area of 
law began to move slowly into the common law courts, because of difficult 
evidential issues of events on the high seas.139 The common law courts were slow to 
recognize the bill of lading as a legal document, because the merchants dealt with 
their own disputes according to their own customs. While there were a number of 
early references to the bill of lading or the book of lading, they were mere references 
and not definitions.140 What appeared to be the first court decision on a bill of lading 
appeared in the 1791 case of Evans v Martlett.141 The case did not define it. 
However, the court held, per curiam, that a bill of lading meant that the consignee 
had property in the consignment. Additionally, Holt CJ held this property to 
comprise a bundle of rights of a kind allowing the consignee to freely assign its 
property in the goods.142 
 
Leggett said that the bill of lading referred to a document produced under the law 
merchant, and as such, was in the nature of international law.143 Bennett stated that 
the bill of lading might be corroborated by the rules of the Customs of the Sea. This 
was a 14th century manuscript preserved at Paris, but probably drawn up at Barcelona 
sometime in that century.144 Chapter LVII of the Customs of the Sea stated that every 
covenant, which the merchant entered into with the managing owners of the ship had 
to be fulfilled, if it was entered into the ship’s book.145 This book later became 
known as the book of lading.146 Chapter XV stated that this register was stronger 
evidence than a private writing, and could not be contested.147 It seems that this 
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register created a reverse evidential onus, and as an apparently customary 
administrative device, a breach might have been indicative of fraud. 
 
Sustaining this stance, in the 1534 case of Chapman v Peers,148 the Court held as 
follows. 
 . . . suits between merchants of London that owners and masters or 
charterers of ships or their pursers are not bound and ought not nor is any 
one of them bound nor ought he to be bound to answer for goods or things 
carried or laden in their ships that are not entered mentioned or inserted in 
the book of lading.149 
 
Lawes stated that the original bill of lading was designed as conclusive evidence of 
agreement, not only that the goods had been received by the carrier, but also that a 
certain disposition had been made of them, that they had been laden or loaded, on 
board the ship.150 This suggested that any wrongful dealings in the property rights in 
the transported goods were dealt with on a reverse onus, or strict liability, basis, and 
might have been indicative of fraud. 
 
2   Production Marks in the Regulation of Trade by the Gilds and Companies 
 
This section asks how production marks were related to product source and goodwill. 
It investigates how this goodwill was secured. It will examine also how artisans were 
regulated in the market by a system of seals and international regulations. 
 
Damage to gild goodwill appeared to have been at the peril of its artisans. In this 
respect, Rogers said as follows. “The modern trade-mark is goodwill symbolised.”151 
Schechter stated that while the modern trademark is an asset, the medieval mark 
which indicated source or origin was a distinct liability, no doubt because of its 
draconian and strict liability regime of administration.  For medieval craftsmen, the 
trademark was a police mark, which was compulsory to have and to apply.152 The 
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following statutes provided for compulsory sealing of all cloths manufactured in 
England, and these seals were signs of police-style regulation. 
that then a Seal of Lead therefore ordained, and by the Treasurer of England 
for the time being provided, shall be set and hanged in the lowest part of the 
Edge of the same Cloth Streit or Kersey, for perfect knowledge to be had to 
All Cloth the Buyer thereof . . . .153 
 
This provision appears to have been supervised by the Treasurer of England for the 
benefit of the buyers. The reference to “perfect knowledge” appears to regulate 
product source, and arguably, that perfect knowledge could only have been inferred 
from a seal.154 
Cloth made within every such City Burgh and Town of this Realm; and of 
that Seales for every Shire of this Realm for the sealing of all manner Cloth 
made within every Shire, out of the said Cities Burghes or Townes of the 
same Shire, having on the one side your said armes and on the other side 
the name of the Shire therein inprinted.155 
 
This provision appears to have been designed to locate the manufacturing source of 
the cloth to a specific city or shire. This could have been for identifying someone 
who would have the obligation of answering for problems. 
 
There were two aspects of economic history providing context for this discussion. 
The first was that until the latter part of the 15th century, so large a percentage of 
manufacturing was arranged on the gild system that it could be described as the 
whole organisation of industry.156 Holdsworth said that even when the gilds became 
subject to national regulation, rather than municipal control, they were relied upon by 
the crown and parliament to supervise manufacturing and trade.157 The second aspect 
was that crown grants of monopoly were widespread in gild charters. They were 
enforced with high standards of production.158 Evans had reported “work must be 
good and legal . . . an infraction of the regulations must be reported that the gild may 
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not secure a bad reputation.”159 This suggested the gild exercised a kind of property 
interest in the reputation of its artisans. 
 
According to Schechter, seals arose to regulate markets.160 Arguably, regulating a 
market was a way of regulating production. It appears that this style of regulation 
was by international commercial custom. At least since 1900, when the English city 
of Bristol published a volume of its medieval municipal records, traditionally called 
The Little Red Book of Bristol,161 historians had known of the existence, among other 
documents recorded in this book, of a Latin treatise entitled Lex Mercatoria.162 
Carus-Wilson reported that Bristol boomed as a city of foreign trade in the 15th 
century. There was a busy industrial suburb of Bristol, situated by the River Avon, 
where there was the Weavers' Hall, Weavers' Chapel and Tucker Street. These 
signified Bristol’s status as one of the leading manufacturing cities of England. The 
Little Red Book of Bristol recorded the ordinances, customs and liberties made for 
the commonalty of Bristol. It was Bristol’s reference treatise of the Lex 
Mercatoria.163 
 
However, the name of Bristol appeared nowhere in the body of the Little Red Book of 
Bristol itself. The names used in certain examples of official correspondence 
included London, Boston, York, etc., in England, and Paris in France, but never 
Bristol. This suggests that the treatise may have been written elsewhere. Teetor 
stated that no copy has been found elsewhere, that dating of the treatise could be only 
approximate, and that the examples of inter-municipal correspondence recorded in it 
contained various dates, ranging from 10 Edward I in 1282 to 14 Edward I in 
1286.164 
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The Little Red Book of Bristol stated that the law merchant was understood to have 
its source in the customs of the market place. Such market places were held only in 
five locales: in cities, fairs, seaports, market towns and boroughs, and the law 
merchant or law of the market place was always followed in those places.165 
 
Teetor described the market environment as follows. It was normal for apprentices 
and employee merchants to trade publicly and openly under the purview of their 
masters such that money, goods and merchandises were borrowed and lent for the 
use of their masters. The lenders would hand over no goods at all if they thought the 
apprentices and employee merchants were borrowing on their own accounts and not 
for their masters. An ordinance about ostensible authority, but also a preventative 
measure against the act of passing off, provided that the masters of such apprentices 
and employee merchants were to answer in the same manner for such goods and 
merchandises when delivered to them by the hands of their apprentices and employee 
merchants, as if they had received those same goods and merchandises by their own 
hands. This applied if both the apprentices and employee merchants were understood 
to have served openly under the authority of their masters. It also required that they 
were dealing with the goods of their masters.166 
 
Teetor stated that it was an established procedure that every market had a common 
seal. This seal was handed over for safekeeping to the lord or steward of the market 
and four persons of the same market, or more or fewer, as the community of the 
market might agree. The seal was guarded in the church or in another safe place 
where the community had ordered. It was always to be used under the private seals 
of two or three other people. These people had to be different from those who had 
the keys of the coffer or chest in which the market seal was guarded. The wordage on 
the impression of this seal, if it was for a city that had a mayor, was to be such as the 
following: "Seal of the mayor and community of the city of London for fairs and 
markets". If they did not have a mayor but a lord, their lord was not to be named in 
the wordage in the impression of their seals. This was because a mayor was one 
within his community, but a lord was above his community. The wordage of the 
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latter kind of impression was to be per the following example: "Seal of the town of 
St. Albans for markets".167 This suggested that seals with wordage were for those of 
lower commercial/social rank, while wordless seals were for those of higher rank. 
Higher rank was represented by graphic symbols, arguably imitative of this attribute 
of royal seals. 
 
Schechter said that “custom”, “common profit” and artisan personal character 
appeared to be elements of gild reputation. Many of the gilds had regulations 
designed to prevent the taking of custom by one craftsman from another by the 
inducing or enticing of customers away or by displaying wares in an open street or in 
booths.168 Development of individual custom was repressed in this way among the 
members of the gild. There was, however, a collective custom. It was enforced by 
prohibiting gildsmen from using a mark or sign of greater prominence than another, 
or to exploit improperly the gild seal affixed to goods, which conformed properly to 
gild standards.169 Lipson noted that shoddy wares or products imperfect in 
workmanship often constituted a police offence or a violation of police regulations, 
and also an injury to the collective goodwill of the gilds.170 It appeared to cover 
misrepresentation of fact as to product quality, and damage to goodwill. The Little 
Red Book of Bristol illustrated this police character. 
Whereas complaint is made that where diverse ordinances have been 
made on the working of woollen cloths to the intent that good and true 
cloth shall be made in the town, as well for the preservation of the good 
fame of the same as for the profit which they shall take on the sale of 
their cloth, the weavers exercising their craft in narrow instruments 
which men call “Osetes” have greatly defamed the said craft by the 
fraudulent cloths which they have made both from the small pieces of 
thread which men call thrums and thread which is called “ab” in place 
of thread which is called Warp, and other defaults, it is ordained by the 
Mayor and good people aforesaid that henceforth there shall be living in 
the said town or suburb but five men only exercising the said craft of 
Osetes on pain of half a mark when any one is convicted thereof . . . .171 
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Lipson noted that the ideal of the common profit was arguably a statement of 
collective goodwill. It was policed by sanctions against bad workmanship, in the 
illustrative instance of the Pewterers of London, as follows: 
At the first default the offender was condemned to lose the defective 
ware, at the second he was also punished, and at the third he was 
expelled from the craft for ever: he had sullied the reputation of the gild 
and damaged its good name in the eyes of the public, upon whose 
favour the craftsmen were dependent for their market.172 
 
An example of a customer complaints process at Bristol was as follows: 
If any tailor lose [spoil] by his evil working a cloth or garment to him 
delivered to be cut, and the possessor complain to the master and 
wardens, the latter shall examine into the matter and the customer’s loss 
be made good, so every tailor shall be better advised to cut well and 
sufficiently the cloth that is delivered to him.173 
 
Such a process description suggested a pre-determined outcome to the investigation. 
As an aside, a predetermined outcome would be strong evidence of a presumption 
against the defendant. To sustain this proposition, the following passage records a 
1316 complaint by the Potters of London to the Mayor and Aldermen, concerning 
certain practices.174 
[Those who] buy in divers places pots of bad metal and then put them on 
the fire so as to resemble pots that have been used, and are of old brass; and 
then expose them for sale . . . to the deception of all those who buy such 
pots: for the moment that they are put on the fire and become exposed to 
great heat they come to nothing, and melt. By which roguery and falsehood 
the people are deceived and the trade aforesaid is badly put in slander.175 
 
The following early case dealing with allegations of de facto passing off was 
recorded in two entries in the Rolls of the Mayor’s Court of London for 1303.176 
A jury of the venue of St Clement’s Lane, consisting of Thomas de Wynton 
and others, said on oath that Stephen de Wynton did not make the brown 
bread (panum bissum) which was seized in the bakehouse of Thomas de 
Wrotham in St Clement’s Lane, for which he was arrested on the ground that 
the bread weighed 20s 8d less than it ought to do, but that a certain Thomas 
de Bedeford, oven-man (furnator) of Thomas de Wrotham, made it and 
sealed it with the seal belonging to the house of his master, to his master’s 
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profit. Judgment that Stephen go quit, and that Thomas de Wrotham be 
distrained to answer what may be charged against him.177 
 
The following entry was recorded in the Rolls of the Mayor’s Court of London for 
1303, four days later. 
A jury was summoned from the venue of St. Clement’s Lane by Candelwyk 
strete to say whether Thomas de Wrotham made a certain brown loaf &c . . 
. . Finally a jury consisting of Stephen le Potter and others said on oath that 
the above Thomas had no profit from bread made in his bakehouse, except 
4d the quarter, which was the rent for the use of the bakehouse and utensils, 
and that a certain Thomas de Bedeford made the bread and sustained 
judgment for the same. Judgment that the defendant be acquitted.178 
 
Noting that the trial was purely for the act, it appeared that the customary penalty for 
“false bread” was the hurdle, or later, the pillory. Thomas recorded that the law was 
that the baker of defective bread was to be drawn upon a hurdle from the Guildhall to 
his own house, through the great streets where the people were assembled, in the 
dirtiest of streets, with the faulty loaf hanging from his neck.179 This suggested that 
faulty artisanship, where the production mark did not correspond to bread quality, 
would convict the artisan on a strict liability basis, purely by extrinsic evidence of 
the quality of the bread. 
 
3   Development of the Law of Certification Marks 
 
The chapter 2 discussion of quo warranto suggested a commercial ranks system, 
enforced at its base by certification and accreditation. This section investigates how 
marks were used to certify artisans, to trace and police their work. 
 
The history of certification marks is based on regulation, namely the process by 
which governments imposed requirements on enterprises, citizens, and the 
government itself, by way of laws, orders and other rules to protect values such as 
the quality or quantities of goods, public health or safety.180 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Arthur Hermann Thomas Calendar of Early Mayor's Court Rolls, City of London (England) Lord 
Mayor's Court, City of London (England) Court of Common Council (Library Committee, The 
University Press, 1924), 152. 
178 Thomas, above 177, 153. 
179 Schechter, above 107, 55. 
180 Jeffrey Belson Certification Marks (Sweet & Maxwell, 2002) 6. 
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Belsen defined the certification mark as follows. 
A certification mark is a mark, which indicates that certain characteristics 
of goods or services, in connection with which the mark is used, are 
certified.  Whereas the legal perception of ordinary trademarks is primarily 
one of individual source designation, certification marks are upheld as 
indicia of conformity of goods or services to particular standards, which are 
stipulated by the proprietor. Thus a certification mark is a guarantee that 
goods or services, in connection with which the mark is used, conform to 
certain standards . . . .181 
 
The gilds controlled the markings on products, so that they could control, police and 
enforce standards of workmanship, the quality of merchandise, and weights and 
measures. Therefore, these marks were described as liability marks, police marks or 
regulatory marks. Enforcement was by seizing noncompliant or nongild wares. There 
was a right to punish offenders in the gild’s own court of justice.182 
 
Craftsmen had their own marks, and gilds had their own marks. The craftsman’s 
mark would represent a control and regulatory trace to an offending craftsman. 
However, the gild mark, as a mark of the association as a whole, would represent an 
assurance that the so-marked goods were the outcome of authorized gild 
workmanship. In this way, the gild mark identified and distinguished the goods from 
those of other sources.183 
 
As a descriptive example, because of the prominence of their products, the 
Goldsmiths were subject to significant regulatory legislation, in the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries. Craftsmen, dealers, assayers and wardens of the craft could each 
be held liable for unauthorized marking and selling of wares. The craft was held 
responsible at all levels for properly marking, or failing to mark, or deal in compliant 
goods.184 
 
The first statute regulating the standard of silver and gold was enacted in 1300, as 28 
Edw I, c 20, stated as follows. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Belson, above 180, 1. 
182 Belson, above 180, 6. 
183 Belson, above 180, 7. 
184 Ibid. 
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IT is Ordained, That no Goldsmith of England, nor otherwhere within the 
King's Dominion, shall from henceforth make, or cause to be made, any 
Vessel, Jewel, or any other Thing of Gold or Silver, essayed and touched, 
except it be of good and true Allay, that is to say, Gold of a certain Touch, and 
Silver of the sterling Allay, or of better, at the Pleasure of him to whom the 
Work belongeth; and that none work worse Silver than Money; and that no 
Manner of Vessel of Silver be marked depart out of the Hands of the Workers, 
until it be essayed by the Wardens of the Craft; and further, that it be marked 
with the Leopard's Head; and that work no worse Gold than of the Touch of 
Paris; And that the Wardens of the Craft shall go from Shop to Shop among 
the Goldsmiths, to essay if their Gold Business or be of the same Touch that is 
spoken of before; and if Goldsmiths they find any other than of the Touch 
aforesaid, the Gold shall be forfeit to the King . . . .185 
 
The key points of the full version of this provision were as follows. First, the alloy 
should be of a certain touch.186 Second, silver should not be worse than money. 
Third, the workers should not be trusted on their own but should be supervised by 
Wardens of the Craft. Fourth, finished work must be marked with the Leopard's 
Head. Fifth, if any Goldsmith were to be attainted187 he should be imprisoned. Each 
of these key points is highly subjective and therefore subject to an administrative 
discretion. However, the fifth point prescribed mandatory prison after the 
discretionary disciplinary penalty had been suffered. These presumptions against the 
workers, including that of attainder, were arguably indicia of a strict liability regime 
based on commercial ranks. 
 
Later, in 1363, a statute of 37 Edward III, c. 7 enacted that each Goldsmith must 
have his own mark, for which he was to be held responsible. That mark was to be 
struck into his work next to the king’s mark. The provision stated thus. 
ITEM, It is ordained, That Goldsmiths, as well in London as elsewhere within 
the Realm, shall make all Manner of Vessel and other Work of Silver well and 
lawfully of the Allay of good Sterling: And every Master Goldsmith shall 
have a Mark by himself, and the same Mark shall be known by them which 
shall be assigned by the King to survey their Work and Allay: And that the 
said Goldsmiths set not their Mark upon their Works till the said Surveyors 
have made their Assay, as shall be ordained by the King and his Council; and 
after the Assay made, the Surveyors shall set the King's Mark, and after the 
Goldsmith his Mark, for which he will answer: And that no Goldsmith take for 
Vessel White and full for the Weight of a Pound that is to say, of the Price of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 1 Statutes of the Realm 1235-1377, 140, 141. 
186 This presumably meant a certain quality to the touch. 
187 Attainder. A bill of attainder was a law that punished a person without permitting a trial or fair 
hearing in a court of law. It was punishment by legislation. Oxford English Dictionary (Clarendon 
Press, 2nd ed, 1989). 
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Two Marks of Paris Weight, but Eighteen Pence, as they do at Paris; and that 
no Goldsmith making White Vessel shall meddle with gilding, nor they that 
do gild shall meddle to make White Vessel: And they which shall be so 
assigned in every Town, shall make their Searches as oftentimes as shall be 
ordained; and for that which shall be in the Goldsmith's Default, they shall 
incur the Pain of Forfeiture to the King the Value of the Metal which shall be 
found in Default.188 
 
The key points of this provision were as follows. First, each master was to have a 
mark assigned to him by the king. Second, private marks were not to be applied until 
the king’s mark was administratively approved for application. Third, private marks 
were answerable to officials on a reverse onus basis. Fourth, meddling was 
proscribed. Fifth, searches could result in an instant forfeiture to the king. This 
suggested indicia of a strict liability regime. 
 
In contravention of this legislative regime, a 1468 case illustrated the typical passing-
off style of mischief of the time. In that case, Derek Knyff and Thomas Gomercy 
were imprisoned for five days and fined 20 shillings, by the Gild of Goldsmiths, for 
manufacturing substandard silver spoons. These bore counterfeit Leopard’s Head 
marks, and were found on the premises of John Fabian in Coggeshall, Essex.189 
 
Belsen continued that despite strict enforcement, unscrupulous traders continued to 
evade the law and sell substandard silver. Consequently, the 1423 statute of 2 Hen. 
VI. c. 14 tightened the law, and was stated as follows. 
ITEM, That no Goldsmith, nor Worker of Silver, sell any Workmanship of 
Silver, unless it be as fine as the Sterling, except that of Silver, unless the same 
need Souder in the making, which shall be allowed according as the Souder is 
necessary to be wrought in the same. And that no Goldsmith nor Jeweller, nor 
any other that worketh Harness of Silver, shall set any of the same to sell within 
the City, before that it be touched with the Touch of the Leopards Head, if it 
may reasonably bear the same Touch, and also with the Mark or Sign of the 
Workman of the same, upon Pain of Forfeiture of the Double, as afore is said; 
and that the Mark and Sign of every Goldsmith be known to the Wardens of the 
same Craft. And if it may be found, that the said Keeper of the Touch touch any 
such Harness with the Leopard's Head, except it be as fine in Allay as the 
Sterling, that then the Keeper of the Touch, for every Thing so proved not as 
good in Allay as the said Sterling, shall forfeit the Double Value to the King 
and to the Party, as is above recited . . . . in Manner and Form as before is 
recited within the City of London. And  the Justices of Peace, Mayors and 
Bailiffs, and all other having Power as Justices of Peace, shall hear, inquire, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 37 Edw III c VII in 1 Statutes of the Realm 1235-1377, 380. 
189 Belson, above 180, 16-24. 
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determine by Bill, Plaint, or in other Manner, of all that do contrary to the said 
Ordinances, and thereof to make due Execution by their Discretions . . . .190 
 
This statutory provision created the position of a Keeper of the Touch. This task was 
the company warden’s duty. Another member of the company was to assist him, if 
required.191 
 
The key points of this provision were as follows. First, silver work had to be as fine 
as Sterling or the maker forfeited double value. Second, there was a prohibition 
against selling within the City before the product was marked with the Leopards 
Head and with the mark or sign of the workman. The penalty for breaching this was 
forfeiture of double the product’s value. Third, Justices of the Peace were to hear 
matters of breach of these rules and make execution by their discretion. Arguably, 
through the absence of assessment of guilty mens rea, this was a strict liability 
regime. 
 
Under the 1478 statute of 17 Edward IV, c.1, an additional mark was created, as an 
assay mark. It was introduced to identify the assayer. The assay mark appeared next 
to the king’s mark and the maker’s mark. It was changed every year with the annual 
change of the wardens of the gild. This statute held the goldsmiths’ company liable. 
They were fined if inspectors found substandard silver to be marked as good.192 It 
was stated as follows. 
Nor that no Goldsmith, Jeweller, nor other Worker of Harness of Silver, shall 
set no Harness of Silver Plate, nor Jewel of Silver to sell, from the said Feast of 
Easter, within the said City of London, or within Two Miles of London, before 
it be touched with a Touch of the leopard's head crowned, such as may bear the 
same Touch, and also with a Mark or Sign of the Worker of the same so 
wrought within the City of London, or Two Miles of the same, upon Pain of 
Forfeiture of the Double Value of any such Silver wrought and sold to the 
contrary. And that the Mark or Sign of every Goldsmith be committed to the 
Wardens of the same Mystery; and if it may be found that the said keeper of the 
Touch of the leopard's Head crowned, aforesaid, do mark or touch any such 
Harness with the Leopard's Head, if it be not as fine in Allay as the Sterling, 
then the said keeper of the said Touch, for everything proved not of as good 
allay as the Sterling, shall forfeit the double Value; the same Forfeitures to he 
divided into Two.193 
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192 Ibid. 
193 2 Statutes of the Realm 1377-1504, 457. 
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The key points of this provision were as follows. First, products could not be sold 
within the City of London, or within two miles of London, before it was marked with 
the leopard's head crowned. Second, there was a provision for fining the Keeper of 
the Touch for false certification. This was arguably a strict liability regime. Also, the 
Leopard Head mark had been amended by the statute to include a crown. This 
suggested a symbolic crown interest in regulating these wares. 
 
In the London Coopers’ trade, compulsory marking was implemented to suppress the 
sale of oil and soap barrels to brewers. These barrels were to be used for containing 
ale and authorities no doubt wanted to preserve the ale’s quality. Marking was also 
designed to stop the use of inferior materials in the barrels, such as unseasoned 
wood. The Court of Aldermen decreed194 that all coopers must bring all their goods 
into the Chamber of London to be marked. A duplicate of the barrel maker’s mark 
was recorded there against a register of the maker’s name. In addition, the authorities 
inspected places of business, seized unapproved vessels, and fined the holders.195 
 
D   Conclusion 
 
This chapter sought to build on the proposition in chapter 2 that commercial ranks 
were related to the differential levels of commercial status, by arguing that these 
ranks were represented graphically on royal seals as the higher status, and 
represented as strata of trademarks for the lower levels of status. 
 
There was argument that the graphic representations on royal seals were related to a 
strict liability enforcement regime against passed off goods. Grants made in charters 
were made by the sovereign under the royal seal, followed certain symbolic 
customary rules. Thus, a royal seal had its own administrative apparatus, which 
flowed down through the commercial ranks, using the devices of prerogative orders. 
With prerogative orders, the Court of Hustings had complete control of matters 
resembling the later tort of passing-off. 
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There was argument that various strata of administration were used to enforce 
application of royal seals.  The king had an administrative system to use the privy 
seal to create actionable warrants for the application of the great seal. Seals existed in 
a system of ranks, passing through four levels of public administration before 
validating a grant or charter. 
 
The discussion of the swan mark set forth a schema as to how its customary 
administrative system might have manifested lower down the commercial ranks.  
Administrative rules were applied by the king’s officials to the operation of an 
administrative registry, by which any derogation by the common man from these 
administrative rules would render him strictly liable in tort. Should this theoretical 
common man represent that personal property that he made per industriam were his 
own property, then this would be a legal misrepresentation. 
 
The investigation of printers’ devices suggested a wrongful use of another’s printers’ 
device might be heard in the Star Chamber, by inquisitorial process, gathering and 
applying all the existing ancient customs and applicable statutes. In the alternative, a 
breach could be tried in the reverse onus civilian Court of Chivalry, if the device was 
heraldic. Printers’ devices represented crown licence to publish, administered by the 
clergy. A breach of licence to publish could be punished in the Star Chamber as for 
the underlying legal norm of sedition against the king. 
 
Crown regulation of proprietary marks in the middle-ages offered an explanation of 
how merchants might have used proprietary marks to recover stolen property using 
registries. Since stolen property could be rebranded and passed off as the products of 
another manufacturer, registries in various forms were set up by a variety of statutes, 
merchants’ customs and international regulations. This meant it was arguable that 
any wrongful dealings in the customary property rights in the transported goods, 
which could result in passing off, was dealt with on a reverse onus strict liability 
basis, and were indicative of fraud. 
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Production marks in the regulation of trade by the gilds and companies suggested 
that damage to gild goodwill appeared to have been at the peril of its artisans. Each 
market operated under its own seal. Seals with wordage were for those markets of 
lower social rank, while wordless seals were for those of higher rank. Higher rank 
was represented by seals with graphic symbols, mimetic of a cognate attribute of 
royal seals. Thus, faulty work would be traced to the offending artisan via a product 
seal. The artisan was convicted on a strict liability basis, purely by evidence of 
product quality, which it might be alleged caused scandal to the gild. 
 
The law of certification marks suggested that the gild mark would represent an 
assurance to the public that the so-marked goods were the end result of authorized 
gild workmanship and properly authorized inspection. Building on this, any breach 
of an assurance to the public would be complete at the time of public perception of 
breach, regardless of the defendant’s intent. This would be so, because the mark was 
a public mode of communication to the consumer. 
 
There was an administrative system controlling graphic marks from royal seals down 
through various commercial ranks to individual artisan marks. Both seals and marks 
were controlled by an administrative system based on the underlying rules of 
registry. In this kind of system, a defendant’s misrepresentation in the registry 
inferred defendant liability at the time the registry entry became a misrepresentation. 
Also, registries were operated by customary procedures. The customary nature of 
registry procedure was why the identified administrative system continued to inhere 
within the policing of graphic representations. In consequence of this, passing off 
any mark controlled by such an administrative registry could be enforced by a strict 
liability jurisdiction. By further inference, it was argued that passing off any goods 
represented by such a mark would be sanctioned with strict liability due to the public 
nature of the mark, coinciding with suggestions of fraud.
 
  
112	  
	  
IV THE GLOUCESTERSHIRE CLOTHIER’S CASE 
 
A   Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the argument builds on the argument in chapter 2 that gild business 
norms, and other customary norms, were strict liability when enforced, and breaches 
of them might have been indicative of fraud. There is also argument building on the 
proposition, expressed in chapter 3, that printers’ devices were not subject to a 
passing-off regime, but instead, were subject to crown-controlled administrative 
regulation via the clergy, through the Stationers Company, Star Chamber and the 
Earl Marshal’s Court. 
 
This chapter is structured to address the thesis central question of whether or not 
passing-off is a strict liability tort, and if so why and how, by conducting an 
historical examination of the Gloucestershire Clothiers’ Case1 and some of its 
consequences. The significance of this case was that Doderidge J said, in the 1618 
case of Southern v How,2 that what was later to be recognised as the Gloucestershire 
Clothier’s Case was the first recorded case of passing-off.3 Stolte noted that 
Southern v How was first published in Popham’s Reports in 1656 at 79 Eng Rep 
1243.  The second report of the case was in J. Bridgeman’s Reports in 1659 and cites 
the case as decided in 1616. A third report of the case was published in Croke’s 
Reports in 1659 indicating that the case was heard in 1618. Two later abstracts of the 
case appeared in Rolle’s Reports published in 1676. The one is inconsistent with the 
other in several ways, including disagreement as to the date of hearing. Therefore, 
this chapter comprises analysis and interpretation of the reported pleadings in the 
Gloucestershire Clothiers’ Case. It also seeks to build a context in procedural law in 
which the Gloucestershire Clothiers’ Case might be interpreted, in its relationship to 
the development of the tort of passing-off. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Later identified by Professor Baker as J G v Samford (1584) unrep in J H Baker An Introduction to 
English Legal History, (Butterworths LexisNexis, 4th ed, 2002), 459. 
2 Cro Jac 468, 471. 
3 Passing-off is concerned with misrepresentation made by one trader which damages the goodwill of 
another trader. Misrepresentation, damage and goodwill are therefore the three essential elements of 
the tort, and are sometimes referred to as its ‘classical trinity’.  C Wadlow The Law of Passing-Off – 
Unfair Competition by Misrepresentation (Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), 6. 
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This chapter is divided into the following three sections of Seals on Cloth and the 
Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case, Pleading the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case and 
the Doctrine of secondary meaning 1838 – 1896 
 
The section Seals on Cloth and the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case comprises the 
subsections of fraud and deceit in the Gloucestershire Clothiers Case, the mis-use of 
product seals, and Passing-off in Star Chamber. The subsection on fraud and deceit 
in the Gloucestershire Clothiers Case investigates the various manuscript reports of 
the Gloucestershire Clothiers Case. The subsection on the misuse of product seals 
examines the history of their regulatory mechanisms to see how they might have 
created a strict liability enforcement scheme. The subsection on Passing-off in Star 
Chamber investigates the outcomes of continuing crown attempts to stamp out deceit 
in the trades. The section on applying classical styles in pleadings to the 
Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case asks the question of whether the styles of pleading 
in the Court of Common Pleas might have created a strict liability procedure for 
passing-off. The section on the doctrine of secondary meaning 1838 – 1896 will 
investigate how an unsuccessful argument pleaded in Southern v How might have 
reemerged as a strict liability doctrine that would allow a rival trader to sue when not 
directly damaged by a misrepresentation. 
 
In this chapter, the proposition is argued that the crown resisted the damnum absque 
injuria determination of the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case, in part, by means of the 
Jupp case in Star Chamber. Later, Lord Herschell deduced in Reddaway v Banham4 
that no man might make a direct false representation to a purchaser that enabled that 
purchaser to tell a lie to someone else who would be the ultimate customer.5 There is 
argument in this chapter that this deduction would suggest an implication of strict 
liability into the actions of subsequent sellers passing off goods while unaware of the 
lie, but continuing the fraud of another. 
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B   Seals on Cloth and the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case 
 
1   Fraud and Deceit in the Gloucestershire Clothiers Case 
 
This section investigates the various manuscript reports of the Gloucestershire 
Clothiers Case and then seeks to place in context the various allegations of fraud and 
deceit in the case. Doderidge J referred to the case in the 1618 case of Southern v 
How,6 in the following context, in the Hilary Term of 15 Jac. 1.7 The case might be 
summarised as follows.8 
 
In Southern v How,9 it appeared that the plaintiff was the principal’s agent, in his 
action against the merchant principal. A merchant consigned jewels to his factor to 
sell. The factor appointed an agent to dispose of them, and received from him the net 
proceeds of the sale. The purchaser discovered afterwards that the jewels were 
counterfeit. He had the agent arrested, and recovered the purchase money. It was 
argued for the plaintiff that where a person was party to a fraud, the court should 
presume that all following that fraud was his, even though this party might be 
unaware of the fraud. The defendant was the first actor in this fraud, first by his 
knowing they were counterfeit, and secondly by sending his factor and selling the 
counterfeit goods in Barbary. Doderidge J cited an un-named case in Southern v 
How,10 which he placed in the year of 33 Elizabeth, and heard in the Court of 
Common Pleas. In that case, a clothier of Gloucestershire sold very good cloth. In 
London, if they saw any cloth with his mark, they would buy it without any further 
investigation. Another clothier made poor quality cloth and put the first clothier’s 
mark upon it without a legal arrangement to do so. The customer who bought the 
cloth brought an action on the case for this alleged deceit. According to Doderidge J, 
the court judged this action as maintainable. The Court, in the principal case, inclined 
in their opinions against the plaintiff agent. The court held that an action would not 
lie by the agent against the merchant, even though the agent was ignorant of the 
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7 But alternatively in 1618, by one of several conflicting reports, as noted above. 
8 Cro Jac 468, 471. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
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fraud when he made the sale. This would be especially so if the jury did not find that 
either the merchant directed the factor to employ the agent, or he ordered him to 
conceal the fact of the jewels being counterfeit.11 
 
The argument in Southern v How12 ran as follows. A prima facie theory was argued 
for the plaintiff agent that where one was party to a fraud, all which followed by 
reason of that fraud should be presumed as his. In support of this pleading, Sander’s 
Case13 and Agnes Gore’s Case14 were cited by counsel. Each was apparently an 
explanation and illustration of how fraud could arise without proof of mens rea. 
 
In Sander’s Case,15 the defendant gave his wife an apple, which he had poisoned 
with arsenic. He wanted to kill her so that he could marry another woman. The wife 
took a bite from the apple then gave it to their daughter. The daughter died. The 
Court held that the defendant was liable for the murder of his daughter. His intention 
to kill his wife was transferred to the daughter. In Agnes Gores Case,16 “A” put 
poison into a pot intending to poison “B” and then put the pot in a place where she 
thought “B” might come and drink it. However “C” came by the pot, and “A” had no 
malice to “C”, and “C” drank the poison and died from it. The Court resolved that 
this was a case of murder. The court reasoned that the law itself coupled the event 
with the intention, and it coupled the end with the cause. However, if a person laid 
down rat poison only to kill rats, then if anyone ate the rat poison it would not be a 
felony, unless the person had a felonious intent. 
 
The court held against these two arguments in the substantive case. This was because 
the deceit on the plaintiff was practised solely by the servant/agent without his 
master’s authority. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ibid. 
12 Cro Jac 468, 468-471. 
13 1 Wms Saund 263, 263. 
14 9 Co 81 b from Sir Thomas Ireland An Exact Abridgment in English of the Eleven Books of Reports 
of the Learned Sir Edward Coke Knt (I Riley, 1813), 275. 
15 1 Wms Saund 263, 263. 
16 9 Co 81b from Sir Thomas Ireland An Exact Abridgment in English of the Eleven Books of Reports 
of the Learned Sir Edward Coke Knt (I Riley, 1813), 275. 
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In support of the court’s holding against the plaintiff in Southern v How17, Doderidge 
J cited the 1584 Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case. He placed this case in the year of 
33 Elizabeth,18 and noted that it was heard in the Court of Common Pleas. In this 
reported version of that case, a clothier of Gloucestershire used to sell very good 
cloth. 
 
It was alleged that if London customers saw any cloth with his mark on it, they 
would buy it without any further investigation as to quality or source. This 
apparently ignored the operation of the common law doctrine of caveat emptor, and 
thereby tended to limit any remedy to one in equity, where equitable fraud was strict 
liability, explained by Finlayson as follows. 
. . . the maxim, at law is, caveat emptor: let the buyer take care and inquire. If he 
is told falsehoods, then he has a right of action; but if he makes no inquiries, at 
law he has no remedy, though he may in equity. This is the distinction between 
fraud in the legal and equitable sense, though even in equity there is no fraud in 
mere non-disclosure unless there is a duty to disclose, which there is not if the 
parties are in a position of equality in the transaction – that is, of equal 
knowledge and means of knowledge; and the doctrine of equitable fraud would 
only apply to matters in the knowledge only of the vendor, which he ought to 
disclose to the vendee.19 
 
Another clothier made poorer quality cloth and put the first clothier’s mark on it. The 
manuscripts recorded that this was with neither the privity20 nor the warranty of the 
first clothier. The purchaser brought an action on the case for deceit against the 
clothier who sold the poor quality cloth. 
 
Doderidge J did not recall, in this version of the case, whether the court was divided 
as to whether or not this form of action was maintainable. The same Professor Baker, 
mentioned in the introduction chapter to this thesis, maintained that the various 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Cro Jac 468, 468-471. 
18 This year, 1591, is not consistent among the various manuscripts, and should therefore not be taken 
as authoritative. 
19 W F Finlayson A Report of the Case of The Queen v Gurney and Others in the Court of Queens 
Bench: The Summing Up revised by the Lord Chief Justice with an Introduction Containing a 
History of the Case and an Examination of the Cases at Law and Equity applicable to it; or 
Illustrating the Doctrine of Commercial Fraud (Stevens and Haynes, 1870), introduction, 12. 
20 Privity. A relation between two parties that is recognized by law. Oxford English Dictionary 
(Clarendon Press, 2nd ed, 1989). 
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manuscripts21 showed that this case was one of deceit to the original user of the 
common law trademark. There was no written record either of any final or any 
mesne judgment in the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case. 
 
Baker & Milsom reproduced the facts of the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case in the 
first of three manuscripts they cited.22 It began with the arguably significant 
designation of the plaintiff as a clothier. This was significant because it suggested the 
parties might have been subject to the ordinances of the various gilds of cloth 
workers, or to the strict liability doctrine of suo periculo, discussed above in chapter 
2. Unwin’s report that the London Gild of Cloth-Workers had its own Court in the 
years 1537-1639,23 also suggested by the circumstances that the parties might have 
been subject to the strict liability doctrine of tradesman’s peril, suo periculo.24 
 
In the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case, the plaintiff ran his business for 12 years at a 
place called “T” in a specified county. He was said to have used the art and mystery 
of making woollen cloths, called Reading kerseys, ‘halfes’ cloths and Bridgwaters. 
All those cloths that he made at T were said to be good, and without either fraud or 
deception. For the 12 years, he was accustomed to marking the cloths with the two 
letters “J.G.”. Also he affixed onto them a sign called a tucker’s handle.25 This was 
apparently pursuant to the 1536 statute of 27 Hen. VIII, c. 12. This provision 
required every clothier to weave his token or mark into every cloth, before it could 
be sold lawfully. It stated as follows. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Baker cited three manuscripts, each of which reported the case at slight variants, J H Baker and S F 
C Milsom Sources of English Legal History (Butterworths, 1986), 615 et seq, citing Cory’s Entries, 
BL MS Hargrave 123, fo 168v; J H Baker An Introduction to English Legal History, (Butterworths 
LexisNexis, 4th ed, 2002), 459. 
22 Baker and Milsom, above 21, 615 et seq, citing Cory’s Entries, BL MS. Hargrave 123, fo. 168v. 
23 George Unwin Industrial Organization in the 16th and 17th Centuries (The Clarendon Press, 1904), 
228 et seq. Moreau reported that a charter had been granted to weavers in Gloucestershire in the 
time of Henry IV, which was 1399-1413. Simeon Moreau A Tour to Cheltenham Spa or 
Gloucestershire Display’d (R Cruttwell, 1788), 98. 
24 Pollock stated this doctrine as follows. Anyone who professes a craft, holds himself/herself out to 
have the common skill of that craft, and is answerable accordingly. If this person fails, it is no 
excuse that he or she merely did the best possible. The rule is that he/she must be reasonably skilled 
at his/her peril. The term “at his/her peril” is the index of strict liability because it means that the 
breach itself causes the punishment. Frederick Pollock The Law of Torts (Banks & Brothers, 1895), 
18, 19. 
25 Probably the fuller’s club. See the discussion below. 
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. . . cause to be woven his or their seal, token or mark in all and the cloth 
kersey and other clothes  . . . .  of their said seals, than every of the said 
Clothiers.26 
 
Also, by another statute, 3 & 4 Edward VI, c. 2, a clothier was required to set his seal 
of lead into the cloth. 
That every clothier and clothmaker shall from the feast of clothiers from the 
Annunciation of our Lady next coming set his seal of lead to his cloth, declaring 
thereby the just lengths their cloths.27 
 
In both statutory provisions, there is arguably a missing logical step in an argument 
linking the word “his” with a form of sole use or ownership. Both were criminal 
provisions attended by punitive penalties. Applying criminal provisions in civil 
actions will be discussed in chapter 5, below. 
 
To continue the facts of the case, the plaintiff sold these cloths throughout the 12 
years at T, and at C within the same county. He also traded them in other places 
within England, at M in Wales, and overseas. At the wholesale level, he traded them 
to both English and foreign merchants. The Sergeant-at-law pleaded that the buyers 
were accustomed for the previous eight years to buy these cloths from J G in the 
specified places as “good and substantial”. The plaintiff pleaded that they were in 
fact “good and substantial”. This pleading was based on the affirmations of the 
plaintiff, his servants and factors. The plaintiff said that he made much gain from 
these sales, with which he supported his family. 
 
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was aware of all facts pleaded. He alleged 
that the defendant schemed and plotted to both hinder his sales and worsen his 
product’s reputation. He alleged that the defendant made and marketed cloths that 
were “ill, insufficient and unmerchantable, deceitfully marked with the letters ‘J G’ 
and the sign of the tucker’s handle”. It was further alleged, apparently by inference, 
that buyers purchased these cloths thinking they were cloths made by the plaintiff, 
and therefore, buyers bought them without further inspection. However, afterwards, 
buyers realised that the cloths were “deceitful, insufficient and unmerchantable”, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 3 Statutes of the Realm 1509-1545, 544, 545. 
27 4 Statutes of the Realm 1547-1624, 101, 102. 
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size, quality and substance. It was alleged that this reversed the buyers’ opinion and 
esteem of J G cloths, and as a result of this alleged deceit, other merchants began to 
refuse to buy J G cloths. 
 
The Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case was also set out in a second manuscript.28 As 
stated above, it was also cited by Doderidge J in Southern v How at both (1618) Cro 
Jac 468, 471, and in Poph 144. Baker & Milsom regarded the previous and first-cited 
manuscript as inaccurate, as it reported that the action was brought by the buyer of 
the bad cloth for deceit, rather than by the aggrieved J G.29 Arguably, later courts 
knew the case only from these imperfect citations. For example, see the 1742 case of 
Blanchard v Hill,30 in which Lord Hardwicke stated as follows. 
Every particular trader has some particular mark or stamp; but I do not know of 
any instance of granting an injunction here to restrain one trader from using the 
same mark with another, and I think it would be of mischievous consequence to 
do it. Mr. Attorney-General has mentioned a case where an action at law was 
brought by a cloth worker against another of the same trade for using the same 
mark, and a judgment was given that the action would lie. But it was the single 
act of making use of the mark that was sufficient to maintain the action, but 
doing it with a fraudulent design, to put off bad cloths by this means, or to draw 
away customers from the other clothier; and there is no difference between a 
tradesman’s putting up the same sign, and making use of the same mark, with 
another of the same trade. An objection has been made that the defendant, in 
using this mark, prejudices the plaintiff by taking away his customers. But there 
is no more weight in this than there would be in an objection to one innkeeper 
setting up the same sign with another.31 
 
In this second version, J S made good cloth and J D made bad cloth. They were both 
clothiers. J D then put J S’s mark on his own cloth and in this way obtained good 
business, referred to as utterance.32 J D’s cloth was found to be bad. Because of this, 
J S’s cloth was discredited and his business suffered. J S brought an action on the 
case against J D. Anderson CJ held that the action lay, even although the act 
complained of was a lawful act. Peryam J held that there was no action because it 
was damnum absque injuria. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Baker & Milsom, above 21, 617, citing HLS MS 2071, fo 86. 
29 Fitzherbert is authority for the proposition that the buyer would have a cause of action in deceit. 
Anthony Fitzherbert The New Natura Brevium of the Most Reverend Judge Mr Anthony Fitz-
Herbert (Savoy, 6th ed, 1718), 217. 
30 (1742) 2 Atk 484, from Lewis Boyd Sebastian A Digest of Cases of Trade Mark, Trade Name, 
Trade Secrets, Goodwill, &c (Stevens & Sons, 1879), 2, 3. 
31 (1742) 2 Atk 484, from Sebastian, above 30, 2, 3. 
32 Utterance. To go beyond; violating convention or propriety -- Middle English 15th Century. Oxford 
English Dictionary (Clarendon Press, 2nd ed, 1989). 
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Weeks’ 1879 treatise proposed that the doctrine of damnum absque injuria might be 
understood as follows. A tort was a civil wrong for which compensation in damages 
was recoverable. This was in contradistinction to a crime, which was punished by the 
criminal law system in the interest of society-at-large. Every invasion of a legal right, 
such as the right of property, or the rights incident to the possession of property or 
the right of personal security, constituted a tort. So also may an injury to the person, 
character or reputation of another, constituted a tort. In order to constitute a tort, two 
things must occur: actual or legal damage to the plaintiff; and, a wrongful act 
committed by the defendant.33 In as much as a tort implied damage coupled with a 
wrongful act, damnum absque injuria was damage without a wrongful act, as the law 
understood the term.34 The literal definition of the term damnum absque injuria was 
damage without injury. However, it was difficult to conceive of a damage done 
without a corresponding remedy to the party alleging itself to have been damaged. 
Thus, enlarging the above definition, still confined to the definitions of Latin 
transliterators, the term might be better explained as damage, loss, harm, injury, or 
hurt without wrong or injustice.35 Damnum, in the civil law, was the diminution of a 
person’s property and was either factum, already done, or infectum, apprehended or 
threatened. The former might arise from either mere accident or free will of another. 
The latter might have arisen during the exercise of a right enjoyed by the person 
causing it. In either case no reparation had to be made for causing it unless it was 
done wrongfully. In that case, the person injured was entitled to compensation. 
Injuria, in the civil law, was a broad term signifying every action contrary to law. In 
a specific sense, it meant the same as contumelia, outrage.36 Strictly speaking, injuria 
was a wrongful act or tort that related to the defendant, and damnum was the loss 
sustained, or harm done, by an injury, and related to the plaintiff. The injury done 
must be a violation of a right to which the plaintiff was entitled. Also, the plaintiff 
must suffer legal damages from it.37 Damage was defined as the loss caused by one 
person to another or to his property either with the design of injuring him or with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Edward P Weeks The Doctrine of Damnum Absque Injuria considered in its relation to the Law of 
Torts Sumner (Whitney & Co, 1879), 2. 
34 Weeks, above 33, 4. 
35 Weeks, above 33, 6, 7. 
36 Weeks, above 33, 7n. 
37 Weeks, above 33, 7, 8. 
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negligence and carelessness or by inevitable accident. He who had caused the 
damage was bound to repair it, and if done with malice, might be compelled to pay 
beyond the actual loss. If damage was caused by accident without anyone’s blame, 
the loss must be borne by the owner of the thing injured.38 However, there were 
certain acts done, accidents and casualties occurring, by which there was a lawful use 
of one’s own property occasioning lossess to others. For such acts, the law afforded 
no remedy and they were designated as damnum absque injuria.39 
 
There was also a third manuscript identified by Baker & Milsom.40 In this third 
version, Mr Sergeant Fenner pleaded that a clothier gave a slightly different version 
of the mark of another clothier. The difference was hardly noticeable. He put the bad 
mark on bad and false cloths, and the good cloths of the other were thereby 
discredited. Former London Recorder Mr Sergeant Fletewood submitted to the Court 
that an action on the case lay by the custom of London41 for counterfeiting another’s 
mark.42 It is unclear from Baker & Milsom which representative roles Fletewood and 
Fenner held, only that they were Serjeants-at-law in the case. 
 
Of relevance to this pleaded custom was the discussion in the 1675 case of Hutchins 
v Player,43 which referred to an ancient custom of the City of London. The Court 
stated as follows. 
To preserve trade, there is a necessity of order and government for regulation of 
it to prevent deceits and confusion. Cloths are one of the chief staple 
commodities and if every man might make whatever cloths he will, and make 
sale of cloth in substance, or in length, or mixed with false materials, it would 
bring slander upon us, and refuse upon our commodities and an impoverishment 
of the nation.44 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Weeks, above 33, 7. 
39 Weeks, above 33, 8.	  
40 Baker & Milsom, above 21, 617, 618, citing HLS MS Acc 704755, fo 118v. 
41 In chapter 2 it was argued that enforcement of the customs of London was by strict liability 
procedures, the accused first being gaoled. It was also argued there that a breach of a London 
custom was indicative of fraud. 
42 Baker & Milsom, above 21, 617, 618, citing HLS MS Acc 704755, fo 118v. 
43 Hutchins v Player Harg MSS No 55 fol 153, reported in Bannister, S (ed), from Hargraves 
Manuscripts Reports of Judgments Delivered by Sir Orlando Bridgman when Chief Justice of the 
Common Pleas from Mich 1660 to Trin 1667 (Butterworths, 1823), 291, 292. 
44 Ibid. 
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Arguably, Fletewood submitted that this particular London custom was also the law 
of Gloucestershire, in the absence of any statute,45 and should be held as such by the 
Court. In this respect, Noy defined custom as a second law, which could be either of 
the following two kinds. The first was general customs, in use throughout the realm, 
called maxims. The second was particular customs used in some certain county, city, 
town or lordship. He added that every maxim was a sufficient authority to itself, and 
only the courts could finally determine what operated as a maxim. This was because 
maxims were known only to the learned. He stated that a maxim should be construed 
strictly. However, a particular custom should be pleaded and tried by twelve men, 
unless it was a record in some court. He also stated that Cr Jac 80 was authority for 
the rule that a custom should not be construed so as to allow a person to do a 
wrongful act, and the rules for the requirements of a good custom could be found at 
Co Lit 110, 113b, 1 Bl Com. 77, Dav 31 B.46 
 
To reinforce Fletewood’s credentials, Stolte stated that Winfield had identified 
William Fletewood as having been at one time the Recorder of London, and also, as 
the indexer of the Year Book series for the reigns of Edward V, Richard III, Henry 
VII and Henry VIII.47 It is noted at British History Online that William Fletewood 
was Recorder of London in 1571, and was made a Serjeant in 1580. In 1592, he was 
made Queen's Serjeant.48 
 
To explain the office of Recorder, by the Royal Charter of Edward IV dated 9 
November 1463, it was declared to be the ancient custom of London that the mayor 
and aldermen record all their ancient customs by word of mouth as often as anything 
was mentioned before any judges or justices touching their customs. This was done 
by an official holding the office of Recorder, and the records of the Recorder were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 The Rhetorica ad Herennium sets out six sources of law: nature; statute; custom; previous 
judgments; equity; and, agreement. Custom is defined in it as that which in the absence of any 
statute is by usage endowed with the force of statute law, which it defines as law set up by the 
sanction of the people. Cicero Rhetorica Ad Herennium (Harvard University Press, 2004), 91, 93. 
46 William Noy The Grounds and Maxims and also an Analysis of the English Laws (Middletown, 
1808), 39-41. 
47 Keith M. Stolte, How Early Did Anglo-American Trademark Law Begin? An Answer to Schechter’s 
Conundrum, (1998) 88 TMR 564 at 590n, citing Percy H. Winfield, The Chief Sources of English 
Legal History 1925, 23. 
48 British History Online. < http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=46798> accessed 18 
December 2010. 
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subject to being proved in Court, uniquely, by the evidential procedure of judicial 
notice, with only the Recorder himself appearing at the bar of the Court.49 
 
The question before the Court was whether or not an action on the case lay. 
Anderson CJ said that the action did lie. Wyndham J agreed, provided the statute 
law50 could be construed such that no clothier should give the mark of another. 
Fletewood submitted that it had been adjudged in this way in Longe’s Case51 in 
parliament. In that case, the counterfeiter was apparently a member of the House of 
Commons. Peryam and Mead JJ said that anyone might give whatever mark he 
wished, and it was damnum absque injuria to the other, and there was no action for 
deceit against a person who did a wholly lawful act.52 
 
Bower stated that deceit had its own contemporary meaning at the time of the 
Gloucestershire Clothiers’ Case. He stated that an action in deceit was maintainable 
only at the suit of the representee to recover damages in respect of misrepresentation, 
the action being founded in tort.53 He stated that this action was known at common 
law either as an action on the case for deceit, or an action for deceit. A bill for the 
same purpose in equity used to be called an equitable claim for damages. It had 
always been recognised in all courts that the principles of substantive law that 
applied to the two forms of proceedings, and the nature of the relief, were the same.54 
The action required proof of the following elements. If the plaintiff failed to establish 
any one or more of them, the action would fail utterly.55 The elements were, first, 
that the alleged representation consisted of something said, written, or done, which 
amounted in law to a misrepresentation; second, that the defendant was the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Alexander Pulling, The Laws, Customs, Usages and Regulations of the City and Port of London 
(William Henry Bond and Wildy and Sons, 2nd ed, 1854), 4; Year Book, 21 Edw IV 74, 78; 22 
Edw IV 30; Co Litt 74; 2 Inst 126; 2 Roll Aor 579; Cro Car 516 Player v Hutchins, O Brid Com 
Dig Exoins, D, See Chapter 2. 
50 27 Hen VIII c 12 at 3 Statutes of the Realm 1509-1545, 544, 545 and 3 & 4 Edward VI c 2 at 4 
Statutes of the Realm 1547-1624, 101, 102, reproduced as above. 
51 Stolte stated that this was possibly during the 1558 session of Parliament. Stolte was unable to find 
any records of this case. Stolte, above 47, 592. 
52 The matter was heard in the Court of Common Pleas, a common law royal court, which was not 
seized of an equitable jurisdiction. 
53 George Spencer Bower, The Law of Actionable Misrepresentation, Butterworth & Co, London, 
1911, 196. 
54 Bower, above 53, 196. 
55 Bower, above 53, 197. 
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representor; third, that the plaintiff was the representee; fourth, inducement and 
materiality; fifth, falsity; sixth, alteration of position; seventh, fraud; and eighth, 
damage.56 However, a representee who knew the truth of the alleged 
misrepresentation was not deceived. In this way, the representee’s knowledge of the 
truth was a good defence to the allegation of deceit.57 
 
In actions for passing-off, arguably no misrepresentation is made direct to the 
competitor. Nevertheless, the competitor’s proprietary rights and interests are 
invaded, giving the competitor a cause of action either for an injunction or for 
damages. Bower noted that the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case was therefore not 
really an action in deceit, because it did not satisfy the deceit element that the 
plaintiff was the representee. He added that to succeed in an action of passing-off, 
the plaintiff had to prove that the public, and not the plaintiff, was deceived, and that 
damage and fraud were in concurrence.58 
 
In his history of the common law action of deceit, Bower traced the action through 
three historical threads. The first apparently existed at the time of King John,59 and 
continued to exist, as meaning a variety of contempt for the crown.60 The second was 
from the time of Henry VI61 until the nineteenth century, as a time of transition in the 
meaning of deceit. He said the third had the same meaning as it has in modern 
times.62 Of these, the first and second heads will be examined now in respect of their 
relevance to the court’s treatment of the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case. 
 
The first kind of deceit described the common law rule applying whenever the 
crown, or an officer or department of the state had been induced, by a 
misrepresentation of material matters, to grant any privilege to a subject. Where the 
rights and interests of any other subject would be curtailed, then that grant could be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Ibid. 
57 Bower, above 53, 200. 
58 Bower, above 53, 197. 
59 1199-1216. 
60 Bower, above 53, 381-402. 
61 1422-1461. 
62 Bower, above 53, 381-402. 
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revoked, withdrawn, repealed or avoided, or even treated as void ab initio.63 This 
was stated as follows. 
If the king is deceived by misinformation of his interest his grant will be void, 
9. Hen. VI. 28, for example, if the king granted a fair or market or similar on the 
same day on which there was an ancient fair, the grant would be void. Even if 
the king made the grant with certainty of knowledge and he was deceived, then 
the grant would be void because certainty of knowledge does not help a 
falsity.64 
 
This rule had been applied to charters of incorporation, privileges and monopolies in 
respect of inventions, trademarks and other exclusive rights and licences, such as a 
right to take a wreck.65 In the 1820 case of Alcock v Cook,66 Best CJ stated the 
principle in strict liability terms apparently similar to a process of vitiation of 
contract by fraud. His honour stated the rule in the following form, arguably 
conjectural. 
We take it to be a principle of the common law of this country, that if the king 
makes a grant which cannot take effect in the manner in which it ought to take 
effect according to its terms, we must conclude that the king has been deceived in 
that grant, and, therefore, that the grant is void.67 
 
This form of misrepresentation was illustrated in the 1853 case of The Eastern 
Archipelago Company against The Queen on the Prosecution of Sir James Brooke.68 
In that case, the charter issued by the crown contained a proviso that, should the 
grantee not comply with the directions and conditions contained in the charter, it 
would be lawful for the Queen, by any writing under the great seal or under the sign 
manual, to revoke and make void the charter either absolutely or under any terms as 
the Queen might think fit. It appeared that the company, which was the beneficiary 
of the charter, was required to obtain and pay for a certain certificate from the Board 
of Trade before commencing its trading operations. The company had procured a 
false certificate. The court held that the Attorney-General’s fiat for a scire facias69 to 
repeal a charter for abuse or for breach of an express or implied condition was the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Bower, above 53, 307, 309. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Bower, above 53, 307, 309. 
66 (1820) 5 Bing 340, 340-354; 130 ER 1463. 
67 (1820) 5 Bing 340, 348; 130 ER 1463. 
68 [1853] Eng R 42; (1853) 2 El & Bl 856-915; 118 ER 980, 982. (1 January 1853). 
69 Scire facias. A reverse onus proceeding directed at a person to show cause why crown grants, 
charters, and franchises should not be rescinded or repealed. Encyclopaedic Australian Legal 
Dictionary, LexisNexis, Sydney [2012], online. 
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right of every aggrieved subject. Platt B held,70 that the crown could not, in 
derogation of the right of the public, limit and fetter its own exercise of the royal 
prerogative.71 Although Bower stated that the case involved a public fraud, he 
viewed no mention in the court’s decision of any requirement for fraud for the 
charter to be repealed.72 Arguably, this procedure required no proof of intent. 
 
Fitzherbert’s Natura Brevium referred to a the writ of deceit, as applicable in the 
times of Henry VI and Elizabeth I to the specific instance of sale of cloth, as follows. 
If a man sell cloths, and warrant them of a certain length, if they be not of such 
length, he who bought them shall have a writ of deceit against him upon his 
warranty, although the warranty be only by word. But if the warranty be made 
at another time after the bargain made, then it ought to be in writing, otherwise 
he shall not have an action upon that warranty, for he shall not have an action 
of deceit therefore, if the warranty be not made upon the bargain and at the time 
of the bargain.73 
 
Arguably, there was no room for proof of mens rea in this formulation. Bower 
suggested that a reputation, the seller’s goodwill, or a trademark could amount to an 
implied warranty. Also, he stated that in chancery, fraud had always been treated as 
denoting any transgression of equitable rules. This included nondisclosure, 
unaccompanied by misrepresentation in contracts and agreements uberrimae fidae, 
abuse of the influence arising from a dominant position on the one side and 
incapacity or distress or necessity on the other, unconscionableness, or oppression. In 
all these instances actual dishonesty was not required to make the acts actionable in 
equity.74 
 
2   The Mis-Use of Product Seals 
 
Arguably, the action in the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case appeared similar in 
effect to a private action for an alleged breach of a personal monopoly right. This 
regulation by private monopoly arguably reduced the need for consumers to conduct 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 (1853) 2 El & Bl 856, 884, 885. 
71 [1853] Eng R 42; (1853) 2 El & Bl 856, 884, 885; 118 ER 988 (1 January 1853). 
72 Bower, above 53, 360. 
73 Fitzherbert, above 29, 217. 
74 Bower, above 53, 387. 
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prepurchase inspections. This section investigates regulatory mechanisms, which 
might have tended to diminish consumer prepurchase inspection. 
 
Unwin stated that monopolies were used by the Stuarts75 for raising money without 
the consent of Parliament. They provided the monarch with money, and furnished 
salaries, pensions and rewards to the monarch’s friends and servants. The public face 
of their rationale was to encourage native industries, reduce foreign dumping of 
goods, protect local manufacturers from capitalist domination, and guarantee good 
quality goods to the consumer at reasonable prices.76 
 
Unwin also stated that in a similar way to many other gilds of the time, the Tallow 
Chandlers obtained a monopoly by letters patent from Queen Elizabeth in 1576 for 
them to be searchers, examiners, viewers and tryers of soap, vinegar, butter, hops and 
oils. The crown letters patent authorised the extension of these activities beyond the 
City of London into various other geographic areas.77 Arguably, this widened the 
geographical impact of any London customs under which the Tallow Chandlers 
might have operated. 
 
This species of monopoly arguably had far-reaching effects on the operation of the 
old common law principle of caveat emptor.78 The gild monopoly meant that gild 
officials would act as presale inspectors of goods instead of the consumers. No 
person was allowed to sell these products before they were searched and taxed by the 
Tallow Chandlers. The Mayor and Aldermen of the City of London resisted this 
competing system of taxation as feared competition to their lords’ Leet Courts.79 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 From James I, 1603, and Charles I, 1625, to the commencement of the Commonwealth. 
76 Unwin, above 23, 293, 294. 
77 Ibid. 
78 . . . the maxim, at law is, caveat emptor: let the buyer take care and inquire. If he is told falsehoods, 
then he has a right of action; but if he makes no inquiries, at law he has no remedy, though he may 
in equity. This is the distinction between fraud in the legal and equitable sense, though even in 
equity there is no fraud in mere non-disclosure unless there is a duty to disclose, which there is not 
if the parties are in a position of equality in the transaction – that is, of equal knowledge and means 
of knowledge; and the doctrine of equitable fraud would only apply to matters in the knowledge 
only of the vendor, which he ought to disclose to the vendee. Finlayson, above 19. 
79 Unwin, above 23, 294. 
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Unwin stated that in 1601, Queen Elizabeth80 succumbed to the pressure of various 
powerful interests against monopolies and proclaimed the abolition of the most 
widespread patent monopolies. The Queen left the remainder of the monopolies to 
the decisions of the judges, signifying movement of monopoly control from the 
crown to the court.81 A monopoly in playing cards held by Edward Darcy was made 
into the test case Darcy v Allin, known as the Case of Monopolies.82 In this case, the 
crown patent was condemned as a dangerous innovation contrary to common law. 
Fuller put to the court the key part of the defence argument. He submitted that the 
only role of the crown in labour was strictly limited to preventing deceit through 
“commutative justice by the way”, inferring an application of natural law. 
But arts and skill of manual occupations rise not from the King, but from the 
labour and industry of men, and by the gifts of God to them, tending to the good 
of the commonwealth, and of the King, the head thereof, and do meet with 
commutative justice by the way, to see that there be just measure and just weight 
in things to be measured and weighed, and that no deceipt or fraud be used 
therein, to the deceipt of the subjects, and for that purpose the office of the clark 
of the market, gager, and garbler, &c. are used; but to restrain men from any 
lawful trade whereunto they are inclined, is unnatural and unmeet.83 
 
Unwin argued that, despite the defeat of the monopoly in the Case of Monopolies, it 
was a mere temporary setback for monopolists. However, it would prove to be a 
severe defeat for the monopolies of the incorporated gilds, as direct crown regulation 
became more pervasive.84 This development was by no means new. The office of the 
Aulnager, acting as another form of regulation,85 had been in operation for a long 
time, and will now be discussed. 
 
It appeared that crown prevention of deceit in the cloth trade was achieved through 
the Office of Aulnager. Zupko stated that with the Aulnager’s seal on cloth, 
purchasers could feel satisfied that the product had passed government inspection. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 1558 – 1603. 
81 Unwin, above 23, 294. 
82 Edward Darcy Esquire Plaintiff Thomas Allin of London Haberdasher Defendant, [1599] EngR 
186; (1599) Noy 173; 74 ER 1131. 
83 Darcy v Allin Noy 173, 181. 
84 Unwin, above 23, 300. 
85 Aulnage was the measuring of cloth to determine whether its length and breadth violated any of the 
specifications laid down by statute. . . . An Aulnager was an official stationed in a port or town who 
measured the cloth brought in by merchants and textile manufacturers to determine whether its 
length and breadth conformed to statutory specifications. Ronald Edward Zupko A Dictionary of 
Weights and Measures for the British Isles: The Middle Ages to the Twentieth Century (American 
Philosophical Society, 1985), xxxvi. 
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This office was originally subject to a grant of tenure. It remained essentially in the 
king’s hands, by the 1394 statute 17 Ric. II. c. 5,86 and also the 1453 statute 31 
Hen.VI. c. 5.87 These provisions voided all letters patent appointing any Aulnager 
except by the consent of the King or Treasurer of England. This suggested that 
forging or otherwise mis-using an Aulnager’s seal would be deceitful, in the sense 
stated above from King John’s time. 
 
The duties of the office of Aulnager were let to farm by the 1403 statute of 4 Hen. 
IV. c. 24.88 This provided that the Aulnage could be set to farm at the discretion of 
the Treasurer of England. This suggested the creation of a private monopoly in the 
hands of a public official. Finally, the office of the Aulnager was abolished with the 
1700 statute of 11 William III. c. 20. §2.89 After the 1632 Star Chamber case of Jupp, 
discussed below, it seems the Aulnager became an unnecessary office. 
 
By the 1323 statute of 16 Edward II, c. 6,90 the Warden of the Aulnage was ordered 
to deliver to the Exchequer the rate rolls of his office containing all the defaults 
which he had found in cloths throughout the realm. This suggested that the crown 
officials might have been aware of who produced faulty cloth. It also suggested the 
prior existence of crown control of the cloth industry through an administrative 
system. 
And the Warden of the Aulnage shall deliver yearly to the Treasurer of the 
Exchequer the Estreats of his Office, wherein shall be contained all the Defaults 
which he hath found of Cloths throughout the Realm, and also where, and 
when, and to whom the Cloths did appertain, which he found contrary to the 
Assize, and the Price, and to whom he hath delivered them, where and when, 
and by what Warrant.91 
 
This provision of 16 Edward II, c. 6 arguably inferred the necessity for tracking the 
cloths, under suspicion of official corruption. Lipson noted that the Aulnager tested 
measurements and quality in each piece of cloth. He affixed his seal if it was found 
to be sound. Otherwise, he had the power to confiscate the cloth. In this way, his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 2 Statutes of the Realm 1377-1504, 88. 
87 2 Statutes of the Realm 1377-1504, 364, 365. 
88 2 Statutes of the Realm 1377-1504, 140. 
89 7 Statutes of the Realm 1695-1701, 610, 611. 
90 1 Statutes of the Realm 1235-1377, 192. 
91 Ibid. 
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office ensured uniformity of length, breadth, weight and goodness of the cloth, in 
accordance with the Assize.92 By the time of the 1353 statute of 27 Edward III, c. 4, 
the Aulnager’s powers were further clarified, expressly empowering and mandating 
him to mark the cloth, as follows. 
 . . . the King's Aulneger shall measure the Cloth, and mark the same, by 
which Mark a Man may know how much the Cloth containeth.93 
 
However, this must not have solved the problem of prepurchase inspection. In the 
13th year of Richard II,94 a complaint was submitted to parliament. Fosbrooke 
recorded that it stated that cloths made in Somerset, Dorset and Gloucester were 
tacked and folded together before they were shown for sale. These cloths were 
alleged to be defective because they were broken and damaged. They had different 
colours and widths on the outside and were falsely made with a range of different 
kinds of wools. It was ordained that no cloth should be shown for sale unless it was 
untacked and opened up so that purchasers could fairly examine it. It was also 
ordained that the weavers and fullers should affix their seals to every piece of cloth 
that they had worked.95 The reasoning for this enactment was stated in the statute.96 
It was stated as a general presumption as being for stamping out the deceit of the 
public and its inevitable consequences in international trade. 
. . . to the great deceit, loss, and damage of the people, in so much that the 
merchants that buy the same cloths, and carry them out of the realm to sell to 
strangers, be many times in danger to be slain, and sometime imprisoned, and 
put to fine and ransom by the same estrangers, and their said cloths burnt or 
forfeit, because of the great deceit and falsehood that is found in the same cloths 
when they be untacked and opened, to the great slander of the cloths of the 
Realm of England.97 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 E Lipson An Introduction to the Economic History of England (A & C Black Ltd, 3rd ed, 1923), 
406. Also, An assize was an enactment that regulated the quality, quantity, weight, measure, and 
price of articles for sale. An example of this type of assize was the Assisa Panis et Cervisiae of 
Henry III, issued in 1266. The assize was also the name for a session at which the examination and 
authentication of local weights and measures took place. Merchants and producers broke the assize 
when they adulterated their goods, sold defective merchandise, or employed false weights and 
measures. Zupko, above 79, xxxvi. 
93 1 Statutes of the Realm 1235-1377, 330. 
94 1390. 
95 Thomas Dudley Fosbrooke Abstracts of Records and Manuscripts Respecting the County of 
Gloucester Formed into a History, Vol I (Jos Harris, 1807), 38. 
96 13 Ric II Stat 1 c 11 at 2 Statutes of the Realm 1377–1504, 64. 
97 Ibid. 
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The 1391 statute of 15 Richard II c 1098 provided for mandatory sealing of cloths, 
stated as being to prevent the wrong of deceit of the people by artisan fullers, and 
suggesting a presumption of deceit by fullers.99 The statute also covered other people 
who were drawing out the size of cloth, to misrepresent it to consumers. The 
arguably strict liability prohibition stated in the statutory provision was purely 
regulatory, punishing only the act of buying the cloth prior to fulling by others.100 
The provision linked derogation from product reputation with deceit. It may have 
acted as a kind of statutory quia timet injunction. 
At the Complaint of the Commons made in the Parliament, because that of old 
Times divers Cloths were made in the Town of Gilford, and other Places 
within the Counties of Surrey, Sussex, and South, called Cloths of Gilford, 
which were of good making and of good Value, and did bear a great Name: 
And now because that Fullers and other of the same Country, do use to buy 
the Cloths of the said Countries before that they be fulled and performed, and 
in making, for Covetousness to have the said Cloths of greater Measure over 
the common Assise that late was used, do draw the Cloths more longer and 
more large than they were wont or ought to be, to the great impairing of the 
said Cloths, and great Deceit of the People: For to eschew such Damages and 
Deceits in Time to come, It is agreed and assented, That from henceforth no 
Fuller nor other Person, whatsoever he be, shall buy within the said Towns 
and Counties any Cloth before the same Cloth be fulled and fully performed in 
his nature, and also sealed under the Seal thereto ordained, upon Pain of 
Forfeiture of the same.101 
 
Thus, the subject cloth in the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case was duly sealed with 
the sign of the tucker’s handle. 
 
The word ‘fulling’ appeared in different forms in various parts of England. For 
example, during the period between 1273 and 1888, in the west country of England, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 2 Statutes of the Realm 1377-1504, 81. 
99 Fullers. Those practicing the trade of fulling, which was the art or act of cleansing, scouring and 
pressing cloths, stuffs and stockings, to render them stronger, closer and firmer. Thomas Tegg The 
London Encyclopaedia or Universal Dictionary of Science Art Literature and Practical Mechanics, 
Vol IX, (London, 1839), 673. 
100 In the early middle ages, there were four chief stages in the manufacture of cloth: initially the wool 
was carded or combed by hand; it was then spun on the rock or distaff; thirdly the yarn was woven 
on a hand-operated loom; and, fourthly this product called a loose web was fulled either by hand or 
by foot. . . . The process of fulling was one of beating or compressing the cloth in water which 
served to shrink the cloth by anywhere from a fifth to a half. This increased the density of the cloth 
giving it greater resistance to both cold weather and wear. Fulling also felted the cloth so that the 
pattern of weaving was no longer visible. This gave the cloth the merchantable characteristics of a 
smoother and softer surface, and also imparted greater fabric strength. The fulling process also 
scoured and cleansed the cloth using various detergents to remove the oil which had been put into 
the cloth during the earlier stage of spinning. E M Carus-Wilson ‘An Industrial Revolution of the 
Thirteenth Century’ (1941) 11(1) The Economic History Review, 39-60, 40. 
101 2 Statutes of the Realm 1377-1504, 81. 
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of which Gloucestershire was a part, fulling was called ‘tucking’. Tuckers102 
performed it either by hand or in a tucking mill.103 So, the fuller’s work implement 
was likely to have been the same tool as the tucker’s work implement. 
 
A method of crown control of product reputation was by implying a church-
assocated reputation into an artisan seal. Carus-Wilson stated that in respect of the 
fulling business, either hand fulling or fulling with hand-wielded clubs was probably 
used for the smaller articles. Water-powered fulling mills were built on manors, to 
achieve scale of production. Local bishops owned many of these fulling mills. The 
fuller’s club, very probably the same in effect as the tucker’s handle, became the 
emblem of St James and was cast into stained glass in the east window of the 
Gloucester Cathedral.104 In this way, arguably, this tool had become integrated into 
the community’s mind as a substantial icon within the religious symbols of 
Gloucester. Therefore, it might have acquired a certain solemnly revered meaning, 
beyond that of a mere artisan’s tool, giving rise to the question as to whether it could 
have been an exclusively personal symbol. If not, the damnum absque injuria 
argument could be given force in the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case, arguably by a 
similar mechanism as to that applying to printers’ devices, discussed above in 
chapter 3. On this basis, the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case may have been heard in 
the wrong jurisdiction, with the parties lacking locus standi to litigate to either final 
or mesne judgment in the Court of Common Pleas. 
 
In the 1483-4 statute of 1 Richard III, c. 8, the crown mandated the sealing of all 
cloth with a lead seal. The seal should have the Royal Arms of England on one side, 
and the Arms sign or token of the city or town on the other side. It had to be sealed at 
the time when the cloth was made. The statute provided for strict monetary penalties 
for failure to seal manufactured cloth.105 It appeared to be in operation as late as 
1518, explained by example as follows. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Tucker. One whose occupation is the fulling and dressing of cloth; a fuller; a cloth-finisher . . . . 
originally one who burled or teased the cloth. Oxford English Dictionary (Clarendon Press, 2nd ed, 
1989). 
103 E M Carus-Wilson ‘The Merchant Adventurers of Bristol in the Fifteenth Century’ (1928) 11 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fourth Series, 61-82, 43n. 
104 Carus-Wilson, above 100, 41, 42; St James was a religious identity in the Christian tradition. 
105 2 Statutes of the Realm 1377-1504, 486. 
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Harris recorded that the merchants of Coventry built up a large trade in the buying 
and selling of wool and the weaving of cloth. Coventry thus became a very wealthy 
part of England. Until a depression in 1518, Coventry had been very prominent 
among cloth-making towns for over 100 years. In the middle of Coventry stood the 
Searching-House, where all locally made cloth was examined. There were two 
weavers and two fullers specially appointed to conduct these examinations. Six 
drapers were appointed to superintend the weaver and fuller inspectors, in order to 
guard against any bias in the inspections. If the cloth was sufficiently fulled and well 
woven, the inspectors set the city seal on the cloth. This was as a token of genuine 
quality. Otherwise, defective cloth was returned to the weavers unsealed, and 
therefore unsaleable.106 
 
The Leet Court of Coventry passed an order in 1518 providing precise instructions 
for the searching process. This was so that the industry could grow to the larger scale 
manufacture of better quality cloth. In that order, the Leet Court determined that the 
seal should be the Elephant and Castle, which was the seal of the City of 
Coventry,107 suggesting that artisan reputation resided effectively in hands of the 
city. These provisions add to the suggestion that either the Gloucestershire Clothier’s 
Case was heard in the wrong jurisdiction, or that the defendant’s act was wholly 
lawful. 
 
3   Passing-off in Star Chamber 
 
An action in what amounted to passing-off apparently did not succeed in the 
Gloucestershire Clothiers’ Case. Arguably, the crown resisted the damnum absque 
injuria determination of the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case by means of the Jupp 
Case in the Star Chamber. The crown had implemented various regulatory systems to 
work against deceit in the trades. These regulatory systems had worked against 
consumer prepurchase inspection. Therefore, this section examines the consequence 
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in the Star Chamber to see how it examined all the relevant laws to reach a unified 
outcome. 
 
In the 1632 Star Chamber trial of Thomas Jupp of London, a cloth-worker was 
prosecuted in the Star Chamber by the Attorney-General. Jupp admitted his fraud, 
and admitted smuggling inferior cloth with Colchester seals out of the country. He 
was fined £1000 and condemned to the pillory. The court took evidence of user and 
goodwill. Also, the Court examined the actions of the accused, and simply 
characterised them strictly as fraudulent.108 Schechter explained the facts and 
holdings of the case as follows.109 
 
Thomas Jupp was brought to the bar of the Court of Star Chamber and was examined 
before Mr. Noy the Attorney General of England. The record of the examination was 
read to the court, to the following effect. Jupp had bought several pieces of Bocking 
bayes for Goddard, and he put a seal on them. These seals were like the seal put on 
Colchester bayes which were somewhat more expensive cloths, and which sold 
better overseas than did Bocking bayes. He sealed them with iron stamps. Some were 
engraved in Foster Lane, and others were delivered to him by Thomas Downs, then 
in Ireland. It was well known that the buyers of Colchester Bayes bought these bayes 
without further enquiry, after having viewed the seal. Jupp displayed for sale two 
pieces of actual Colchester Bayes. One had the whole seal and was not faulty, and 
the other one was marked as faulty by cutting off a piece of it and affixing the seal at 
an angle. This faulty one was still of a better quality than the Bocking bayes, all of 
which he had sealed with the whole seal. He admitted that he had often made faulty 
bayes with the whole seal. He did this by cutting off the puckle of the bay at an angle 
and drawing it and then fixing the seal in another place, so that it appeared to have 
been sealed with the whole seal. He admitted doing this a hundred times, on the 
request of merchants. The Court reviewed all the laws then in existence for true 
draping of wool, for searching, measuring, marking, affixing seals of various places, 
as well as those laws relating to the Aulnager’s public seals on cloths. The Court 
took into account that the town of Colchester received a very large part of its income 
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from making bayes, and that every one of these bayes were manufactured to 
completion and sealed with a seal attesting their goodness. The court recognised that 
if, upon search, any were identified as of insufficient quality, the searchers marked 
accordingly. The buyers all relied on the seal alone. The Court characterised Jupp’s 
offence as a false cozenage, which would discourage buyers from relying on the 
credit of the seal. The Court of Star Chamber added that any merchants, or other 
tradesmen, who had employed Jupp or any other person to seal bayes fraudulently 
should be discovered and identified. This was in order to receive the sentence of the 
Court. However, those who delivered the offenders to the Court should receive the 
mercy of the Court.110 
 
From this case, the Star Chamber had inferred the importance of maintaining buyers’ 
reliance on the public meaning inhering in seals, rather than buyers conducting their 
own prepurchase inspections. The damaged party was the City of Colchester, rather 
than the representee purchaser. Finally, the Star Chamber was concerned about those 
who were complicit with Jupp, stating that they would receive the sentence of the 
court. 
 
C   Styles of Pleadings in the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case 
 
It was suggested in chapter 2 that passing-off was a conjectural argument based on 
facts, an inference from which might be that the tort was strict liability in character. 
Throughout this thesis, the argument has been advanced that common law decision-
making might be subject to underlying legal norms, and that if these underlying 
norms were strict liability in character, so might be the substantive law which they 
underlie. Therefore, this section examines the nature of those conjectures used in the 
Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case. The Sergeants-at-law conjectured through their 
skill in pleadings. This was arguably part of the procedural law during the English 
Renaissance. In the second part of this section is an examination of the 
Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case, in the context of the identified character of the 
pleadings of its time. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Ibid. 
136	  
	  
1   Pleadings during the English Renaissance 
 
This investigation is to characterise the style of pleadings at the time of the 
Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case. This is so that conclusions may be drawn later, to 
see if it was structured as a strict liability case on the basis of a strict liability style of 
pleading. 
 
Since all that is available in today’s surviving reports of the Gloucestershire 
Clothier’s Case is the pleadings in the Court of Common Pleas, an analysis of the 
case may put an understanding of these pleadings in an English Renaissance context, 
in order to assess the character of the conduct of the case. This is significant because, 
as stated by van der Poel, during the English Renaissance scholarship returned to 
classical texts and this ancient style was reembedded into styles of pleading.111 
 
Frost stated that classical rhetoricians approached the creation of legal argument 
according to a well-established method. First, they began by categorizing legal 
arguments into their appropriate status, sometimes also called stasis. The word 
“status” meant “position” or “answer to an action”.112 In Quintilian’s view, a cause 
of action arose strictly from the fact that the first collision between the parties was 
based on matters of status within the case, and that this collision between the parties 
created the issue of the case.113 Quintilian used to teach his students the heuristic 
procedures of the status doctrine as a means of penetrating to the core of a particular 
rhetorical situation.114 In this doctrine of status causae,115 Quintilian wrote that there 
were four kinds of legal argument: those based on fact; those based on definition; 
those based on justice or quality; and those based on procedural issues.116 He also 
wrote that there were four ways of defensive argument open to the defendant, as 
follows. 
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By Far the strongest method of self-defence was, if possible, to deny the 
charge.  
 
The second best was when it was possible to reply that the particular act 
with which you were charged was never committed. 
 
The third and most honourable was to maintain that the act was 
justifiable. 
 
If none of these uses of defence was feasible, there remained the last and 
only hope of safety: if it was impossible either to deny the charge or 
justify the act, we must evade the charge with the aid of some point of 
law, making it appear that the action had been brought against us 
illegally.117 
 
Vickers stated that in the medieval period of England, 426-1416 C.E., classical 
rhetoric had survived apparently in the two basic texts of Cicero’s De Inventione and 
of the anonymous Rhetorica ad Herennium,118 which some attributed to Cicero. He 
stated that throughout England, during the English Renaissance, classical rhetoric 
was linked with the study of law. For example, he recorded that King Edward VI, 
who reigned 1547-1555 wrote Latin legal compositions using the classical 
approach.119 Shoeck noted that by the middle of the sixteenth century,120 the Inns of 
Court were training lawyers in classical rhetoric and slanting their pedagogy with a 
heavy emphasis on Senecan tragedy. He concluded there was a close union between 
classical rhetoric and the law at that time.121 Shoeck cited Sir Thomas Elyot’s 
characterization of lawyers’ training in the Inns as an exercise incorporating the style 
of the ancient pleadings rhetoric. According to Elyot, this was so, both in court and 
in Chancery pleadings. They were student exercises in the form of heads of 
declamation, called thema. Students were asked to use Quintilian’s stasis causae to 
outline the nature of the cause of action.122 
 
Cicero asserted that every controversy was either about a fact and its inferences, 
about a definition when people described the deed in different ways, about the nature 
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of an act, or about legal processes.123 Cicero further developed status theory by 
discussing the qualitative issues arising in causes of action as dividing into two 
categories, namely the equitable and the legal. The equitable category arose where 
there was a question about the nature of justice and right or the reasonableness of 
reward or punishment. The legal category was that in which the court examined what 
the law was according to the custom of the community and according to justice.124 In 
the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case, the court only examined the qualitative issue of 
the law. The Court of Common Pleas had no jurisdiction to examine the nature of 
justice and right or the reasonableness of reward or punishment. It was solely a 
common law court. Arguably, the case was based on acts, which were pleaded as 
facts, and stated as propositions and their inferences. 
 
Mendelson stated that classical pleaders structured their arguments as declamations. 
Practitioners of the declamation style would analyse either an historical or a legal 
problem and develop a pragmatic argument in response to the identified problem. 
They adapted their argument to a specific audience with a definite need to know.125 
Declamations were of two kinds, the suasoria or deliberative speech about history or 
politics, and the controversia or forensic speech on a specific legal case. Thus, the 
argument in a declamation was carefully cobbled together by an expert pleader 
trained in judicial rhetoric.126 Mendelson added that in most of the Senecan 
controversiae, the declamation was structured beginning with a brief statement of the 
operative law, then a short narration of the facts and circumstances of the particular 
case, then arguments for and against, which were typically drawn from memory.127 
For example, in the 1584 Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case, Fletewood used this 
declamatory device of arguments from memory to introduce a custom of the City of 
London, as representing the prevailing law.128 
 
Van der Poel stated that during the 16th century there was a kind of humanist 
revolution throughout Europe. Arguably, it spread more widely by the advent of the 
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printing press. It took hold in England a little later in the English Renaissance, during 
the 1558 to 1603 reign of Queen Elizabeth.129 The English Renaissance scholars 
were most interested in recovering and studying Latin and Greek literary, historical, 
and oratorical texts, then applying them to contemporary problems.130 
 
The English Renaissance period saw a humanist introduction of new educational 
curricula, concentrating again on ancient sophistical teachings. For example, 
according to van der Poel, students would learn their way through and master the 
sophistical progymnasmata,131 then begin the practice of declamation,132 at the 
pinnacle of their rhetorical skill.133 Van der Poel stated that the ancient didactic 
declamation and the humanist form of the declamation were linked by Cicero’s 
rhetorical exercise of thesis.134 Thesis was originally a philosophical and dialectic 
exercise mainly in the a priori prelegal field of ethics, from which could arise 
arguments about negligence, negligence being about a de facto moral or ethical state 
of affairs. The exercise would argue pros and cons theoretically without reference to 
a given person, time, or place. Cicero’s modification to this format had been to 
interweave concrete circumstances involving persons, places and times, so as to 
make the exercise into one of better utility in legal pleadings and in public 
orations.135 
 
Van der Poel stated that Agrippa136 defined the form of declamation of the time of 
the English Renaissance, during the time of Elizabeth I, in purely tactical terms. This 
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suggested that its power was in the imaginable inferences drawn from its various 
propositions by a court influenced primarily by persuasive rhetoric.137 The following 
was Agrippa’s definition of declamation. 
The declamation does not formulate a definitive judgment, nor a dogma. Instead, 
the propositions of the declamation are alternately put in a jocular or in a serious 
form, are formulated in a deceiving or a straightforward way. Sometimes it voices 
my own opinion, sometimes those of others, some things it declares to be true, 
others to be false, still others to be dubious. Sometimes it takes the form of 
straightforward reasoning, at other times of admonishing talk. It does not 
continually condemn, nor instruct, nor assert. It does not at all places declare my 
own ideas and it brings to the fore many invalid arguments, so that he who takes 
the counterpart will have something to reject and to refute. If the censor who wrote 
against me is not able to discern these different elements, he cannot but pronounce 
a stupid judgment on them.138 
 
To which elements did Agrippa refer? Possibly, his elements might have been: first, 
propositions framed in a context of often-unstated inferences; second, personal 
opinion; third, either reasoning or admonition; and fourth, deliberate provision of a 
weak argument for the bench to refute. It remains now to gather evidence from the 
Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case, to decide inductively whether its pleadings were in 
a declamatory style. If they were declamations, it could be argued that the case was 
an attempt to discover the law by rhetorical persuasion. If the argument were by 
rhetorical persuasion, arguably it relied on underlying elemental norms. 
 
2   Examining the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case in this Context 
 
The section now looks at two manuscript reports of the Gloucestershire Clothier’s 
Case, in which the pleadings are reported, along with some judicial responses. The 
objective is to see if the case was pleaded in a declamatory style, and if so, draw 
appropriate conclusions. 
 
The second manuscript excerpt in Baker and Milsom139 stated that the good 
clothier’s business had been discredited. The underlying norm to this legally-charged 
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fact was arguably a corollary of the London custom of taking away a brother 
artisan’s customers by selling unaccredited goods.140 Anderson CJ said in this second 
manuscript version that the action merely seemed to lie.141 However, Peryam J said 
that the bad clothier had committed no wrong, because he did a wholly lawful act.142 
Anderson CJ rejoined that commissioning a lawful act, such as using another 
clothier’s seal, causing indirect damage, nevertheless could infer the commission of a 
wrong.143 
 
In the third manuscript excerpt in Baker and Millsom,144 Sergeant-at-law Fenner 
pleaded that the defendant used a slightly altered version of the plaintiff’s mark and 
thereby discredited the plaintiff’s cloths. In response, Sergeant-at-law Fletewoode 
pleaded that an action on the case lay for such a fact pattern by the custom of 
London. Fletewoode would have known that, were the case being heard in 
Gloucestershire, a custom of London might not be operative law within that 
geographical jurisdiction. However, Anderson CJ accepted Fletewoode’s submission 
and said that the action lay. Wyndham J agreed, provided only that the statute could 
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be construed such that no clothier could give the mark of another. Fletewoode 
rejoined with an oral pleading that a similar fact pattern had been adjudged as a valid 
case of an unlawful use of another’s mark in a case at the Bar of Parliament. Such a 
Parliamentary case arguably would have had wider geographic persuasion. However, 
Peryam and Mead JJ said that, possibly either in obiter or in dialectic with counsel or 
another judge, deceit did not lie against a person who did a wholly lawful act. 
 
The above suggests that the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case was pleaded as a 
conjectural argument based on facts, as propositions and their often-unstated 
inferences. Many of these inferences were in the nature of oral recollections of 
custom. The defence was arguably weak within Quintilian’s stasis theory, suggesting 
the defendant was of lower status than the plaintiff. There were opinions of the 
pleaders and there were fact statements resembling admonition. There was no 
available record of a deliberately weak argument especially framed for the court to 
refute. However, it appears arguable that the pleadings were declamatory in style. 
 
Therefore, the following questions arise from the above discussion of the 
Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case. The first is whether a custom of London had been 
breached. If one such custom had been breached, then as has already been argued in 
chapter 2, the litigation of this breach would be treated as strict liability and be 
indicative of fraud. The second was whether the wrong inferred from a statute could 
be litigated as a civil matter. In Chapter 5, there will be a discussion of this 
procedural issue, within an analysis of the Advocaat Case.145 It will address the issue, 
inter alia, in the context of the old common law doctrine of the equity of the 
statute.146 The third is whether an apparently wholly lawful act could be deceptive, 
by means of the indirect nature of the damage it caused. This third question will be 
examined in this chapter in the section on the doctrine of secondary meaning, below. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 [1979] AC 731, 731-756.   
146 There appeared to be a principle that the courts, guided by the dictates of conscience and natural 
justice, could modify the rigor of a statute or apply its rules to cases not provided for, to avert 
hardship or injustice. W H Loyd ‘The Equity of a Statute’ (1909) 58(2) University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review and American Law Register, New Series, 76-86, 82, citing Henry Campbell Black 
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D   The Doctrine Of Secondary Meaning 1838 - 1896 
 
In Southern v How,147 it was argued for the plaintiff that where one was party to a 
fraud, the court should presume that all following that fraud was done by him, for 
which he would be liable. It was reported further that the court inclined against this 
argument. This section will ask whether this unsuccessful argument in Southern v 
How148 might have reemerged as a strict liability doctrine that might be relevant to a 
future tort of passing-off. 
 
In the 1838 case of Millington v Fox,149 the plaintiffs Crowley Millington and 
Thomas Isaac Millington carried on for many years beforehand a business 
manufacturing steel products. They made steel products by a unique process. It 
involved the rolling together of more than one bar of steel. Each of their 
manufactured pieces of steel had stamped on them the word “Crowley” or “Crowley 
Millington”, as well as the initials “I H”. They were said to have been initials of 
Millington’s chief workman John Heppel. The defendants James Fox and Samuel 
Fox had carried on a steel business for some years. They had stamped their steel 
products with the plaintiff’s marks alongside the mark “Fox Brothers”. The 
defendants pleaded the existence of a secondary meaning. They said that they used 
the plaintiff’s marks as a generic symbol. This was because the market understood 
those marks to designate a particular method of manufacture, rather than the source 
of the manufacture. It was pleaded for the defendants that they had not knowingly 
and wilfully used the marks of the plaintiff. 
 
Lord Chancellor Cottenham stated even the absence of fraud would not prevent the 
injunction from being granted. This was because certain secondary meanings could 
still damage the plaintiff. His Lordship’s reasoning was stated in the following terms. 
There was sufficient in the case to shew that the plaintiffs had a title to the marks in 
question; and they undoubtedly had a right to the assistance of a Court of Equity to 
enforce that title. At the same time, the case is very different from the cases of this 
kind, which usually occur, where there has been a fraudulent use, by one person, of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 (1618) Cro Jac 468, 469; Poph 143; 2 Roll Rep 26 (Doderidge J). 
148 Ibid. 
149 3 MY & Cr 338, 338-344; 40 ER 956. 
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the trade-marks or names used by another trader. I see no reason to believe that 
there has, in this case, been a fraudulent use of the plaintiff’s marks. It is positively 
denied by the answer; and there is no evidence to show that the defendants were 
even aware of the existence of the plaintiffs as a company manufacturing steel; for 
although there is no evidence to show that the terms “Crowley” and “Crowley 
Millington” were merely technical terms, yet there is sufficient to show that they 
were very generally used, in conversation at least, as descriptive of particular 
qualities of steel. In short, it does not appear to me that there was any fraudulent 
intention in the use of the marks. That circumstance, however, does not deprive the 
plaintiffs of their right to the exclusive use of those names; and therefore, I stated 
that the case is so made out as to entitle the plaintiffs to have the injunction made 
perpetual.150 
 
In the 1847 case of Franks v Weaver,151 the court teased out something of the nature 
of fraud. The report extracted the case as follows. 
The Plaintiff invented and sold a medicine under his own name. The Defendant 
also made and sold a similar medicine, and on his labels, he used the Plaintiffs 
name and certain certificates given of the efficacy of the Plaintiffs medicine, in 
such an ingenious manner, as, prima facie, though not in fact, to appropriate and 
apply them to his own medicine. Held, that, although there were other 
differences in the mode of selling, the proceeding was wrongful, and the 
Defendant was restrained by injunction.152 
 
Lord Langdale MR held that nobody had been able to define what fraud was, 
because it was so multiform, suggesting that fraud was a concept as a form rather 
than as a state of affairs. He stated that in the present case it consisted in the crafty153 
adaptation of certain words in such a manner, ordinarily and constantly, as to be 
calculated to make it appear to persons when he was selling the product that the thing 
sold was prepared by the plaintiff.154 Craftiness in words arguably meant knowingly 
arranging a secondary meaning without prior public usage. The suggestion arises that 
this would have to be an inference made by the court as a finding of fact. Thus, 
arguably, the judgment would have been essentially unappellable as a finding of fact. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 3 MY & Cr 338, 352. 
151 10 Beav 297, 297-304. 
152 10 Beav 297, 297. 
153 The word craft was explained in the Rhetorica ad Herennium as the topic of an argument 
considering security. Security is to provide some plan for ensuring the avoidance of a present or 
imminent danger, the two subheadings for which are might and craft. Craft is exercised by means of 
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154 10 Beav 297, 303. 
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In the 1896 case of Reddaway v Banham,155 the plaintiff manufactured and sold a 
product it called “camel hair belting”. The defendant, seeking to establish the 
existence of a secondary meaning to the term “camel hair belting”, also designated 
its product as camel hair belting. This was without saying that it was not 
manufactured by the plaintiff, but was manufactured by the defendant. Lord 
Herschell confirmed the holding of Turner LJ in Burgess v Burgess156 that it was a 
question of evidence in each case as to whether there had been a false 
representation.157 Turner LJ also held, thus. 
Where a person is selling goods under a particular name, and another person, 
not having that name, is using it, it may be presumed that he intends it to 
represent the goods made by himself as the goods of the person whose name 
he uses.158 
 
The jury in Reddaway v Banham159 found that the defendants had described their 
belts as camel hair belting to mislead their customers into thinking that they were 
buying Reddaway’s belting. His Lordship held that the governing principle was that 
it was not a question of property, but, it was a right to protection from having another 
man’s goods passed off as his goods. His Lordship also held that Banham’s 
describing their belts as camel hair belting would deceive purchasers into the belief 
that they were getting something that they were not getting, namely belting made by 
Reddaway.160 
 
On this basis, Lord Herschell had incorporated a dominant purpose test to outline the 
fallacy161 of a defence, which overlooked the fact that a word may acquire in a trade 
a secondary signification differing from its primary one.162 He said that if it was 
communicated to people in that trade, who would understand it in its secondary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 [1896] AC 199, 200-201. 
156 3 D M & G 896, 896-905. 
157 3 D M & G 896, 905. 
158 Ibid. 
159 [1896] AC 199, 200-201. 
160 [1896] AC 199, 208. 
161 A fallacy is a violation of one of the criteria of a good argument. Any argument that fails to satisfy 
one of the following four criteria is a fallacious one. Fallacies, then, stem from the irrelevance of a 
premise, from the unacceptability of a premise, from the insufficiency of the combined premises of 
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rebuttal to the most serious challenges to its conclusion or to the argument itself. T Edward Damer 
Attacking Faulty Reasoning (Wadsworth, 4th ed, 2001), 42. 
162 [1896] AC 199, 212, 213. 
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sense, it could be a falsehood even though it would be true in its primary sense.163 
Thus, a man who conveyed a particular idea which was false and who knew and 
intended this to be the case could not be absolved from a charge of falsehood, merely 
because another sense existed which was neither conveyed nor intended to be 
conveyed. Therefore, no man might make a direct false representation to a purchaser 
that enabled that purchaser to tell a lie to someone else who would be the ultimate 
customer.164 This lie could be told without wrongful intent, since the teller might 
well have been deceived. Arguably, this represents a reemergence of the failed 
argument in Southern v How,165 in which the argument was stated in words to the 
following effect ‘where one was party to a fraud, the court should presume that all 
following that fraud was done by him, for which he would be liable’.166 
 
E   Conclusion 
 
This chapter argument set out to build on the propositions in chapter 2 that gild 
business norms, and other customary norms, were strict liability when enforced and 
were indicative of fraud. It also sought to build on the proposition in chapter 3 that 
printers’ devices were not subject to a passing-off regime, but instead, were subject 
to direct crown administrative regulation via the clergy. This chapter argument 
addressed the thesis central question of whether or not passing-off was a strict 
liability tort, and if so why and how, by conducting an historical examination of the 
Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case and some of its consequences. 
 
In the 1618 case of Southern v How,167 a prima facie theory was argued for the 
plaintiff that where one was party to a fraud, all which followed by reason of that 
fraud would be taken to have been done by him.168 This argument was held to be 
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164 Ibid. 
165 Cro Jac 468, 471; 79 ER 400. The case was first published in Popham’s Reports in 1656 at 79 Eng 
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ineffective, on the basis of the old Gloucestershire Clothiers’ Case. In the various 
manuscripts of the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case, the court held that the action on 
the case did not lie because it was damnum absque injuria to the other. The court 
stated that there was no action for deceit against a person who did a wholly lawful 
act. 
 
Regulation by private monopoly greatly reduced the need for consumers to conduct 
prepurchase inspections. It was argued that the crown acted against the customary 
legal norm of caveat emptor, leading to the creation of consumer-based actions 
against product misrepresentation at the point of sale. The consequences in the Star 
Chamber suggested continuing crown attempts to prohibit deceit in the trades. In the 
Star Chamber, the Court characterised the offence of Jupp as a false cozenage, which 
would discourage buyers from relying on the credit of the seal. Arguably this adds 
force to the argument on royal seals and trade marks in chapter 3 that a mis-use of a 
seal or mark was dealt with on a strict liability basis. Thus, Star Chamber acted in 
favour of seals representing product quality, and punished Jupp for using a false seal. 
This suggested a crown interest in stamping out any rhetorical act that derogated 
from the symbolic meaning of an authorised seal, and, it appeared to agree with the 
failed argument in Southern v How.169 
 
The chapter investigation asked the question of whether the styles of pleading in the 
Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case created strict liability procedures. There was 
argument that it was likely that the pleadings in the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case 
were declamatory. This was significant because, if true, it would confirm the 
importance and practical effect of underlying unstated legal norms of custom and 
status. Thus, the following questions flowed from the notion of a declamatory form 
of pleadings. The first was whether a custom of London had been breached, because 
if so, building on what was suggested in chapter 2, litigation of this breach would 
have been treated as strict liability. The second was whether the wrong inferred from 
a statute could be litigated as a civil matter and was indicative of fraud. In Chapter 5, 
below, there will be a discussion of this issue, within an analysis of the Advocaat 
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Case.170 The third question was whether an apparently wholly lawful act could be 
deceptive, by means of the indirect nature of the damage it caused. This was 
addressed as an examination of the doctrine of secondary meaning. 
 
There was discussion of how the unsuccessful argument in Southern v How171 might 
have reemerged as a strict liability doctrine. In the 1896 case of Reddaway v 
Banham,172 Lord Herschell deduced that no man might make a direct false 
representation to a purchaser that enabled that purchaser to tell a lie to someone else 
who would be the ultimate customer.173 It was argued that this suggested a 
reemergence by restatement of the failed argument in Southern v How.174 It 
suggested that when, non-gild members engaged in subsequent product resale, they 
were nevertheless bound by ancient custom, an action for a breach of which was 
strict liability and indicative of fraud. 
 
There was argument that the crown resisted the damnum absque injuria 
determination of the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case by means of the Jupp Case in 
the Star Chamber. Later, Lord Herschell deduced that no man might make a direct 
false representation to a purchaser that enabled that purchaser to tell a lie to someone 
else who would be the ultimate customer.175 There was argument that this deduction 
would imply strict liability into the actions of subsequent sellers unaware of the lie. 
Chapter 5 examines fraud and applies its suggestions to apparently re-emergent 
custom within the tort of passing-off.
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V   THE COMPLETION PHASE OF PASSING-OFF 
  
A Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the question is asked as to whether old London custom was 
reintroduced into the elements structure of passing-off. If so, this could raise the 
issue of whether a breach of a specified bundle of customs generated the tort of 
passing-off by relating fraud and strict liability. 
 
Wadlow stated in his history of the tort that passing-off was essentially complete,1 
with the House of Lords judgment in the 1979 House of Lords case Erven Warnink 
BV v Townend & Sons2 (‘Advocaat Case’). This suggests that some aspect of the 
scope of passing-off was dealt with in that case, in order for it to become 
“completed”. After a preliminary examination of the nature of fraud in commerce, 
there will be an investigation of the role of custom within goodwill. The section 
seeks to develop a workable description of goodwill, based on the case law. This is 
all in preparation to investigating how the court might have amended the scope of 
passing-off in the Advocaat Case,3 and if so, what the consequences were in 
assessing the kind of liability in passing-off.  The chapter’s argument addresses these 
issues in three main sections. The first is entitled fraud in commerce. The second is 
entitled goodwill. The third is entitled amending the scope of passing-off. 
 
The first section on fraud in commerce has one subsection entitled deceit and fraud, 
building on the chapter 4 discussion of deceit, and relating deceit to fraud. The 
second section is on goodwill and it builds on the chapter 2 discussion of old local 
custom, asking how it might interlock with damage to goodwill in the context of 
passing-off. The subsection on judicial reasoning by analogy conducts an analysis of 
this analogic doctrine, so that it can be applied to developing a principle for 
understanding goodwill. The purpose of this is to try to identify how goodwill could 
be damaged in the context of passing-off and uncover any strict liability in damage to 
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goodwill. The section on amending the scope of passing-off has one subsection 
examining Lord Diplock’s argument in the Advocaat Case,4 which chapter one had 
noted as representing the completion phase of passing-off. This final analysis is to 
identify any strict liability in Lord Diplock’s formulation of the elements of passing-
off. 
 
This chapter will suggest that fraud, as a genus, appeared to amount to a very serious 
breach of commercial custom. Thus, as soon as another trader exposed a trader’s 
business nostrums5 as no longer secret to one business, purchasers’ custom with the 
trader might be immediately affected, with or without intent. In the Advocaat Case,6 
Lord Diplock’s process of reasoning by analogy amended the common law of 
passing-off, so that damage depended on a trader’s interest in business goodwill. 
 
B   Fraud in Commerce 
 
1   Deceit and fraud 
 
Wadlow stated that the courts abandoned the element of fraud in passing-off, even as 
a legal fiction.7 Therefore, a brief examination of the nature of civil fraud in 
commerce will ask the question of whether fraud could have been abandoned within 
the development of the tort of passing-off. 
 
In the context of his extensive treatise on passing-off, Narayanan proposed that 
injury to goodwill could take various forms, including any apprehension of diversion 
of sales, injurious association, misappropriation of business reputation or 
misappropriation of personality.8 He stated that each of these was a species of the 
one genus of unfair trading or unfair competition. He called them “badges” of 
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(Clarendon Press, 2nd ed, 1989). 
6 [1979] AC 731, 739-748. 
7 Wadlow, above 1, 32. 
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common law fraud. He proposed that badges of fraud were not species of fraud, but 
were indicia of fraud, or put another way, they were indicative of fraud.9 
 
The 1601 Twyne’s Case10 dealt with badges of fraud. Smith recorded that the 
circumstances in Star Chamber of Twyne’s Case11 were as follows.12 There was a 
Bill of Information filed in the Star Chamber by the Queen’s Attorney-General Coke 
against Twyne of Hampshire for the making and publishing of a fraudulent gift of 
goods. Pierce was indebted to Twyne in the amount of £400 and was also indebted to 
C in the amount of £200. C brought an action in debt against Pierce who, being in 
possession of the goods to the value of £300, executed a secret deed of gift of all of 
his goods and chattels real and personal to Twyne, pending the resolution of the writ. 
This was to be in satisfaction of his debt, even though he remained in possession of 
the transferred goods. Sir Thomas Egerton, Lord Keeper of the Great Seal, Chief 
Justice Popham, Anderson J and the whole Court of Star Chamber resolved that this 
gift was fraudulent.13 
 
The Court stated the following six points.14 The first was that the gift had the signs 
and marks of fraud because the gift was general and did not exclude his clothes or 
anything else of personal necessity, because it was commonly said that quod dolosus 
versatur in genrealibus.15 The second was the donor continued in possession, used 
them as his own property, traded them, and therefore defrauded and deceived those 
with whom he traded. The third was the gift was made in secret, and et dona 
clandestine sunt semper suspiciosa.16 The fourth was that it was made pending the 
writ. The fifth was there was a trust between the parties because the donor possessed 
all the property and fraud is always clad in trust and trust is a cover for fraud. The 
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sixth was there was a clause in the deed that the gift was made honestly, truly and 
bona fide.17 
 
Consider this argument to contextualise Twyne’s Case.18 Ram categorised the 
sources of law contained within judicial opinions as at 1835.19 His third category was 
the customs of some cities and places, such as a hamlet, town, burgh, city, manor, 
honour, hundred or county.20 This infers that some customs might become 
operational law in counties, cities, towns or lordships. He stated that customs in use 
throughout England were called maxims. Noy stated that they were interpreted 
strictly, meaning that they had to be tried by a jury of twelve men and they operated 
as oral rules.21 Thus, the court in Twyne’s Case22 based its badges of fraud on 
maxims,23 suggesting that a badge of fraud was based on customary law.24 
 
According to Smith’s account, the Star Chamber also resolved that, since they were 
of the view that fraud and deceit abounded in those days more than in former times, 
all statutes made against fraud should be expounded liberally and beneficially to 
suppress the fraud.25  However, Kerr noted that the tendency of the subsequently 
established courts of equity was to hold that a seller remaining in possession of sold 
goods was not conclusive evidence of fraud. Instead, it was only a badge of fraud. In 
other words, it was a prima facie presumption of fraud, which might be rebutted by 
explanation, showing the transaction to be fair and honest. From this, Kerr concluded 
that the question of fraud, inferred from of badges of fraud, was not a question of 
law, but one of fact for the jury.26 In this view, the question arises as to how 
appellable a finding of fraud could really be. 
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A similar situation was demonstrated in the 1852 case of Graham v Chapman,27 in 
which fraud was found by virtue of policy expressed in a bankruptcy statute.28 In 
Graham v Chapman,29 a trader, in consideration of a past debt of £240, and a present 
advance of £200, conveyed by deed substantially the whole of his property. He gave 
the transferee a right to seize and take all future acquired property, even though it 
should be purchased with the money, which was alleged to be the consideration for 
the transfer. The court held that, inasmuch as the trader got no equivalent for any part 
of the stock transferred, and such transfer necessarily defeated and delayed his 
creditors, though without fraud in fact, it still constituted an act of bankruptcy within 
the statute 12 & 13 Vict c 106, s. 67.30 
 
Jervis CJ delivered the judgment of the court,31 stating the maxim that every person 
must be taken to intend that which is the necessary consequences of his own act, and, 
if a trader make a deed which necessarily has the effect of defeating or delaying his 
creditors, he must be taken to have made the deed with that intent. However, 
according to Jervis CJ, such a deed with such an effect was, by the policy of the law 
of bankruptcy, an act of fraud. Therefore the transfer, to be accomplished by the 
deed, was a fraudulent transfer.32 From this judgment fraud was not inferred, but 
found by the policy of the law of bankruptcy. This was arguably circuitous 
reasoning, suggesting that fraud was a form of denunciation of status, and therefore 
reverse onus. Thus, the mere allegation of fraud raised a presumption of defendant 
liability, and it could be said from this that fraud was implication of strict liability by 
denunciation of status. 
 
Confirming the lasting rhetorical significance of badges of fraud, in the 1870 case of 
Allen v Bonnett,33 Elias Bonnett was a brick manufacturer, who made an indenture 
conveying all his property to another person in consideration of £300. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 12 CB 85. 
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29 12 CB 85, 85. 
30 12 CB 85, 85. 
31 12 CB 85, 103. 
32 Ibid. 
33 (1870) LR 5 Ch App 577. 
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arrangement included a provision for redemption for £750 and interest. More than a 
year later he became bankrupt. The creditors sought to have the indenture declared 
void, because they had suspicions concerning the advancing of the money. Lord 
Hatherley, LC, stated that in such cases where there is an absence of distinct proof of 
positive fraud, there are two relevant badges, or indicia, of fraud. He added that these 
badges of fraud have always induced the court to hold that such deeds could not be 
sustained against the creditors under a bankruptcy, when such indicia were found.34 
The Lord Chancellor cited these two instances as follows.35 The first was one where 
the whole of a person’s property, who afterwards becomes bankrupt, has been 
assigned to an antecedent debt and no further advances have been made. He stated 
that this kind of transaction was of no advantage to the bulk of the creditors. The 
second was where an assignment was made by a trader just upon the verge of 
bankruptcy of such frame and form as to indicate clearly and plainly on the face of 
the deed and the face of the transaction, without any further proof of fraud or 
arrangement between the parties, that the purpose was fraudulent.36 
 
Both fraud and deceit were discussed in chapter 4, in the section on fraud and deceit 
in the Gloucestershire Clothiers Case. In that section, an early form of deceit from 
the time of King John was identified as deriving from breaching an agreement with 
the crown. It is arguable that fraud can be inferred from deceit. For example, Lord 
Herschell stated the following in the 1889 case of Derry v Peek,37 confirming deceit 
as indicative of fraud. 
Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made 
(1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly and 
carelessly whether it be true or false . . . . if fraud be proved, the motive of 
the person guilty of it is immaterial. It matters not that there was intention to 
cheat or injure the person to whom the statement was made.38 
 
From this, Lord Herschell appeared to say that intention to cheat or injure is 
irrelevant to a finding of fraud. In the later 1896 civil case of Reddaway v Banham,39 
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35 (1870) LR 5 Ch App 577, 580. 
36 Ibid. 
37 (1889) 14 AC 337, 374-376. 
38 Ibid. 
39 [1896] AC 199, 221. 
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Lord Macnaghten characterized fraud as follows. Suggesting fraud’s policy basis, his 
characterisation of fraud leads all the way to, but stops short of, honesty. 
Fraud is infinite in variety; sometimes it is audacious and unflushing; 
sometimes it pays a sort of homage to virtue, and then it is modest and 
retiring; it would be honesty itself if it could only afford it. But fraud is fraud 
all the same, and it is the fraud, not the manner of it, which calls for the 
interposition of the court.40 
 
Finally, equity was able to articulate fraud and deceit as distinct states of affairs. 
Thus, in the 1903 case of In re London and Globe Finance Corpn, Limited,41 
Buckley J defined “intent to defraud” as follows. 
To deceive is, to induce a man to believe that a thing is true which is false, 
and which the person practicing the deceit knows or believes to be false. To 
defraud is to deprive by deceit; it is by deceit to induce a man to act to his 
injury. More tersely it may be put, that to deceive is by falsehood to induce a 
state of mind; to defraud is by deceit to induce a course of action.42 
 
It appears that fraud was not procedural, but was qualitative. There were two 
chronological steps to fraud. The first was deception by person A directed at person 
B, followed by a self-injurious action by person B. These steps were discussed in the 
1950 case of Kat v Diment,43 arising under the Merchandise Marks Act 1887 (UK). 
This statute was one in a series of criminal statutes, ultimately used and interpreted 
by Lord Diplock in the Advocaat Case,44 discussed later in this chapter. It will be 
argued later in this chapter that Lord Diplock used this statute, within a series of 
developing criminal laws, to make over its anti-fraud criminal provisions into a civil 
action within the tort of passing-off. 
 
From this, it appeared that fraud in commerce was a successful use of persuasive 
rhetoric. To induce a course of action leading to damage to the actor suggested 
inducing a breach of acceptable behaviour. Put another way, fraud appeared to be 
inducing a change in a person’s thoughts, so that person adopted a false position, 
leading to that person breaching acceptable, or customary, behaviour. Explained this 
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42 Ibid. 
43 (1950) 67 RPC 158, 162. 
44 [1979] AC 731, 743. 
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way, fraud could not be abandoned, as it existed in dialectic with customary 
behaviour. 
 
C   Goodwill 
 
1   Local Custom 
 
This section investigates the scope of meaning for the term “local custom” as it 
might apply to goodwill. It was argued in chapter 2, in the 1675 case of Hutchins v 
Player,45 that a breach of a City of London custom was heard as a criminal matter. It 
was treated as a strict liability offence. It was also argued in chapter 2 that a custom 
of London was operational as the local common law. In chapter 2, it was also argued 
that in certain circumstances, custom could operate as the common law of England. 
Its breach was tried on a strict liability basis. Therefore, this investigation will be in 
three parts. First it is necessary to describe the nature of custom. Then, a formal 
record of operative customs will be consulted to identify customs arguably relevant 
to passing-off. Finally, the section examines how customs could be formed and how 
this mechanism for formation might relate to a strict liability aspect to their 
enforcement.  
 
 (a) Describing Local Custom 
 
In this chapter, the word “custom” has its basic dictionary meaning as “a habitual or 
usual practice; common way of acting; usage, fashion, habit, either of an individual 
or of a community”. This meaning developed circa 1200 C.E.46 in England. 
However, in this chapter, this basic meaning of the word “custom” will often have an 
additional legal meaning. This meaning apparently developed circa 1400 C E, as “an 
established usage which by long continuance has acquired the force of a law or right, 
especially the established usage of a particular locality, trade, society, or the like”.47 
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Within this latter meaning, two further dictionary refinements are available. The first 
is “the practice of customarily resorting to a particular shop, place of entertainment, 
etc. to make purchases or give orders; business patronage or support”, and then more 
specifically, “designating articles made to measure or to order, or places where such 
articles are made, or people producing work of this kind”.48 Thus, according to its 
dictionary meaning, custom infers regular resort to a particular business to buy 
articles meeting a buyer’s established or agreed purchase requirements. 
 
Potts described London custom as follows. 
The ancient city of London, being the metropolis and chief town for trade and 
commerce within the kingdom, it was necessary, that it should have certain 
customs and privileges for its better government, which though derogatory from 
the general law of the realm, yet being for the benefit of the citizens, and for the 
advantage of those who trade to, and from the city, have not only been allowed 
good, by the judgments in the superior courts, but have also been confirmed by 
several acts of parliament. The customs of London differ from all other in point 
of trial, for if any of the customs be pleaded, and denied, and issue be taken 
thereupon, the existence of such customs shall be tried a by a writ directed to the 
Mayor and aldermen, to certify whether there is such a custom or not, and they 
shall make their certificate by the mouth of the recorder. These customs of 
London relate to diverse particulars with regard to trade, apprentices, widows, 
orphans and a variety of other matters . . . .49 
 
Trying a breach of custom has arguably always been strict liability in nature, as was 
discussed in chapter 2, in the 1675 case of Hutchins v Player.50 Suggesting the scope 
of custom, Potts described it in 1815 as follows. 
A custom is a law or right, not written, which being established by long use, and 
the consent of the ancestors, hath been, and is daily practised. If it is to be 
proved by record, the continuance of an hundred years will serve. Custom is 
either general or particular. General when allowed through all England. 
Particular is that, which belongs to this or that county, as gavelkind to Kent. 
General customs which are used throughout England, and are the common law, 
are to be determined by the judges: but particular customs, such as are used in 
some certain towns, boroughs, cities, etc., shall be determined by a jury. But the 
judges of the courts of kings bench and common pleas can overrule a custom, 
though it be one of the customs of London, if it be against natural reason.51 
 
This suggested that customary laws were a species of natural law, breaches of which 
should be tried as a finding of fact by a jury. Arguably, a limiting form of the above 
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49 Thomas Potts A Compendious Law Dictionary (Walker & Edwards, 1815), 185. 
50 Harg MSS No 55 fol 153. 
51 Potts, above 49, 184, 185. 
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description, as might apply to goodwill as an element of passing-off, would 
substitute ‘long-standing consent of buyers’ for ‘consent of ancestors’. The 
description also suggests that the more local is a custom, the more it is a matter for 
the jury, and therefore, an issue of fact rather than of law. 
 
Pulling stated that the distinction between general laws and those observed only on a 
local basis dates back to the ancient Imperial Roman Law, once operative in 
England.52 Species of local laws in England, recognised by the common law, 
included ancient customs,53 privileges and franchises sanctioned by royal charters 
and acts of parliament.54 
 
Noy stated that there was an obligation inherent in a custom, or any usage voluntarily 
adopted, which was founded on principles of natural justice.55 Noy classified custom 
as natural law. He specified the following in respect of custom. “ . . . the force of 
nature is the greatest” and “ . . . natural affection, or brotherly love, are good causes 
or considerations to raise an use”.56 
 
Part of the City of London Recorder’s job was to appear at the Bar of the Court and 
recall ancient custom for the court’s consideration. This was discussed in the chapter 
2 discussion of the nature of the jurisdiction of the courts of the City of London. 
Pulling said that these customs were said to be different to the customs of other 
localities because they could never become obsolete by disuse, or in other words, 
subject to desuetude.57 The crucial ones tended to be confirmed by statute. This 
arguably made important London mercantile customs into national business laws.58 
Cunningham noted that London customs were also given over to Oxford and many 
other affiliated towns in England.59 
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(b) Formal Record Of London Customs 
 
Arnold’s Chronicle60 was a formal written record of the customs of London. The 
following identifies those entries, which appear to be relevant to the later tort of 
passing-off. Their relevance will be assessed as they might appear to be either 
nascent elements of the later tort of passing-off, or forms of law which might have 
preceded passing-off. 
 
From the preface to Arnold’s Chronicle,61 it appears that the data in it reflected 
correct information as at the year 1502. However, there is material in Arnold’s 
Chronicle written as early as 1473.62 This suggested that the following customs of 
London were extant long before the Gloucestershire Clothiers’ Case.63 The articles 
of the Charter and Liberties of the City of London64 containing the customs most 
relevant to passing-off, were the following five, plus the record of a mandatory oath. 
 
The first was an article apparently preventing the act of forestalling. 
That no merchant or other go against merchants coming by land or by water 
with their merchandise or vitals toward the city to buy or to sell until they come 
to the said city, and their wares have been put to sale.65 
 
This was where all the arriving goods could be intercepted and purchased before they 
arrived at the market. Then, prices could be raised at market by the forestaller. 
Arguably, forestalling could have the dual effect of damaging the custom of all 
merchants except the forestallers, and raising a public confusion as to the products’ 
sources of manufacture. In theory, it also provided an opportunity for the forestaller 
to deal with the goods deceptively, such as for example altering their trademarks or 
trade names to manipulate their market value. Arguably, this deception would make 
buyer prepurchase inspection of goods very difficult. In theory, passing-off had the 
same net effect as forestalling. This theory would run as follows. It could facilitate a 
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61 Arnold’s, above 60. 
62 Arnold’s, above 60, v-xii. 
63 Professor Baker identified the Gloucestershire Clothiers Case as J G v Samford (1584) unrep in J H 
Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (Butterworths, 4th ed, 1990), 459. 
64 Arnold’s, above 60, fo 1-11. 
65 Article xxvii, Arnold’s, above 60, fo 3. 
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monopolistic gathering of goods from multiple sources and then deceptively selling 
them at prices inflated from their natural value, as if they were all from the same 
proper source. 
 
The second was another custom limiting the qualifications and accreditation of those 
selling their goods. 
That every person admitted into the liberty of the city must be a member of a 
specified craft or office accredited by the authority of 6 men of the same craft 
or office.66 
 
This gave discretion over craftsmen to the wardens of their gild, thereby creating 
commercial rankings as to source of manufacture. In this way the public would look 
up the commercial ranks to form their pre-purchase impressions of the quality and 
probity of the goods. For example: if certain goods were from the gild of clothiers, 
they might have a better reputation than goods from artisans who did not have the 
status of freedom of the city. 
 
The third was a custom that was arguably a proscription against a nascent form of 
passing-off, because it recognised a regulatory problem in correctly representing the 
source of the goods for sale. 
If any freeman of the city avouched the goods of foreigners to be theirs he 
would lose the liberty of the city.67 
 
This article prohibited the selling of goods as having an accredited manufacturing 
source, when they were really made by unaccredited artisans. It aimed to stop people 
selling their good as having been made by freemen of the City, when it fact they 
were not. 
 
The fourth was a custom regulating sales of goods by non-citizens of London and its 
suburbs. 
That citizens dwelling outside the liberty of the said city and exercising 
merchandises in the same must pay taxes in the city or else lose their right to 
sell.68 
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68 Article xliiii, Arnold’s, above 60, fo 5. 
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This article suggested those from outside London were at a financial disability in 
selling their wares in London. 
 
The fifth was a custom seeking to stamp out foreign economic activity in 
unsupervised places. 
That no merchant stranger should sell any merchandise within the liberties to 
another merchant stranger otherwise their merchandise shall be forfeit.69 
 
This article was designed to restrict business between merchant strangers. 
 
Finally, there was a customary oath demanded of every freeman in the city. Its 
wordage indicates how these freemen were to be bound, and was expressed as 
follows. 
You shall swear that you shall be good and true to our sovereign Lord the King 
and to his heirs Kings of England and you shall be obedient to the Mayor of the 
City of London and you shall maintain the franchise freedom and custom of the 
city to your power. And the same city in all that is in you without danger you 
shall keep and you shall be partner of all charges touching the city and . . . you 
shall not avow the goods of foreigners as for yours whereby the king shall lose 
his custom . . . and if you know any foreigner using any merchandise in the city 
you shall warn the Chamberlain or the officers, and you shall not plead with any 
freeman outside the city if you have the right of the Mayor  . . . .70 
 
Embedded within the form of the oath was a requirement prohibiting the presentation 
of any goods at market, sourced from a foreigner, and whereby the king would lose 
his custom. 
 
(c) Establishing Custom 
 
Having described custom, and having described those customs of London as 
arguably relevant to passing-off, it remains to see how customs could be formed. 
 
The above customs of London, set out in Arnold’s Chronicle, must have had wide 
force because of London’s pre-eminence as a central city of trade and commerce. In 
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this respect, Ayliffe described custom in the following terms. He styled custom as a 
species of immemorial right, introduced by the tacit consent of the people. It would 
be established by a long course of practice in such matters only as the people were 
enabled to do by expressly consenting to it. He added that this practice or usage 
would substitute for a law deficient in any specific point.71 The length of time of 
usage was to be regarded as being the equivalent of the people’s consent to the 
custom. In this way customs were similar to statutes. Customs might be either 
general or special. They would be general where they were of the majority of the 
people of the state, and in this instance had the force of unwritten law.72 They would 
be special when they were more of a local character. He noted that a general custom 
had the effect of the law of the state and could not be introduced by individual 
persons. It was a species of right, originated by the manners and usage of the whole 
people of a state.73 However, a prescription74 between two people established the 
existence of a private custom between individuals. The required period of usage 
appeared to be 40 years by Canon Law and 10 years by the civil law.75 Thus, it might 
be inferred that a custom is a conjectural argument based on fact that has the force of 
a statute, when there is no actual statute covering its subject matter. 
 
Ayliffe stated four things as required in order to introduce a custom.76 The first was a 
lawful prescription. The second was a frequency of repetition of acts, such as, for 
example, two acts within ten years and which were notorious in the community. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 John Ayliffe Juris Canonici Anglicani (D Leach, 1776), 194. 
72 Also known as a maxim. Noy, above 21, 39-41. 
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third was the tacit consent77 of the people evidenced by long and repetitive usage. 
The fourth was that the custom had to be founded on equity or right reason.78 
 
Ayliffe continued that when a person based intent to act on a custom, there was a 
legal obligation to prove the custom. This was because a custom was strictly a matter 
of fact, and facts could not be merely presumed without proof. Witnesses were 
brought to prove that the custom was both notorious and long standing.79 Ayliffe 
stated that customs were adjudged the same way as the private law established in 
contracts,80 breach of which required no proof of intent. 
 
2 Judicial Reasoning by Analogy 
 
This section investigates the theory of Lord Diplock’s judicial reasoning by analogy, 
as it was used in the Advocaat Case,81 to see if this process might have affected the 
structure of the tort of passing-off in such a way as to have made it strict liability in 
character. It asks if any relationship might exist between judicial reasoning by 
analogy and a possible re-emergence of old customary law into the tort of passing-
off. 
 
In his 1997 paper on judicial reasoning by analogy, Farrar explained judicial 
reasoning by analogy as part of the doctrine of precedent. 
Reasoning by analogy is fundamental to Common Law method and yet until 
recently has received relatively little analysis except as part of the Doctrine of 
Precedent. In this article we shall attempt an analysis of the nature of analogy 
in general, its relationship to logic and its place in reasoning with cases, 
statutes and codes. We shall then review some theoretical discussions of 
analogy and the link between reasoning by analogy and justificatory reasoning, 
ending with an analysis of justification in terms of principle, policy and 
considerations of fairness underlying the Doctrine of Precedent.82 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 However, a statute has the express consent of the people. Ayliffe, above 71, 195. 
78 The Law rests on equity when it seems to agree with truth and the general welfare; for example a 
man who is more than sixty years old, and pleads illness, shall substitute an attorney for himself. 
Thus according to circumstances and a person’s status virtually a new kind of law may well be 
established. Rhetorica ad Herennium, above 53, 95. 
79 Ayliffe, above 71, 196. 
80 Ayliffe, above 71, 195. 
81 [1979] AC 731, 739-748. 
82 John H Farrar ‘Reasoning by Analogy in the Law’ (1997) 9(2) Bond Law Review, 149, 149. 
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He explained how judicial reasoning by analogy forms part of the doctrine of 
precedent. 
The method used by Common Law judges in deciding cases is a form of 
practical reasoning, combining reasoning by analogy with reasoning by rule 
and principle.83 
 
By the term ‘rule’, he meant a standard in the form of ‘If circumstances X apply, 
then consequence Y shall (or ought) to follow.’84 However, he explained the 
principle as a less precise, more general standard and often ethical in content. 
Principle was to be distinguished from policy, as policy set out a social goal. 
Analogy involved both a comparison and a weighing process. If the similarities 
outweighed the dissimilarities, then the earlier case was to be followed. If not, then 
the earlier case was to be distinguished.85 However, it was not so much the earlier 
case as the rule or principle implicit in the earlier case to be followed. This 
introduced and inferred the term ratio decidendi,86 by which the first case was 
followed.87 
 
The term ratio decidendi did not appear in James Ram’s book The Science of Legal 
Judgment published in 1834, which was the first published systematic work on the 
case law method. Farrar regarded the omission as likely to be significant because the 
phrase had found favour with jurists, but not yet with the Bench. Farrar argued that 
Ram’s book was written for a judicial audience.88 
 
However, in fact, Ram’s view was that the judicial holdings were express on the face 
of the record, rather than implicit in the judge’s reasons for decision. According to 
Farrar’s interpretation of Ram, there was no room for interpreting another judge’s 
words in depth. Farrar suggested that, instead, the judge must be taken at face 
value.89 Thus, in Ram’s 1835 edition of The Science of Legal Judgment,90 Ram 
linked opinion with judicial decision making. This would admit the possibility of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Farrar, above 82, 151. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Farrar, above 82, 151, note 7. 
89 Farrar, above 82, 151. 
90 Ram, above 19. 
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judicial reasoning by analogy. He divided opinions from the bench into first, judicial 
opinion and second, extra-judicial opinion. The former was an opinion on the 
question before the court and was a resolution or determination, a direct solemn 
opinion, a formed decisive resolution, an adjudication, or a professed or deliberate 
determination. The latter was an opinion given on a question unnecessary to decide 
in the given case, one kind of which was called obiter dictum. It was not to be taken 
as a resolution of the court.91 
 
Farrar exemplified the process of judicial reasoning by analogy92 by examining Lord 
Diplock’s speech on the duty of care in negligence in the 1970 House of Lords case 
of Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co.93 
 
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co94 was decided in 1970, some nine years before Lord 
Diplock’s speech in the 1979 House of Lords decision in The Advocaat Case.95 In 
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co,96 Lord Diplock began by discussing judicial 
reasoning by analogy to extend common law tort liability in negligence. He 
suggested that the House of Lords would be deciding whether the English law of 
civil wrongs should be extended to impose legal liability not yet recognised by the 
courts. He stated that this function, which judges hesitated to acknowledge as law 
making, played only a minor role in the decision of most cases. He added that little 
conscious thought had been given to analysing its correct methodology.97 
 
His lordship disclosed his 5-step procedure for application of judicial reasoning by 
analogy. The first step was to analyze all the previous cases looking for the common 
characteristics. Lord Diplock put it this way. 
In all the decisions that have been analyzed a duty of care has been held to exist 
wherever the conduct and the relationship possessed each of the characteristics 
A, B, C, D, etc. and has not so far been found to exist when any of these 
characteristics were absent.98 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Ram, above 19, 36, 37. 
92 Farrar, above 82, 154. 
93 [1970] AC 1004, 1004-1071. 
94 [1970] AC 1004, 1004-1071. 
95 [1979] AC 731, 739-748. 
96 [1970] AC 1004, 1057-1071. 
97 [1970] AC 1004, 1058. 
98 [1970] AC 1004, 1059. 
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The second step was to convert the analysis into a statement of law that the doctrine 
existed when all of the discovered characteristics were proved in evidence. Lord 
Diplock put it this way. 
For the second stage, which is deductive and analytical, that proposition is 
converted to: In all cases where the conduct and relationship possess each of the 
characteristics A, B, C, D, etc. a duty of care arises. The conduct and 
relationship involved in the case for decision is then analyzed to ascertain 
whether they possess each of these characteristics. If they do the conclusion 
follows that a duty of care does arise in the case for decision.99 
 
The third step was to analyze the conduct and relationships in the case at hand. This 
was to see if it demonstrates the said characteristics. Lord Diplock put it this way: 
But since ex hypothesi the kind of case which we are now considering offers a 
choice whether or not to extend the kinds of conduct or relationships which give 
rise to a duty of care, the conduct or relationship which is involved in it will take 
at least one of the characteristics A, B, C or D, etc. And the choice is exercised 
by making a policy decision as to whether or not a duty of care ought to exist if 
the characteristic which is lacking were absent or redefined in terms broad 
enough to include the case under consideration.100 
 
The fourth step was that if extending the law by analogy, then the conduct in the case 
must possess at least one of the said characteristics. If so, a policy decision of a judge 
could be taken by re-defining the characteristics in more general terms. Lord Diplock 
put it in the following way. 
The policy decision will be influenced by the same general conception of what 
ought to give rise to a duty of care as was used in approaching the analysis. The 
choice to extend is given effect to by redefining the characteristics in more 
general terms so as to exclude the necessity to conform to limitations imposed 
by the former definition, which are considered to be inessential.101 In all cases 
where the conduct and relationship possess each of the characteristics A, B, C, 
and D, etc but do not possess any of the characteristics Z, Y, or X etc which 
were present in the cases eliminated from the analysis, a duty of care arises.102 
 
Step five was to prevent the law being stated in too general terms. For this, the judge 
should take care to consider only reported cases where the actual decision alone 
carried authority, proper weight, and was stated within the ambit of the dicta of the 
judges. Farrar argued that in the early history of English and Scots Law, the courts 
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used statutes as the basis of argument by analogy.103 The old equity of the statute 
approach recognized the possibility of statutory analogies such as extending the 
meaning of a statute using equitable procedures. Farrar said that this approach, which 
was perhaps necessitated by the fact that many early statutes were not so well written 
and were excessively terse, has now been discredited. Nevertheless, Farrar noted that 
one could still identify some relatively modern examples where courts seemed to 
have used statutory provisions by analogy,104 such as in the Advocaat Case,105 per 
Lord Diplock. 
 
Farrar’s view was that the equity of the statute appeared to derive from a principle 
that the courts, guided by the dictates of conscience and natural justice, could modify 
the rigor of a statute or apply its rules to cases not provided for, to avert hardship or 
injustice.106 This procedure was embedded deeply into jurisprudence. For example, 
Sir John Doderidge commented on St. Germain’s Doctor and Student,107 saying that 
equity is “triple in our law”. By this he explained that equity either kept the common 
law in conformity, or expounded statute law, or gave a remedy in the court of 
conscience, in cases of extremity which otherwise were unredressed by the law.108 
 
Farrar also cited Francis Bacon as having explained the theory of the equity of a 
statute in his general view of judicial reasoning by analogy. Bacon set this out in a 
letter to the Earl of Rutland, in which he stated as follows. 
The observation of proportion or likeness between one person or one thing and 
another, makes nothing without example, nor nothing new; and although exempla 
illustrant non probant, examples may make things plain that are proved, but prove not 
themselves; yet when circumstances agree, and proportion is kept, that which is 
probable in one case is probable in a thousand, and that which is reason once is reason 
ever.109 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Farrar, above 82, 157. 
104 Farrar, above 82, 154, 157. 
105 [1979] AC 731, 739-748. 
106 W H Loyd ‘The Equity of a Statute’ (1909) 58(2) University of Pennsylvania Law Review and 
American Law Register, New Series, 76-86, 82, citing Henry Campbell Black Handbook on the 
construction and interpretation of the laws (West Publishing Co , 1911), 42. 
107 Dialogue I, Ch. XVII. 
108 Loyd, above 106, 78, citing Doderidge’s English Lawyer, 211. 
109 Farrar, above 82, 163, citing Francis Bacon Letters and Life Vol. II (Longman, Green, Longman and 
Roberts, 1862), 196. 
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In other words similarities achieve nothing by themselves. Strictly, argument by 
example proves nothing. However, it raises a presumption of a probable or rational 
connection, which is arguably an indicium of strict liability. According to Bacon, this 
would not be subject to desuetude. The presumption would then have to be either 
verified or falsified by observation.110 In this way, the conclusion of an argument by 
analogy effected a conclusion of reverse onus, which was arguably an indicium of 
strict liability. 
 
Farrar considered the general approach of modern courts. He said judges regarded 
the legislative categories as closed categories and did not view statute law as a source 
of legal principle. He stated that statutes could be interpreted and reinterpreted but 
not reworked or extended. Nevertheless, this general position had some exceptions. 
First, a recognized exception was where the statute referred to a common law 
concept and there the concept was capable of further analogical development within 
the common law.111 Arguably, this could include an ancient local custom filling a 
lacuna in the law, or a custom of the City of London operating as the common law. 
Second, occasionally legislation was used as an expression of public policy in the 
common law world. This kind of expression of public policy was relatively rare in 
the United Kingdom and Australia, The Advocaat Case112 being one such 
exception.113 
 
3 Understanding Goodwill 
 
This section examines goodwill, so that it can be understood in the context of Lord 
Diplock’s speech in the Advocaat Case,114 below. It seeks to apply Lord Diplock’s 
schema for judicial reasoning by analogy, to develop a description of goodwill that 
might explain goodwill’s unique susceptibility to damage by acts of passing off. 
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Allen explained the absence of a unified definition of goodwill by the fact that it was 
a thing incapable of a separate existence. This was because its nature varied with the 
nature of the business to which it attached. It was also from the fact that the word 
was a commercial term used by mercantile practitioners. He said that frequently they 
had no clear appreciation of what they meant when they used it.115 In 1889 Allen 
described goodwill in the following terms. 
The task of establishing a business or a professional practice is generally a 
matter that requires the expenditure of time, labour and money. The 
general public are slow to purchase a new comer’s goods – to test or rely 
upon a stranger’s skill. Perseverance and industry are, however, not 
unusually successful, and our commercial or professional man who has 
worked steadily through the weary period of probation finds, sooner or 
later, that his goods or services are in fairly constant demand. This is 
seldom due, however, to the number of his promiscuous customers or 
clients, but rather to the fact that certain persons go to him regularly. 
These persons have found that he is honest and trustworthy; that his goods 
are of high quality, or that his skill and knowledge are commendable; they 
have been satisfied with the treatment they have received in the past, and 
are loath, in the absence of some reliable recommendation or other special 
circumstances, to run the risk of transferring their custom to another. They 
have, in fact, a confidence in the man, and a good will towards him. These 
regular customers constitute what has been well called his “connection”, 
commercial or professional, and they afford him the security of a fairly 
constant income. If he is obliged to carry on his work in such a manner 
that these customers can no longer resort to him, as, for instance, if he has 
to leave their neighbourhood, he loses this connection and is thereby 
seriously prejudiced.116 
 
As such, goodwill was a valuable form of property. It had no separate existence of its 
own, apart from the business being run. It might be subject to sale, mortgage, or 
bequest. Or it might be an asset available to a trustee in bankruptcy.117 Arguably, this 
meant that it might be dealt with fraudulently, and subject to a sequestration order.118 
 
Allan said there were two classes of legal rights allowing a person to acquire the 
goodwill of a business, exclusive of any agreement with the previous trader. The first 
was the possession of the premises and of the old stock. The second was the right to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Charles E Allan The Law Relating to Good Will (Stevens and Sons, 1889), 4. 
116 Allan, above 115, 1, 2. 
117 Allan, above 115, 2. 
118 In chapter 2, above, this kind of order was shown to be a customary power of the Court of the City 
of London, used to seize property to satisfy alleged debts. The remedies of foreign attachment and 
sequestration were arguably open to abuse, such that, hypothetically, a debtor could either be chased 
away or kidnapped or worse, so that his goods could be either attached or sequestered or both, and 
thereby title to his working capital and stock was transferred out of the debtor’s hands. 
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carry on the old business and to represent that it was the old business that was carried 
on.119 The word “goodwill” usually meant the second of these classes of rights. It 
included the following three specific rights. The first was the sole right to use the old 
trade name or firm name. The second was the sole right to the trademarks connected 
with the business. The third was a right to the benefit of contracts entered into by the 
assignor with third parties, for the protection of the business.120 
 
This exclusive class of right was discussed in the 1879 case of Levy v Walker.121 In 
that case, James LJ stated that the right to use the partnership name, as a description 
of the articles sold in that trade, was an exclusive right against all the world. This 
was so that no other person could represent himself as carrying on the same business. 
From this, Allen stated that the reason why a person using a firm name used by 
others could be restrained from so doing was because the public might be or were 
deceived by this use. The consequence of the deception would be that the person, 
whose business name had the reputation, suffered an injury to the property in the 
business.122 For this, fraud was not a necessary requirement for proof. Rather, it was 
assumed by pleading merely that the wrongful act was calculated to deceive.123 
 
In 1922 Foreman noted that goodwill had been defined by economists as the 
reputation, business standing or favour, which the entrepreneur enjoyed in the eyes 
of the public. He also explained goodwill as the habit or custom, which led men to 
deal with a definite or particular enterprise in preference to others of the same kind. 
He speculated that the legal definitions of goodwill were not as cogent as the 
economics-based theories, and instead were clustered under several sub headings. In 
respect of the early English cases, Foreman’s argument suggests that the descriptions 
of those sub headings were per the following five heads.124 
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121 [1879] 10 Ch D 436. 
122 Allan, above 115, 18, 19. 
123 This may only have meant that it was very widely persuasive, judged by assessing the effect of the 
rhetoric inherent in the firm’s name. 
124 C J Foreman ‘Conflicting Theories of Good Will’ (1922) 22(7) Columbia Law Review, 639-653, 
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Foreman’s first head was the concept embodied or inherent in the grounds, buildings, 
productive processes and stock of an enterprise.125 This was illustrated by Lord 
Eldon’s definition in 1810 in Cruttwell v Lye126 as follows. “The good-will, which 
has been the subject of sale is nothing more than the probability that the old 
customers will resort to the old place.” In the later 1842 case of England v Downs,127 
Lord Langdale MR held the goodwill of a seller of victuals to be incident to the stock 
and the licence, but not to the premises on which the business was established. 
 
Foreman’s second head was that goodwill of a business may be established and held 
permanently through effort within the business.128 This was illustrated in the 
following two cases. In Cooper v Metropolitan Board of Works,129 Cotton LJ held 
that if goodwill depended on personal skill of the person who parted with it, it was 
not transferred to others merely through a sale of the premises.130 In England v 
Downs,131 Lord Langdale MR held goodwill to be the chance or probability that 
custom will be had at a certain place of business in consequence of the way in which 
that business had been run previously.132 
 
Foreman’s third head was that goodwill is simply nothing more than value.133 This 
was illustrated by a supposition put forward by the members of the court in Cook v 
Collingridge:134 goodwill might be defined as the value of the chance that the 
customers of partners retiring altogether would deal with those who purchased from 
such retiring partners and succeeded to their establishment. Lord Eldon agreed and 
drafted this wordage into his order of the Court.135 
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Foreman’s fourth head was that intangible connection between an enterprise and the 
public.136 It was explained by Sir John Romilly in Wedderburn v Wedderburn,137 as, 
“it seems to be that species of connection in trade which induces customers to deal 
with a particular firm”.138 
 
Foreman’s fifth head was the form of fixed impressions or conceptions on the part of 
the consuming public.139 Sir W. Page Wood VC described this in the 1859 case of 
Churton v Douglas,140 as follows. It appears that Churton v Douglas141 reported the 
strength of the business name as an element of goodwill. In this 1859 case there was 
a sale of a business, and the question for the court was whether the person selling the 
business was entitled to set up in competition. The Vice-Chancellor, Sir W. Page 
Wood, was prepared to grant a temporary injunction, and stated that, it was in the 
nature of goodwill that the public had more regard for the name of the firm than they 
had for its trading address. In support of this proposition, the Vice-Chancellor noted 
that the word “firm” was derived from the Italian word, which simply meant 
“signature”. His conclusion was that when one parts with the goodwill of a business, 
one means to part with all of the good disposition which customers entertain towards 
the house of business. The name or firm identifies this good disposition. It may 
induce customers to continue giving their custom to it.142 
 
Taking these five separate headings together, goodwill can be argued as the value in 
the probability of the business continuing to maintain its connection to buyers to 
induce custom in the same way. 
 
In his 2008 paper, Tregoning conducted a detailed survey of the relevant cases.143 
The process of limiting the general rule for goodwill will now be applied by 
reference to Tregoning’s survey of the operative case law. As such, Tregoning 
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determined that the first case in which goodwill was expressly mentioned by name 
was the 1743 matter of Gibblett v Read.144 Before this, he argued that goodwill 
appeared to have been referred to by the synonym of “custom”.145 For example, in 
the 1859 case of Churton v Douglas,146 Wood VC emphasized that custom was what 
was meant by goodwill. He noted that references to custom, as a synonym for 
goodwill, appeared in the 1620 case of Broad v Jollyfe.147 
 
In the 1620 case of Broad v Jollyfe,148 the defendant was trading as a mercer. He had 
a shop at Newport, selling old and sullied wares. The plaintiff had a shop there 
selling new and fresh wares. The plaintiff bought all of the defendant’s old wares for 
their original prices. He assumed that the defendant would no longer run the shop. 
The defendant then furnished his shop with new wares and maintained his business 
in his shop. Houghton J held that this was a case of good assumpsit.149 This was 
because one might restrain oneself not to trade at a particular place, and the person 
who gave the consideration expected the benefit of the customers. The judge referred 
to the local custom in London of letting his shop and wares to his servant when he 
completed his apprenticeship and to covenant that he should not trade in the let shop 
or in the same street. Thus, the court held that it was customary that a person might 
voluntarily agree for valuable consideration not to use his trade, because volenti non 
fit injuria.150 Arguably, this was explainable as the selling of his custom and leaving 
another person to gain it, having impliedly waived a right of action in tort to regain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 (1743) 9 Mod 459, 459-461; 88 ER 573. Extracted in this chapter, below. 
145 Custom. The Oxford English Dictionary explained the word “custom” as a habitual or usual 
practice; common way of acting; usage, fashion, habit (either of an individual or of a community); 
the practising of anything habitually; the being or becoming accustomed; in law, an established 
usage which by long continuance has acquired the force of a law or right, especially the established 
usage of a particular locality, trade, society, or the like; the practice of customarily resorting to a 
particular shop, place of entertainment, etc. to make purchases or give orders; business patronage or 
support. Oxford English Dictionary (Clarendon Press, 2nd ed, 1989). 
146 (1859) 1 Johns Eng Ch 174, 188. 
147 (1620) Cro Jac 596, 597; 79 ER 509. 
148 Cro Jac 506, 597. 
149 Assumpsit. Latin – he or she promised or undertook. The common law action developed in the 14th 
century, Skyrne v Butolf  YB Pas 11 Ric II (Ames series), 223, for breach of an undertaking, which 
replaced the earlier action of trespass on the case. Assumpsit was a general contractual remedy 
arising from a promise where a person assumed and took it on himself or herself to perform some 
act or pay something for another. It was subsequently abolished by the (UK) Judicature Act 1873. 
The term is now used mainly to refer to an action that lay where a party claimed damages for breach 
of simple contract. Encyclopaedic Australian Legal Dictionary, LexisNexis, Sydney [2012], online. 
150 Volenti non fit injuria. Latin – there can be no injury to the willing. Encyclopaedic Australian Legal 
Dictionary, LexisNexis, Sydney [2012], online. 
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it. The court held that a prescription, or private agreement, to restrain a person from 
using a trade in a specified place was good.151 
 
Tregoning argued that the following five passing-off style of cases were central to 
the development of the law of goodwill.152 
 
The first case, the 1742 case of Blanchard v Hill153 contrasted local custom with a 
crown grant as the source of goodwill. This suggested that, at common law, a crown 
grant of monopoly was not a source of goodwill. In Blanchard v Hill,154 the plaintiff 
sought to restrain the defendant from using the Mogul stamp on his playing cards. He 
argued that he owned the sole right. He submitted had he had appropriated the stamp 
for himself pursuant to the terms of the charter of King Charles I previously granted 
to the Cardmakers’ Company. Lord Hardwicke held that the monopoly intention of 
the charter was illegal, unless duly confirmed by an act of parliament. His Lordship 
added that, a court of equity would never establish a right of such a kind claimed 
under a charter from the crown, unless there had been first an action to try the right at 
law. There was an objection that the defendant, in using the Mogul mark, had taken 
the plaintiff’s customers away. Lord Hardwicke held that there was no more weight 
in this than if an innkeeper displayed the same sign as another innkeeper.155 This was 
arguably reminiscent of the law of printers’ devices, discussed above in chapter 3. 
 
In the second case of Gibblett v Read,156 the court considered nostrums157 as an 
element of goodwill. In this 1795 case, Hardwicke LC considered that although it 
might be difficult to define sufficiently the nature of property, that property could 
still be transmissible to representatives of the testator’s estate. In this case, the 
deceased had purchased shares in a newspaper from such representatives. The court 
held, a priori, that all things of this sort ought to be taken according to the known 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Cro Jac 506, 597. 
152 Tregoning, above 143. 
153 (1742) 2 Atk 484, 484-487. 
154 (1742) 2 Atk 484. 
155 (1742) 2 Atk 484, 487. 
156 (1795) 9 Mod 459, 459-461. 
157 Nostrum. A means or device for accomplishing something; a pet scheme or favourite remedy, esp. 
for bringing about some social or political reform or improvement. Oxford English Dictionary 
(Clarendon Press, 2nd ed, 1989). 
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nature of the dealing.158 Thus, the case was put in terms of physical secrets, or 
nostrums, where the nostrums could be part of the personal estate of the testator. 
Were the business to have been one of great trade, the executor would have to 
account for the value of what was called the goodwill of it, explained as follows. If 
anyone had thought of the nostrums, in the absence of a patent, then any such 
discoverer might have simply sold them. The court held that the value of these 
nostrums was that, since the business was a partnership, there were kinds of secrets 
in the business between the partners. It held that there was a certain expense in 
having procured the required intelligence to develop these secrets. 
 
The third case of Hogg v Kirby159 considered trade comity160 between traders as a 
possible element of goodwill. In this 1803 case, there was an application to dissolve 
a restraining injunction. It was to restrain Kirby’s magazine, which appeared to be a 
continuation of the plaintiff’s magazine. This was in its volume and page numbers 
and which was published under a similar title.161 Mr Richards and Mr Wetherell 
argued, on behalf of Kirby, against dissolving the injunction by noting that the 
injunction had been based on property at law, agreement and trust. They argued, by 
analogy to newspapers, that it had been established that property existed in a 
newspaper and that an action lay for another person publishing under the same title. 
They also argued that a court of equity had jurisdiction to apply the remedy of 
specific performance, under the heads of agreement. This remedy gave the court 
jurisdiction to call upon a person not to do an act, which he had covenanted not to 
do, or to compel a person according to his covenant to forego the use of a legal right 
or privilege, such as in a restraint of trade. They also argued that an author’s 
copyright, after the copyright expiry, might still become property by virtue of an 
agreement. Lastly, they argued that under trust law a property arose in a publication 
according to the usage of booksellers, on the ground that when a person contracted 
with another person in the same trade they were bound to conform to the customs 
and usages of the trade.162 
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159 8 Ves 215, 215-228. 
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English Dictionary (Clarendon Press, 2nd ed, 1989). 
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The Lord Chancellor, Lord Eldon, started his reasoning by seeking the genus for 
magazines and newspapers.163 He apparently decided the genus was books.164 He 
held, in obiter, that by the usage of booksellers, which arose from comity between 
them, if one worked on and produced a certain work, he would be considered as its 
proprietor. However, their dealings consequently based on that comity, unless 
specifically sanctioned by the law of England, were not of a species, which was very 
necessary to encourage.165 The Lord Chancellor directed that the parties apply to try 
the matter at law, and then use any favourable outcome at law to dissolve the 
injunction.166 
 
The fourth case of Cook v Collingridge167 dealt with the balance between the 
business reputation and the reputation of the individual partners as an element of 
goodwill. In this 1825 case, Lord Eldon provided a definition of goodwill as “ . . . the 
value of the chance that the customers of partners retiring altogether will deal with 
those who purchase from such retiring partners and succeed to their establishment . . 
. .”168 His Lordship held that the chance of a purchaser of the partnership property 
retaining the old customers could not be treated as of no speculative value.169 He 
held that this value could be determined by resort to the previous 3 or 4 years 
profits.170 
 
The fifth case was that of England v Downs.171 It linked the custom of past business 
behaviour with the likelihood of it continuing into the future. In this 1842 case, Lord 
Langdale MR defined goodwill as follows: “It is the chance or probability that 
custom will be had at a certain place of business in consequence of the way in which 
that business has been previously carried on.”172 
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At the beginning of this section, a general principle for goodwill was argued to be 
the value in the probability of the business continuing to maintain its connection 
with buyers to induce custom in the same way. This principle was necessarily 
general. However, it may now be limited by the following: issues of local custom as 
opposed to a crown grant of monopoly, nostrums, trade comity, business reputation, 
and, likelihood of continuing custom. This process of limitation can particularise the 
sources of damage in passing-off. Arguably the general principle may now be limited 
to goodwill is the value in the probability of the business continuing to maintain its 
connection with customers of good disposition to it, to induce local custom by 
means of its own nostrums and reputation, in the same way as in the past. 
 
For the purposes of the thesis, this particularisation of sources of damage to goodwill 
might be used to uncover areas of strict liability within passing-off. This newly-
limited principle suggests that goodwill was an interest uniquely susceptible to 
damage by misrepresentations as to the ownership of business nostrums and 
reputation. Arguably, these nostrums, and the business reputation together, could 
affect the business’s ability to induce local custom, by affecting purchasers’ better 
disposition towards the business than to its competitors. It was suggested, in the 
above discussion of local custom, that custom within goodwill was to be treated like 
contract, breach of which required no proof of intent. Therefore, damage to goodwill 
of this kind would require no proof of intent. 
 
The Advocaat Case173 confirmed goodwill as the interest damaged in passing-off. 
Having discussed custom within goodwill, and ways in which goodwill could be 
damaged within the context of passing-off, the discussion now turns to an analysis of 
the Advocaat Case.174 
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D   Amending the Scope of Passing-Off 
 
1   The Advocaat Case 
 
The investigation in this chapter centres around the House of Lords Advocaat Case,175 
because Wadlow stated in his history of the tort that passing-off was essentially 
complete with the House of Lords judgment in that case.176 This section examines 
The Advocaat Case,177 looking for whether this process of completion might have 
been related to any strict liability structure within the tort of passing-off, and if so, 
how. 
 
In the Advocaat Case,178 the plaintiffs, Erven Warnink BV and Victoria Wine Co 
Ltd, appealed against a decision of the Court of Appeal of 19 April 1978 allowing an 
appeal by the defendants, J. Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd and H. Keeling & Co., from 
the judgment of Goulding J given on 29 July 1977. Warnink had been granted an 
injunction restraining Townend from advertising, offering for sale, selling or 
distributing any product under the name or description of ‘advocaat’. The appeal was 
allowed.179 
 
In The Advocaat Case180 the facts were stated by Lord Diplock, and paraphrased thus. 
The plaintiffs manufactured and distributed an alcoholic drink known as 'advocaat'. It 
was made out of a mixture of eggs and spirits. Advocaat was a distinct and 
recognisable drink made almost exclusively in the Netherlands by a number of other 
manufacturers as well as the plaintiffs. It was sold in England for many years. After 
heavy advertising, it became a popular drink in England, where the name 'advocaat' 
had acquired a substantial reputation and goodwill. The defendants manufactured an 
alcoholic drink in England out of dried eggs and Cyprus sherry, properly called an 
egg-flip, which they marketed as 'Old English Advocaat'. Because their product 
contained sherry rather than spirits less excise duty was payable on it and it could 
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therefore be sold at a lower price than Dutch advocaat. The two drinks were not so 
different than an inexperienced or casual drinker would think they were different. 
Even though the defendants had not passed off their product as that of the plaintiffs, 
the plaintiffs applied for an injunction restraining the defendants from selling or 
distributing under the name 'advocaat' any product, not made out of eggs and spirits 
without the addition of wine. They claimed they were members of a class consisting 
of all those who had a right to use the name and as such were entitled to protect the 
name by a passing-off action. The judge granted the injunction, but on appeal by the 
defendants the Court of Appeal discharged the injunction and dismissed the action on 
the ground that the name 'advocaat' was purely descriptive and not distinctive. The 
plaintiffs appealed.181 
 
From this, the key facts were three. First, the name “advocaat” had acquired a 
substantial reputation and goodwill through advertising. Second, it was unlikely that 
the defendant’s product could be confused with the plaintiff’s product at the time of 
purchase. Third, the plaintiffs were members of a class consisting of all those who 
claimed a right to use the name “advocaat”. The defendants appeared to have found a 
way of using the name “advocaat” and paying less excise taxes than the rightful 
claimants of that name. The House of Lords allowed the appeal and Lord Diplock’s 
speech represented the majority view of the House. His argument ran in 13 
substantiated propositions, analyzed as follows. 
 
Lord Diplock’s first proposition might be restated this way. His Lordship stated that 
this was an action for passing-off. It was not in its classic form of a trader 
representing his own goods as the goods of somebody else.182 Rather, it was the 
extended form first recognized and applied by Danckwerts J in the 1959 J Bollinger 
v Costa Brava Wine Co Ltd (the Spanish Champagne Case).183 In the Spanish 
Champagne Case,184 the facts were stated. 
On the hearing of preliminary points of law in an action by the plaintiffs (suing 
on behalf of themselves and all other producers of wine from grapes grown in 
the Champagne district of France) for an injunction to restrain the defendants 
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from applying the description "Spanish Champagne" to wine made in Spain or 
made from grapes grown there, for a declaration that "Spanish Champagne" 
was a false trade description of such wine and for damages, the court made the 
following assumptions of fact. The plaintiffs carried on business in the 
Champagne district of France. For many years their wine had been known in 
the trade as "Champagne" and had a high reputation. Members of the public or 
in the trade ordering or seeing wine advertised as "Champagne" would expect 
to get wine produced in Champagne from grapes grown there. The defendants 
were marketing a wine not produced in the Champagne district and were 
selling it under the name of "Spanish Champagne". The plaintiffs alleged, in 
addition to other causes of action, breach of statutory duty under s 2(2) of the 
Merchandise Marks Act, 1887, as amended by s 4 of the Merchandise Marks 
Act, 1953.185  
 
The Court held that it was unlawful competition for a trader to associate with his 
product a name or description, without any natural association, to use the reputation 
and goodwill of other traders who genuinely indicated the product origin.186 
 
Lord Diplock’s second proposition was essentially thus. The question of law was 
whether the House of Lords should approve this extended concept of the cause of 
action for passing-off. His Lordship said that this question was one of legal policy.187 
Arguing for this approval, Lord Diplock argued that no purchaser of Keeling's Old 
English Advocaat thought or would be likely to think it to be goods supplied by 
Warnink or to be any make of Dutch advocaat. Thus, Warnink had no cause of action 
for passing-off in its classic form.188 
 
However his Lordship noted that the trial judge was satisfied of the following five 
points. First, the name 'advocaat' was understood by the public in England to denote 
a distinct and recognisable species of beverage.189 Second, Warnink's product was 
genuinely indicated by that name and had gained reputation and goodwill under it.190 
Third, Keeling's product had no natural association with the word 'advocaat'. It was 
an egg and wine drink properly described as an egg-flip. However, advocaat was an 
egg and spirit drink. These were different beverages and known as different to the 
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public.191 Fourth, members of the public believed and had been deliberately induced 
by Keeling to believe, without confusion, that in buying their Old English Advocaat 
they were in fact buying advocaat.192 Fifth, Keeling's deception of the public had 
caused and, unless prevented, would continue to cause, damage to Warnink in the 
trade. It would also cause damage to the goodwill of their business, both directly in 
the loss of sales and indirectly in the debasement of the reputation attaching to the 
name 'advocaat'. This was if it was permitted to be used for alcoholic egg drinks 
generally, rather than only to those that were spirit based.193 
 
Thus the judge found a species of goods, reputation and goodwill, use of a name 
without a natural association, that the public was misled and that there was damage 
to Warnink caused by this deception of the public. This was arguably not dissimilar 
to the classical trinity for passing-off.194 
 
Lord Diplock’s third proposition was to the following effect. His Lordship recalled 
that unfair trading as a wrong actionable at the suit of other traders who thereby 
suffered loss of business or goodwill might take a variety of forms. These would be 
such as conspiracy to injure a person in his trade or business, slander of goods, or 
that described as passing-off.195 He described passing-off as most protean among the 
other forms of unfair trading.196 In considering Lord Diplock’s use of the term 
‘protean’, his Lordship may have meant merely that the tort was more chameleon-
like, or variable, than other torts. 
 
Lord Diplock’s fourth proposition ran this way. Arguably continuing his Proteus 
analogy, his Lordship added that the forms that unfair trading took would change 
depending upon how trade was carried on and on how business reputation and 
goodwill were acquired.197 His Lordship remarked as follows. 
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Emerson's maker of the better mousetrap if secluded in his house built in the 
woods would today be unlikely to find a path beaten to his door in the absence 
of a costly advertising campaign to acquaint the public with the excellence of his 
wares.198 
 
Lord Diplock’s fifth proposition proposed as follows. Lord Diplock stated that 
someone who sold goods correctly described as manufactured by him or her, in fact 
as an inferior class or quality, but misrepresenting those goods as a superior class or 
quality, might well injure the goodwill of another manufacturer’s business.199 Such a 
form of misrepresentation was held in the 1915 case of A G Spalding & Bros v A W 
Gamage Ltd200 to be actionable. In that case, reported Lord Diplock, Lord Parker 
regarded extending this form of misrepresentation to the action in passing-off, as a 
consequence of recognizing that what the law protected by a passing-off action was a 
trader's property in his business or goodwill.201 Arguably, this proposition 
distinguished an inferior class of goods from an inferior quality of goods. It 
suggested that an inferior class might be related to the concept commercial rank 
discussed in chapter 2, above. 
 
Lord Diplock’s sixth proposition made these determinations. His lordship held that 
the significance of this decision in the law of passing-off was that misrepresenting 
one’s own goods as the goods of someone else was not really a separate genus of 
actionable wrong. Instead, it was a particular species of wrong included in a wider 
genus.202 Lord Herschell had discussed this in the 1896 case of Reddaway v 
Banham,203 as follows: 
I am unable to see why a man should be allowed in this way more than in any 
other to deceive purchasers into the belief that they are getting what they are not, 
and thus to filch the business of a rival.204 
 
Lord Diplock’s seventh proposition stated thus. Deploying the early phase of judicial 
reasoning by analogy, Lord Diplock then noted that A G Spalding & Bros v A W 
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Gamage Ltd205 and the later cases made it possible to identify five characteristics of a 
valid cause of action for passing-off. These five were expressed as follows. 
. . . a misrepresentation; made by a trader in the course of trade; to prospective 
customers of his or ultimate consumers of goods or services supplied by him; 
which is calculated to injure206 the business or goodwill of another trader (in the 
sense that this is a reasonably foreseeable consequence); and which causes 
actual damage to a business or goodwill of the trader by whom the action is 
brought or, in a quia timet action, will probably do so.207 
 
Lord Diplock’s eighth proposition explained the following. His lordship warned that 
in formulating general propositions of English law, there was a need to beware of the 
logical fallacy of the undistributed middle.208 Schuyler wrote that the fallacy of the 
undistributed middle is a logical fallacy occurring in syllogisms. For example: All P 
is M, All S is M, therefore all S is P. The fallacy of the undistributed middle consists 
in the fact that only a part of the middle is compared with the extremes in the two 
premises, and it is not certain that it is the same part. The extremes are not compared 
with the same thing, and there is no reason for inferring their relations to each 
other.209 
 
The effect of this would be arguably as follows. It did not follow that because all 
passing-off actions could be shown to present the above five characteristics, that all 
factual situations, which displayed these characteristics, gave rise to a cause of action 
for passing off.210 A market example of this breadth of behavior included what the 
common law described as mere puff,211 dealt with in the 1866-7 matter of Dimmock 
v Hallett.212 The doctrine underlying puffery was embodied in the civil law rule 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 (1915) 84 LJ Ch 449, 449-456. 
206 The wordage “calculated to injure” arguably represents an interpretation of the natural 
consequences of the defendant’s actions. It does not appear to imply that the defendant calculated 
anything. 
207 [1979] AC 731, 742. 
208 Ibid. 
209 A Schuyler The Principles of Logic (American Book Company, 1869), 50-53. 
210 [1979] AC 731, 742. 
211 Puff. It is known also as “puffery”. Puffery is a representation, statement, or conduct that overtly 
over-exaggerates the attributes or characteristics of some product or service and is not intended to 
be an offer to be relied upon. Puffery consists of statements commending particular subject matter 
and not statements of fact or promissory statements. The non-specific language of a puff fails to 
satisfy the criteria of contractual obligation for the reason that no contract was intended. Carlill v 
Carbolic Smoke Ball Co[1893] 1 QB 256; [1891-94] All ER Rep 127. 
212 (1866-67) LR 2 Ch App 21. 
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simplex commendation non obligat,213 inferring its genesis from customary law. In 
Dimmock v Hallett,214 Turner LJ held as follows. 
Thus I think that a mere general statement that land is fertile and improvable, whereas 
part of it has been abandoned as useless, cannot, except in extreme cases — as, for 
instance, where a considerable part is covered with water, or otherwise irreclaimable — 
be considered such a misrepresentation as to entitle a purchaser to be discharged. In the 
present case, I think the statement is to be looked at as a mere flourishing description by 
an auctioneer.215 
 
This suggested that the puffery must be quite extreme before the court would regard 
it as a misrepresentation. However, since extreme puffery was purely a judicial 
determination as to misrepresentation, necessarily extrinsic to the intentions of the 
parties, this was arguably an indicium of strict liability. 
 
Lord Diplock’s ninth proposition ran this way. Lord Diplock noted that parliament 
had progressively intervened on behalf of consumers. He stated that this intervention 
was to impose on traders a higher standard of commercial candour than the legal 
maxim caveat emptor216 required of them. Parliament did this by criminalizing 
misleading descriptions of the character or quality of goods. He noted this was 
realized in the Merchandise Marks Acts 1887 to 1953,217 as well as in even more 
rigorous later statutes.218 However, no civil action arose from this series of statutes. 
He cited London Armoury Co Ltd v Ever Ready Co (Great Britain) Ltd219 as 
authority for this determination. In that case, Tucker J stated that, in order to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 Simplex commendation non obligat. Simple commendation can only be regarded as a mere 
invitation to a customer without any obligation as regards the quality of goods. James Morwood 
(ed), The Oxford Latin Mini Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 1995). 
214 (1866-67) LR 2 Ch App 21. 
215 (1866-67) LR 2 Ch App 21, 23. 
216 . . . the maxim, at law is, caveat emptor: let the buyer take care and inquire. If he is told falsehoods, 
then he has a right of action; but if he makes no inquiries, at law he has no remedy, though he may 
in equity. This is the distinction between fraud in the legal and equitable sense, though even in 
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Lord Chief Justice with an Introduction Containing a History of the Case and an Examination of the 
Cases at Law and Equity applicable to it; or Illustrating the Doctrine of Commercial Fraud 
(Stevens and Haynes, 1870) Introduction, 12. 
217 Beginning in 1862, the Merchandise Marks Act of the United Kingdom made it a criminal offence 
to imitate a trademark of another person with intent to defraud or to enable another to defraud. 
218 [1979] AC 731, 743. 
219 [1941] 1 KB 742, 742-754. 
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determine whether the intention of the statute is to preclude private remedy, the court 
must decide whether the harm the plaintiff sought to be remedied by the statute was 
the kind which the statute was intended to prevent. He stated that it was insufficient 
merely to plead that the plaintiff’s harm was due to a breach of the statute.220 
 
Lord Diplock’s tenth proposition disclosed a process of reasoning by analogy. Lord 
Diplock stated as follows. 
Where over a period of years there can be discerned a steady trend in legislation 
which reflects the view of successive parliaments as to what the public interest 
demands in a particular field of law, development of the common law in that 
part of the same field which has been left to it ought to proceed on a parallel 
rather than a diverging course.221 
 
Lord Diplock’s eleventh proposition stated that it was required to identify reasonably 
precisely the members of a relevant class of traders. They ought to be those whose 
products bore a particular word or name so distinctive that their right to use it 
truthfully as a descriptive term of their product became a valuable part of the 
goodwill of each of them.222 
 
Lord Diplock’s twelfth proposition stated that goodwill was generated by the market 
reputation that species of product has gained by its distinctive qualities. Therefore, if 
the type of product that had acquired the reputation could be identified, then the 
members of the class entitled to share in its goodwill could be ascertained.223 
 
In order to do this, Lord Diplock required the following three steps to be taken. First 
define the type of product. Second, establish that it had recognizable qualities and 
distinguish it from every other type of product that competed with it in the market 
and which had gained for it in that market a reputation and goodwill. Third, establish 
that the plaintiff's own business would suffer more than minimal damage to its 
goodwill by the defendant's misrepresenting his product as being of that type.224 
From this formula, it appeared arguably that the boundary between puffery and fraud 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 [1941] 1 KB 742, 748, 749. 
221 [1979] AC 731, 743. 
222 [1979] AC 731, 744. 
223 This was arguably the same in effect as the old London custom of preventing business of and with 
merchant strangers. 
224 [1979] AC 731, 747-748. 
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was situated at somewhat more than minimal damage to the plaintiff’s goodwill. 
 
Lord Diplock’s thirteenth proposition determined that, in the subject case, prima 
facie225 as the law then stood, the presence of those characteristics set out in the 
previous paragraph, above, was enough to prove passing-off. This was unless there 
was also present some exceptional negativing feature. His lordship found no such 
exceptional features of the case.226 Thus, Warnink’s appeal was allowed and the 
injunction restraining Townend was permitted to stand. 
 
It is arguable that Lord Diplock appeared to have described by analogy a corollary of 
the old custom prohibiting the false avouching the goods of foreigners, where the 
term ‘foreigners’ meant people without specific entitlement to trade in their own 
name. Arguably, this had been a proscription against a nascent or preceding form of 
passing-off. The rationale for this was because it recognised a regulatory problem in 
correctly representing the source of the goods for sale.227 Such prohibition was 
effected by prescribing who could, and who could not, use certain trade names to 
induce customer good disposition towards the business. This article prohibited the 
selling of goods as accredited goods, when they were really made by unaccredited 
people.  As such, the custom was a nascent form of regulating entitlement to be a 
member of a class using a trade name with customary authority.  
 
 
E Conclusion 
 
In order to conduct this chapter’s investigation into whether the tort of passing-off 
was a strict liability tort, and if so, how and why it became a tort of strict liability, the 
chapter’s focus was to follow the concept of fraud, as an underlying concept, through 
breach of custom, and then to an analysis of damage of goodwill in the context of the 
law of passing-off. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 This is arguably an indicium of strict liability. 
226 [1979] AC 731, 748. 
227 If any freeman of the city avouched the goods of foreigners to be theirs he would lose the liberty of 
the city. Article xlii, Arnold’s, above 60, fo 4. 
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The outcomes of this chapter might be argued as follows. Fraud as a genus was likely 
characterized as an injurious breach of commercial custom. In this respect, as soon as 
a product’s nostrums were exposed as not secret to one business, purchasers’ good 
disposition to deal exclusively with the trader would be immediately affected, with 
or without intent. Passing-off would amount to improper dealing in a competitor’s 
nostrums, and therefore would be fraudulent. Certain customs of London had 
maintained privileged trade groups where nostrums could be shared, controlled and 
kept secret from non-Londoner strangers, or non-freemen. In the Advocaat Case,228 
Lord Diplock worked a process of reasoning by analogy to amend the law of 
passing-off. Arguably, he used the doctrine of the equity of the statute, which was a 
mode of applying judicial policy to create common law by analogy, and the outcome 
of which was a rebuttable conclusion. Thus, the form of passing-off reasoned by 
Lord Diplock had a rebuttable elemental structure. 
 
The form of passing-off before the time of Lord Diplock’s reasoning by analogy was, 
per Wadlow’s argument,229 that the statements of Parker J (as he then was) in the 
1909 case of Burberrys v Cording230 contained the classic statement of the principles 
of passing-off in its traditional form. It was stated such that a trader must not 
represent his goods as the goods of somebody else.231 After the time of Lord 
Diplock’s reasoning by analogy, the tort arguably took the following amended form, 
confirmatory of the Spanish Champagne Case.232 It was unlawful for a trader to seek 
to attach to his product a name or description with which the product had no natural 
association, to make use of reputation and goodwill of other traders of which the 
origin was genuinely indicated by the name or description.233 Because of its 
dependance on goodwill, this raised the issue of reemergent old London custom, as 
to proper source, to the tort of passing-off, a breach of which arguably would be 
characterized by inherent policy as fraud, requiring no proof of intent.
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229 Wadlow, above 1, 32. 
230 (1909) 100 LT 985, 986-993. 
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232 [1960] Ch 262, 283, 284. 
233 Ibid. 
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VI  CONCLUSION 
 
A   Introduction 
 
The research question of the thesis is in two parts. ‘Has the historical development of 
the tort of passing off resulted in the tort becoming a strict liability tort? If so, why 
and how did this development take place?’ In order to address the research question, 
the thesis objectives: 
(a) provided an overview of the legal norms underlying the origins of the tort 
deriving from a hierarchy of gilds, counties and the crown, with restricted resort 
to the Royal Courts;  
(b) discussed the seminal 16th Century Elizabethan Gloucestershire Clothier’s 
Case,1 in the context of how the later tort both began and completed the passage 
from gild and county jurisprudence into the royal courts system; 
(c) examined the so-called completion phase and more protean nature of the tort 
of passing-off in the context of the character of good-will, fraud and causation 
and as set out in the Advocaat Case;2 
(d) examined the original elements of the tort of passing-off within ancient legal 
custom and pleading narratives, to reveal a dynamic that influenced the shape of 
the law. The thesis identified these underlying elements, customs and narratives 
so that scholars could rethink and reinterpret current views of the tort of passing-
off to suit changing commercial and consumer needs. 
 
By way of definition, and as already stated above in chapters 1 and 2, above, 
Morison wrote in 1956 that the term passing off indicated as follows. 
 . . . the act of offering goods for sale with an accompanying misrepresentation, 
either by words or by conduct as to the origin of the goods whereby the purchaser 
had been misled and business had been diverted from the plaintiff to the 
defendant.3 
 
Although this characterization of the tort represented what was known commonly as 
the classical trinity,4 it appears that the elemental structure of the tort exhibited some 
instability. The thesis suggested this instability was due to an underlying and re-
emergent bundle of trade customs, which when breached, amounted to a strict 
liability tort of passing-off. These customs were discussed in chapters 2 and 3. It also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Later identified by Professor Baker as J G v Samford (1584) unrep, in J H Baker An Introduction to 
English Legal History, (Butterworths LexisNexis, 4th ed, 2002), 459. 
2 [1979] AC 731, 731-756. 
3 W L Morison ‘Unfair Competition and “Passing-Off” The flexibility of a formula’ (1956) 2 Sydney 
Law Review, 50-65, 56.  
4 C Wadlow The Law of Passing-off, Unfair Competition by Misrepresentation (Sweet & Maxwell, 
3rd ed, 2004), 6. 
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suggested that, in the same way, fraud remained as an underlying and re-emergent 
aspect of the tort. Chapter 4 dealt with the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case, building 
on those aspects of chapters 2 and 3, which provided an understanding of the 
background issues in that case. It sought to clarify the common law consequences of 
that case on passing-off. 
 
The thesis limited its analytic time frame to end essentially at the 1979 Advocaat 
Case.5 This limitation to thesis scope was due to complexities introduced by the 
subsequent statutory development of the consumer law. The Advocaat Case6 
arguably represented a judicial amendment to the scope of the tort of passing-off. It 
was analyzed in some detail in chapter 5, building on Farrar’s discussion of judicial 
reasoning by analogy within the doctrine of precedent.7 Thesis discussion suggested 
that passing-off was amended by the incorporation of those criminal wrongs 
previously proscribed in a series of certain trademark criminal statutes. Further, this 
thesis has suggested that the Advocaat Case8 allowed earlier customary laws to re-
emerge into the tort of passing-off, by confirming goodwill as the principal aspect of 
a business damaged by the act of passing off. The thesis also conducted in chapter 5 
a detailed investigation into the historical development of the law of goodwill, to try 
and identify what aspects of goodwill might have been uniquely subject to damage 
by passing off. 
 
B   Chapter 2 
 
Chapter 2 dealt with research objective “a”, which was to provide an overview of the 
legal norms underlying the origins of the tort deriving from a hierarchy of gilds, 
counties and the crown, with restricted resort to the Royal Courts. The chapter found 
that passing-off was a conjectural argument based on facts, and therefore one of 
reverse onus. Its review of strict liability in tort set out six propositions 
circumscribing strict liability in tort, for the purposes of the scope of this thesis. This 
review suggested that absolute liability in tort be regarded as no more than a limiting 
form of strict liability, for the purposes of the thesis. 
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7 John H Farrar (1997) ‘Reasoning by Analogy in the Law’ 9(2) Bond Law Review, 149. 
8 [1979] AC 731, 742. 
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The chapter identified the norms of commercial ranks, by which a person of higher 
rank could have locus standi to sue a person of lower rank, in matters of personal 
property. Powers of accreditation and confiscation might have been protective 
reactions by those of lower supervisory commercial rank to the possibility of a 
reverse onus action against them in quo warranto. The crown controlled the power of 
the counties by common law actions in quo warranto, the counties controlled the 
power of the gilds by common law actions in quo warranto and the gilds controlled 
the work of the artisans and apprentices by inspection, accreditation and sometimes 
confiscation of their work products. This process of certification, at the base of the 
commercial ranks system was left for later discussion in chapter 3, because 
certification used marks and seals. 
 
The chapter found that a nascent form of passing-off existed well before this action 
was commenced in the royal courts. Londoners had a superior right over foreigners 
to sue in matters of misrepresentation of the source of manufactured goods, where 
foreigners were seen as anyone not accredited as free of the City. The examination of 
the nature of the jurisdiction of the courts of the city of London showed that the 
London Town Clerk could make out several prerogative orders, and that the Court of 
Hustings had complete control over all real and personal property. It could order 
attachment or sequestration. The cumulative effect of these prerogative orders in the 
London jurisdiction represented an old or nascent form of passing-off. 
 
Foreigners had no local rights in the London courts and Londoners could not be sued 
outside the walls of London. London’s customary jurisdiction appeared to give it 
complete power to prioritise the rights in London-sourced personal property over 
foreign-sourced personal property. This inferred a superior locus standi to sue by the 
Londoner freemen in matters of personal property, making the Londoner the plaintiff 
and the foreigner the defendant in old-style passing-off actions. 
 
The ancient customary laws of London were transmitted orally, then later, submitted 
to court by the Recorder, recognised by judicial notice, recorded and archived. 
London customary laws were not subject to desuetude. Thus, London might state its 
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own laws in the common interest and, by its prestige, influence laws elsewhere in 
England. This was how a nascent form of passing-off might have spread from 
London throughout England, and ultimately came to be considered in the later royal 
courts. The examination of the law of freedom of the City showed that the system of 
freedom of the city controlled the right to make a living as an artisan. The oath of a 
freeman included prohibition of a freeman’s name on foreign goods. By prohibiting 
the acts of passing off the goods of non-freemen, it appeared that foreigners suffered 
a disability making and selling their goods under any name in London. This was a 
key underlying reverse onus norm to a nascent form of passing-off. 
 
The crown brought the gilds under crown control to maintain commercial ranks 
among the masters, journeymen and apprentices. Artisan gild membership was both 
permission to and restriction on work, and as well, it was exclusion from the 
mercantile classes.  
 
Gild ordinances were structured to restrict entry into the trades through long 
apprenticeships and gild jurisprudence contained a nascent form of the later tort of 
passing-off, through the prohibition of commercial insubordination. The 
companies/gilds were given rank by crown authority to regulate craft and trades 
activities. It was very likely that the crown and parliament used the Evil May Day 
riot of 1517 ultimately to implement regulations for prohibiting misrepresentation of 
source within the sale of goods. 
 
Masters, and those of the same commercial rank, were the only ones who could trade 
in their own names. Those of lower commercial status could not. Gild regulatory 
power of search and seizure of goods was enforced nationally by the cities and gilds 
so that only masters could trade in their own names, and, wholesalers could trade in 
masters’ goods only by consent of the king. The companies were arranged into 
higher and lower ranks based on so-called wisdom and self-sufficiency, apparently to 
stamp out what was called deceit. 
 
The meaning of deceit and its relationship to fraud included an inference that 
insubordination was related to deceit, and the systematic stamping out of deceit 
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could not go so far as to derogate from the king’s will, or from the common profit of 
the people. Thus, deceit was somehow in dialectic with public opinion. Cited case 
law held that breaches of City of London customary law were dealt with on a strict 
liability basis, and were indicative of fraud by a process of vituperative public 
rhetoric. 
C   Chapter 3 
 
Chapter 3 dealt with research objective “a”. This chapter built on the chapter 2 
finding that commercial ranks were related to the differential levels of commercial 
status, as well as locus standi to sue in matters of personal property, and that such 
acts of insubordination constituted a nascent form of the later tort of passing-off. 
These commercial ranks were represented graphically on royal seals at the higher 
level of status, and represented as strata of trademarks at the lower levels of 
commercial status. 
 
The graphic representations on royal seals were related through symbolic 
representation to a strict liability enforcement regime against passed off goods. 
Grants made in charters were made by the sovereign under the royal seal, and these 
seals and the grants followed certain symbolic customary rules. Thus, a royal seal 
had its own administrative apparatus, based on these old customs, which flowed 
down through the commercial ranks, using the enforcement devices of prerogative 
orders. Various strata of administration were used to enforce applications of royal 
seals. The king had an administrative system to use the privy seal to create actionable 
warrants for the application of the great seal. Seals passed through four levels of 
public administration before validating a grant or charter. 
 
With prerogative orders, the Court of Hustings had complete control of matters 
resembling the later tort of passing-off. Since these administrative procedures were 
based on old customary law, a breach of the administrative rules imported strict 
liability. 
 
The swan mark schema showed how the crown seal customary administrative 
system, set up by the crown, might have manifested lower down the commercial 
193	  
	  
ranks. Administrative rules were applied by the king’s officials to the operation of an 
administrative registry, by which any derogation by the common man from these 
administrative rules would render him strictly liable in tort. Should this theoretical 
common man represent that personal property that he made per industriam were his 
own property, then this would be a legal misrepresentation, because he could never 
claim property in what belonged to someone of a higher commercial status. 
 
The chapter’s examination of printers’ devices found that a wrongful use of another’s 
printers’ device might be heard in the Star Chamber, by inquisitorial process, 
gathering and applying all the existing ancient customs and applicable statutes. In the 
alternative, a breach could be tried in the reverse onus civilian Court of Chivalry, if 
the printer’s device was heraldic. Printers’ devices were indicative of express crown 
licence to publish. The clergy administered these licences and a breach of licence to 
publish could be punished in Star Chamber as for the underlying legal norm of 
sedition against the king. In general, breaches of printers’ devices were not subject to 
a common law tort regime of passing-off, because printers’ devices were regulated 
by the crown, and this system of regulation was operated by the clergy on behalf of 
the crown. 
 
Merchants would use proprietary marks to recover stolen property using registry 
systems, a registry system being a bundle of customary legal norms. Since stolen 
property could be rebranded and passed off as the products of another manufacturer, 
registries in various forms were set up by a variety of statutes, merchants’ customs 
and international regulations. This meant that any wrongful dealings in the 
customary property rights in the transported goods, which could result in passing off, 
were dealt with on a reverse onus strict liability basis, and were indicative of fraud. 
 
Damage to gild goodwill was at the peril (suo periculo) of its artisans. This common 
law doctrine of suo periculo was outlined previously in the section on strict liability, 
in chapter 2. Each market operated under its own seal. Seals with wordage on them 
were for those markets of lower social rank, while wordless seals were for those of 
higher rank. Higher rank was represented by seals with graphic symbols, mimetic of 
a cognate attribute of royal seals. Thus, faulty work would be traced to the offending 
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artisan via a product seal, and the power of enforcement was traceable to its source 
through symbolic means. The artisan was convicted on a strict liability basis, purely 
by evidence of product quality, which it might be alleged caused scandal to the gild, 
scandal being a certain vituperative rhetoric already creating damage in the public 
domain. 
 
Properly certified gild marks would represent an assurance to the public that the so-
marked goods were the outcome of authorized gild workmanship and properly 
authorized inspection. Building on this concept of corporate propriety, any breach of 
an assurance to the public would be complete at the time of public perception of 
breach, regardless of the defendant’s intent. This would be so, because the mark was 
a public mode of symbolic communication to the consumer. 
 
D   Chapter 4 
 
Chapter 4 dealt with research objective “b”, which was to discuss the seminal 16th 
Century Elizabethan Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case,9 in the context of how the later 
tort both began and completed the passage from gild and county jurisprudence into 
the royal courts system. The chapter also dealt with research objective “d”, which 
was to examine the original elements of the tort of passing-off within ancient legal 
custom and pleading narratives, to reveal a dynamic that influenced the shape of the 
law.10 
 
This chapter built on the propositions in chapter 2 that gild business norms, and other 
customary norms, were strict liability when enforced and were indicative of fraud. It 
also built on the findings in chapter 3 that printers’ devices were generally not 
subject to a common law passing-off regime, but instead, were subject to direct 
crown administrative regulation via the clergy. 
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production of indigenous knowledge in intellectual property law (Doctoral thesis at University of 
New South Wales, 2004). 
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In the 1618 case of Southern v How,11 a prima facie theory was argued for the 
plaintiff that, where one was party to a fraud, all which followed by reason of that 
fraud would be taken to have been done by him.12 This argument was held to be 
ineffective, on the basis of both pleadings and opinions by the judges, in the old 
Gloucestershire Clothiers’ Case. In the various manuscripts of the Gloucestershire 
Clothier’s Case, the court held that its action on the case did not lie, because it was 
damnum absque injuria to the other. The court stated that no action for deceit lay 
against a person who acted entirely lawfully.  
 
Regulation by private monopoly greatly reduced the need for consumers to conduct 
prepurchase inspections. The crown acted against the customary legal norm of caveat 
emptor,13 leading to the creation of consumer-based reverse onus actions against 
product misrepresentation at the point of sale. The consequences in Star Chamber 
inferred continuing crown policy attempts to prohibit widespread deceit in the trades. 
In Star Chamber case of Jupp, the court characterised the offence of Jupp as a false 
cozenage, which would discourage buyers from relying on the credit of the seal. 
Arguably, this added force to the argument on royal seals and trade marks in chapter 
3 that a mis-use of a seal or mark was dealt with on a reverse onus, and therefore 
strict liability basis. Thus, Star Chamber acted in favour of seals representing product 
quality, and punished Jupp for using a false seal. This suggested a crown interest in 
stamping out any rhetorical act that derogated from the symbolic meaning of an 
authorised seal. It also appeared to agree with and restore the failed argument in 
Southern v How.14 
 
The pleadings in the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case were of a classical declamatory 
style. This was significant because it would confirm the importance and practical 
effect of pleading various underlying legal norms of customary law and status. It 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Cro Jac 468, 471; 79 ER 400. 
12 Cro Jac 468, 469. 
13 . . . the maxim, at law is, caveat emptor: let the buyer take care and inquire. If he is told falsehoods, 
then he has a right of action; but if he makes no inquiries, at law he has no remedy, though he may 
in equity. This is the distinction between fraud in the legal and equitable sense, though even in 
equity there is no fraud in mere non-disclosure unless there is a duty to disclose, which there is not 
if the parties are in a position of equality in the transaction – that is, of equal knowledge and means 
of knowledge; and the doctrine of equitable fraud would only apply to matters in the knowledge 
only of the vendor, which he ought to disclose to the vendee. Finlayson, above 19. 
14 Cro Jac 468, 471. 
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adds further support to the chapter 2 finding that passing-off was argument by 
conjectural facts rather than only of elemental structure, and thus, a strict liability 
style of action. The following questions flowed from the notion of a declamatory 
form of pleadings in the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case, setting out the areas in 
which a hypothetical mesne judgment could have been formed. The first was 
whether a custom of London had been breached, because if so, building on what was 
suggested in chapter 2, litigation of this breach would have been treated as strict 
liability. The second was whether the wrong inferred from a criminal statute could be 
litigated as a civil matter and indicative of fraud. In Chapter 5, below, there was to be 
a discussion of this issue, within an analysis of the Advocaat Case.15 The third 
question was whether an apparently wholly lawful act could be deceptive, by means 
of the indirect nature of the damage it caused. This was addressed and investigated as 
the doctrine of secondary meaning. 
 
In the 1896 case of Reddaway v Banham,16 Lord Herschell discussed the doctrine of 
secondary meaning when he deduced that no man might make a direct false 
representation to a purchaser that enabled that purchaser to tell a lie to someone else 
who would be the ultimate customer.17 The chapter showed that this deduction would 
imply strict liability into the actions of subsequent sellers unaware of the lie. This 
represented a re-emergence by restatement of the failed argument in Southern v 
How.18 It suggested that when non-gild members engaged in subsequent product 
resale, nevertheless they were bound by the same ancient commercial customs as had 
bound gild members, an action for a breach of which imported strict liability and was 
indicative of fraud. 
E   Chapter 5 
 
Chapter 5 dealt with research objective “c”, which was to examine the so-called 
completion phase and more protean nature of the tort of passing-off in the context of 
the character of good-will, fraud and causation and as set out in the case Erven 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 [1979] AC 731, 731-756. 
16 [1896] AC 199, 212, 213. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Cro Jac 468, 471; 79 ER 400. 
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Warnick BV v Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd,19 (‘Advocaat Case’). Chapter 5 built 
further on the finding in chapter 2 that commercial ranks were related to the 
differential levels of commercial status, as well as to locus standi to sue in matters of 
personal property, and that such acts of commercial insubordination constituted the 
clash of interests in a nascent version of the later tort of passing-off. It also built on 
the chapter 3 finding that marks and seals were controlled administratively in 
registries, by a clergy-based administration, an administrative breach of which would 
be cognate to strict liability misrepresentation. 
 
This chapter showed that civil commercial fraud was a genus of law rather than 
either a tort or a crime. Thus, fraud in commerce was not a law, but a doctrine of 
sorts. In the context of passing-off, fraud was likely characterized as a seriously 
injurious breach by insubordination of commercial custom in a context of established 
commercial ranks. Certain customs of London had maintained privileged trade 
groups, where artisan nostrums could be shared, controlled and kept secret from non-
Londoner strangers, also called non-freemen. When non-freemen engaged in 
commercial activity as if they were freemen, this would be an act of impropriety 
inferring damage. In this respect, as soon as a product’s nostrums were exposed as no 
longer secret to one specific business, purchasers’ good disposition to deal 
exclusively with that trader would be immediately affected, with or without the 
specifically-directed intent of the person causing the exposure. Passing-off would 
amount to an apparent improper dealing in a competitor’s nostrums, and therefore 
would be inherently fraudulent. The underlying theory was that since development 
and maintenance of these nostrums involved significant prior investment, damage 
caused by their dissipation could be quantified on an accounting basis. 
 
In the Advocaat Case,20 Lord Diplock worked a process of reasoning by analogy 
apparently to amend the elemental structure of the law of passing-off. He used the 
doctrine of the equity of the statute, which was a mode of applying judicial policy to 
create common law by analogy, and the structural outcome of which was a rebuttable 
conclusion. His Lordship converted criminal statutory provisions from a series of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 [1979] AC 731, 739-748. 
20 Ibid. 
198	  
	  
Mercantile Marks Acts into civil wrongs using this judicial technique. Thus, the form 
of passing-off reasoned by Lord Diplock in the Advocaat Case21 had a rebuttable 
elemental structure - characterising the tort as more protean than other torts with 
stable definitions of their elements. This lent substantial force to the earlier finding in 
the thesis that passing-off was, rather, a tort based on conjectural arguments of fact, 
based on breaches of custom, and implying fraud. In this vein, chapter 5 showed a 
return to the classical trinity, after the Advocaat Case,22 demonstrating either 
residual instability to the tort’s elemental structure, or homeostasis. This lent even 
further weight to the thesis argument that passing-off was more likely an argument 
constituted by conjectural facts, such as for example within pleadings by classical 
declamatio, and as such, could only be reverse onus, and thus strict liability. 
 
The form of passing-off before the time of Lord Diplock’s Advocaat Case23 
reasoning by analogy was, per Wadlow’s argument,24 that the statements of Parker J 
(as he then was) in the 1909 case of Burberrys v Cording25 contained the classic 
statement of the principles of passing-off in its traditional form. It was stated that a 
trader must not represent his goods as the goods of somebody else.26 After the time 
of Lord Diplock’s Advocaat Case27 reasoning by analogy, the tort took the following 
amended form, confirming the decision in the Spanish Champagne Case.28 It was 
unlawful for a trader to seek to attach to his product a name or description with 
which the product had no natural association, to make use of reputation and goodwill 
of other traders of which the origin was genuinely indicated by the name or 
description.29 Because of its dependance on goodwill, this change suggested a re-
emergence of old London customary law, as to proper product source, to the tort of 
passing-off, a breach of which arguably would be characterized by inherent policy as 
fraud, requiring no proof of intent. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Wadlow, above 4, 32. 
25 (1909) 100 LT 985, 986-993. 
26 (1909) 100 LT 985, 987. 
27 [1979] AC 731, 739-748. 
28 [1960] Ch 262, 283, 284. 
29 Ibid. 
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F Significance and Key Findings 
 
This thesis contributed to knowledge by adding to the pool of historical research into 
policy issues affecting the legal relationship between buyers and sellers of goods. It 
acted to infer this knowledge within a historical study of the tort of passing-off. The 
thesis discussed re-emergent ancient customary laws concerning buyers and sellers 
of goods. It told of a metamorphosis of these customs from proscribed criminal 
wrongs into civil actions, relying on a classical view of customary law, as 
comprehending implied public consent.30 
 
The main thesis contributions to knowledge are a series of outcomes, described thus. 
First, the tort of passing-off was effectively cobbled together from prerogative writs, 
customary commercial laws and gild ordinances, including an old gild requirement 
for obedience to authority. It appeared that a nascent form of passing-off existed 
within gild ordinances of the middle-ages. All these inferred sources of law were 
strict liability in character. 
 
Second, commercial ranks were represented symbolically by a hierarchy of graphic 
marks. At the top were royal seals. At the bottom were individual artisan trademarks. 
A remedy for misuse of any of these marks would depend on its relative commercial 
rank. Each mark was somehow enforced by an administrative system, inferring 
reverse onus for infringement of use. 
 
Third, the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case failed as damnum absque injuria because 
the tucker’s handle mark indicated too low a commercial rank to generate locus 
standi to sue for its breach. The church controlled it, probably without a requirement 
for licensing. Old commercial customary law in the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case 
was pleaded as conjectural legally-charged facts in declamatory form, inferring a 
reverse onus jurisdiction. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The Rhetorica ad Herennium sets out six sources of law: nature; statute; custom; previous 
judgments; equity; and, agreement. Custom is defined in it as that which in the absence of any 
statute is by usage endowed with the force of statute law, which it defines as law set up by the 
sanction of the people. [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium (Loeb Classics Library, Harvard 
University Press, 2004), 91, 93; John Ayliffe Juris Canonici Anglicani (D Leach, 1776). 
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Fourth, the classical trinity of passing-off represented re-emergent a bundle of 
commercial customary law, a breach of which was characterized as commercial 
fraud, and dealt with on a reverse onus basis. 
 
The thesis concludes with a view that the tort of passing-off was cobbled together 
from old laws in which intention was mostly inferred. Otherwise stated, the onus of 
proof of innocence was reversed onto the defendant. The tort deals with disputes 
between people of different commercial status, inferring superior locus standi to sue 
by the person of higher commercial status. This ranking partially explained the 
plaintiff’s loss in the Gloucestershire Clothier’s Case, in which both the parties’ low 
commercial status was probably subsumed by church jurisdiction. The reverse onus 
nature of commercial fraud, as an underlying norm to passing-off, could not be 
abandoned as it was an inherent part of the passing-off argument. The thesis stated 
the operative old customary laws breached within the tort’s required elements and 
facts. In the result, the tort of passing-off is a strict liability tort. 
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